| Date: | 2012-05 |
| By: | Biliana Alexandrova-Kabadjova Sara Gabriela Castellanos Pascacio Alma L. García-Almanza |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2012-02&r=net |
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We investigate the payment card’s adoption rate under consumers’ and merchants’ awareness of network externalities, given two levels of Interchange Fees in a multiagent card market. For the purpose of our research, in multiple instances of the model (scenarios) the investigated effects are analyzed over the complete process of adoption, until the market’s saturation point is achieved. For each scenario, a comparison is made between two different levels of Interchange Fees and different degrees of consumers’ and merchants’ awareness. We model explicitly the interactions between consumers and merchants at the point of sale. We allow card issuers to charge consumers with fixed fees and provide net benefits from card usage, whereas acquirers can charge fixed and transactional fees to merchants.
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| Keywords: | Two-sided markets, financial services, network formation. |
| JEL: | D7 |
Monthly Archives: 六月 2012
Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: A level-k analysis2012
| Date: | 2012-04-23 |
| By: | Gill, David Prowse, Victoria |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38317&r=net |
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In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive ability: more cognitively able subjects choose numbers closer to equilibrium, converge more frequently to equilibrium play and earn more even as behavior approaches the equilibrium prediction. To understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning based on level-k reasoning. We find a systematic positive relationship between cognitive ability and levels; furthermore, the average level of more cognitively able subjects responds positively to the cognitive ability of their opponents, while the average level of less cognitively able subjects does not respond at all. Our results suggest that, in strategic environments, higher cognitive ability translates into better analytic reasoning and a better ‘theory of mind’
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| Keywords: | Cognitive ability; Bounded rationality; Learning; Convergence; Level-k; Nonequilibrium behavior; Beauty contest; Repeated games; Structural modeling; Theory of mind; Intelligence; Raven test |
| JEL: | D83 |
總體經濟學實驗文獻回顧 by Duffy
John Duffy (forthcoming) “Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research." Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2, Princeton University Press. link to PDF. (本站複本)
Notes by yinung
終於找到文獻回顧了! (哈, 其實以前已經找過了,… 人的記憶力真的很脆弱…)
總體經濟實驗之貢獻分類:
1) 總體經濟之個體基礎評估
an assessment of the micro-assumptions underlying macroeconomic models,
2) 總體模型中預期形成之理解
a better understanding of the dynamics of expectations which play a critical role in macroeconomic models,
3)解決多重均衡下的均衡選擇問題
a means of resolving equilibrium selection (coordination) problems in environments with multiple equilibria,
4) 驗證沒有現地之料之總體模型預測結果
validation of macroeconomic model predictions for which field data are not available and
5) 各種總體政策干預對個人形為之影響
the impact of various macroeconomic policy interventions on individual behavior.
1) 總體經濟之個體基礎評估 (to be done)
主題例如: intertemporal consumption and savings decisions, inflation and unemployment, economic growth, bank runs, monetary exchange, monetary or fiscal policy
本文主要內容 (to be done)
2. Dynamic, Intertemporal Optimization
Optimal Consumption/Savings Decisions, Exponential discounting and infinite horizons
3. Coordination Problems
Poverty Traps, Bank Runs, Resolving Coordination Problems: Sunspots, Resolving Coordination Problems: The Global Game Approach
4. Sectoral Macroeconomics
5. Macroeconomic Policies
Ricardian equivalence, Commitment versus discretion, Monetary policy decision-making, Fiscal and tax policies, Exponential or Hyperbolic Discounting, Expectation Formation,
Literature on Experiemnts on Ultimatum Game in Google scholar
Information in ultimatum games: An experimental study
RTA Croson – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1996 – Elsevier
… Author Keywords: Experiment; Ultimatum game; Fairness; Uncertainty; Framing;
Contingent weighting. JEL classification codes: C9; C72. Article Outline. • References.
Journal of Economic Behavior Organisation ELSEVIER Vol. …
Contingent weighting. JEL classification codes: C9; C72. Article Outline. • References.
Journal of Economic Behavior Organisation ELSEVIER Vol. …
Ultimatums in two-person bargaining with one-sided uncertainty: Offer games
A Rapoport… – International Journal of Game Theory, 1996 – Springer
… demand games, our main purpose is to assess the effects of the amount of uncertainty that the
Receiver has about the size of the pie on both the Sender’s offers and the Receiver’s replies.
For this purpose, we designed a between-subject ultimatum game experiment with three …
Receiver has about the size of the pie on both the Sender’s offers and the Receiver’s replies.
For this purpose, we designed a between-subject ultimatum game experiment with three …
Ultimatums in two-person bargaining with one-sided uncertainty: Demand games
A Rapoport, JA Sundali… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1996 – Elsevier
… and the previous investigation of offer games by Rapoport and Sundali (RS) is to assess the effects
of Receiver’s uncertainty about the … A recent experiment by Eckel and Grossman (1992) uncovered
gender differences in a variant of the ultimatum game with complete …
of Receiver’s uncertainty about the … A recent experiment by Eckel and Grossman (1992) uncovered
gender differences in a variant of the ultimatum game with complete …
Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games
R Croson, T Boles… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2003 – Elsevier
… In most ultimatum game experiments, offers are much larger than predicted and not all offers
are accepted. … In addition to giving responders outside options, our experiment deviates from the
traditional ultimatum game by incorporating two-sided imperfect information. …
are accepted. … In addition to giving responders outside options, our experiment deviates from the
traditional ultimatum game by incorporating two-sided imperfect information. …
Two-level ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information: An experimental study
W Güth, S Huck… – The Economic Journal, 1996 – JSTOR
… Acceptance means that Y and Z proceed as in a usual ultimatum game with Y proposing how
to … used a ‘continuum’ of cake sizes4 to study the effects of the amount of uncertainty. … In the
experiment of Mitzkewitz and Nagal both amounts were equal, namely 2. ( Royal Economic …
to … used a ‘continuum’ of cake sizes4 to study the effects of the amount of uncertainty. … In the
experiment of Mitzkewitz and Nagal both amounts were equal, namely 2. ( Royal Economic …
2012.11.09 新增
Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study
W Güth, E Van Damme – Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1998 – Elsevier
This paper reports on an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining situations in which an
inactive third player is present. The proposerXsuggests an allocation (x, y, z) on how to
divide a cake betweenX, Y, andZ. A messagemthat (partially) reveals this proposal is sent …
inactive third player is present. The proposerXsuggests an allocation (x, y, z) on how to
divide a cake betweenX, Y, andZ. A messagemthat (partially) reveals this proposal is sent …
Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games
R Croson, T Boles, JK Murnighan – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2003 – Elsevier
In most models of bargaining, costless and unverifiable lies about private information and
incredible threats about future actions are considered cheap talk and do not impact
outcomes. In practice, however, this type of talk is often an integral part of bargaining. This …
incredible threats about future actions are considered cheap talk and do not impact
outcomes. In practice, however, this type of talk is often an integral part of bargaining. This …
Two-level ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information: An experimental study
W Güth, S Huck, P Ockenfels – The Economic Journal, 1996 – JSTOR
In a two-level ultimatum game one player offers an amount to two other players who then, in
the case of acceptance, divide this amount by playing an ultimatum game. The first offer has
to be accepted by the second proposer. Only the first proposer knew the true cake size …
the case of acceptance, divide this amount by playing an ultimatum game. The first offer has
to be accepted by the second proposer. Only the first proposer knew the true cake size …
Strategy and fairness in social decision making: Sometimes it pays to be powerless
E Van Dijk, R Vermunt – Journal of experimental social psychology, 2000 – Elsevier
Building on the social utility model, the present article investigates the importance of
absolute and comparative payoffs in social decision making. In two experimental studies, we
compared offers in Ultimatum games with offers in Dictator games. Results suggest that …
absolute and comparative payoffs in social decision making. In two experimental studies, we
compared offers in Ultimatum games with offers in Dictator games. Results suggest that …
From ultimatum bargaining to dictatorship—An experimental study of four games varying in veto power
W Güth, S Huck – Metroeconomica, 1997 – Wiley Online Library
ABSTRACT Inspired by Bolton and Zwick (1995) we study four different games, namely the
ultimatum and dictator game as well as the two games in which a veto (non-acceptance) of
the responder implies that only one of the two players does not receive the proposed …
ultimatum and dictator game as well as the two games in which a veto (non-acceptance) of
the responder implies that only one of the two players does not receive the proposed …
Strategy and fairness in social decision making: Sometimes it pays to be powerless
E Van Dijk, R Vermunt – Journal of experimental social psychology, 2000 – Elsevier
Building on the social utility model, the present article investigates the importance of
absolute and comparative payoffs in social decision making. In two experimental studies, we
compared offers in Ultimatum games with offers in Dictator games. Results suggest that …
absolute and comparative payoffs in social decision making. In two experimental studies, we
compared offers in Ultimatum games with offers in Dictator games. Results suggest that …
Responder behavior in ultimatum offer games with incomplete information
S Huck – Journal of Economic Psychology, 1999 – Elsevier
In ultimatum offer games with incomplete information a chance move determines a monetary
amount which has to be distributed. In the games studied here the proposer always learns
the outcome of the chance move whereas the responder only knows the priors. The …
amount which has to be distributed. In the games studied here the proposer always learns
the outcome of the chance move whereas the responder only knows the priors. The …
On perceptions of fairness: The role of valuations, outside options, and information in ultimatum bargaining games
PM Schmitt – Experimental Economics, 2004 – Springer
This study examines fairness perceptions in ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric
payoffs, outside options, and different information states. Fairness perceptions were
dependent on treatment conditions. Specifically, when proposers had higher chip values, …
payoffs, outside options, and different information states. Fairness perceptions were
dependent on treatment conditions. Specifically, when proposers had higher chip values, …
Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power
T Gehrig, W Güth, V Levati, R Levinsky… – Journal of Economic …, 2007 – Elsevier
We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when
accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers
are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by …
accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers
are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by …
Fairness considerations when I know more than you do: Developmental comparisons
S Overgaauw, B Güroğlu, EA Crone – Frontiers in Psychology, 2012 – frontiersin.org
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a valuable paradigm to study fairness considerations. Here, we
tested developmental differences between altruistic and strategic motivations in fairness
considerations using a version of the UG with hidden conditions. Participants were …
tested developmental differences between altruistic and strategic motivations in fairness
considerations using a version of the UG with hidden conditions. Participants were …
Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information on the Side of the Prosper: An experimental Study
R Nagel, R Harstad – … Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, 2004 – dialnet.unirioja.es
Resumen: In this paper we study ultimatum games with incomplete information on the side
of the proposer, which are repeated against changing opponents. The games have the
same subgame equilibrium outcome as its complete information version. A proposer has …
of the proposer, which are repeated against changing opponents. The games have the
same subgame equilibrium outcome as its complete information version. A proposer has …
以下為回顧性文章:
Anomalies: The ultimatum game
RH Thaler – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1988 – JSTOR
… Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) ran an experiment which is very similar to the ultimatum game. …
(‘What would happen in an ultimatum game with c = $1000, or $100,000? None of us have
the research funds to run this experiment, so we can only guess. …
(‘What would happen in an ultimatum game with c = $1000, or $100,000? None of us have
the research funds to run this experiment, so we can only guess. …
被引用 509 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 27 個版本
Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictators and manners
C Camerer… – The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995 – JSTOR
… Context Effects Subjects in interpersonal experiments like the ultimatum game may be influenced
by all kinds of factors: the wording of the instructions, the identity of the experimenters, whether
the experiment is thought to be “economics" or “psychology," and so forth. …
by all kinds of factors: the wording of the instructions, the identity of the experimenters, whether
the experiment is thought to be “economics" or “psychology," and so forth. …
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
W Güth, R Schmittberger… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1982 – Elsevier
… By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related
to their acceptance decisions as player 2. … Econometrica, 17 (1948), pp. 101–104. Stone, 1958
JJ Stone, An experiment in bargaining games. Econometrica, 26 (1958), pp. …
to their acceptance decisions as player 2. … Econometrica, 17 (1948), pp. 101–104. Stone, 1958
JJ Stone, An experiment in bargaining games. Econometrica, 26 (1958), pp. …
GIlth, W., 1993, On ultimatum bargaining games – A personal review, (Tilburg University, Center for Economic
Research, Germany) Report No. 9317.
Gihb, WSchmittberger,
R. and B. Schwarze, 1982, An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367-388.
Giith, W.Tietz, R., 1990, Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results,
Journal of Economic Psychology, 11,417449.
Research, Germany) Report No. 9317.
Gihb, WSchmittberger,
R. and B. Schwarze, 1982, An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367-388.
Giith, W.Tietz, R., 1990, Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results,
Journal of Economic Psychology, 11,417449.
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
W Güth, R Schmittberger… – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 1982 – Elsevier
Abstract There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly
enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining
behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on …
enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining
behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on …
Ultimatum bargaining behavior:: A survey and comparison of experimental results
W Guth… – Journal of Economic Psychology, 1990 – Elsevier
Abstract In an ultimatum bargaining game players 1 and 2 can distribute a positive amount
of money in the following way: first, player 1 determines his demand which player 2 can then
either accept or induce conflict, ie player 2 faces the ultimatum either to accept player 1’s …
of money in the following way: first, player 1 determines his demand which player 2 can then
either accept or induce conflict, ie player 2 faces the ultimatum either to accept player 1’s …
On ultimatum bargaining experiments–A personal review
W Güth – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995 – Elsevier
This review of ultimatum bargaining experiments concentrates on studies in which the
author was actively involved. The basic game situation is either the ultimatum game or
multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining. We outline a behavioral theory of ultimatum bargaining …
author was actively involved. The basic game situation is either the ultimatum game or
multiperiod-ultimatum bargaining. We outline a behavioral theory of ultimatum bargaining …
2012.11.09 新增
The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons
J Brandts, G Charness – Experimental Economics, 2011 – Springer
Abstract In this paper, we present a first survey of the literature regarding whether the
strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible
information set, leads to different experimental results than does the more standard direct- …
strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible
information set, leads to different experimental results than does the more standard direct- …
The effect of short-term information on long-term investment: An experimental study*
Uri Benzion, Lena Krupalnik, Ahron Rosenfeld, Shosh Shahrabani, Tal Shavit (2012) “The effect of short-term information on long-term investment: An experimental study."Economics Letters, Volume 116, Issue 1, July 2012, Pages 20–22. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.003. ****.
notes by yinung
其它的 MLA 實驗文獻都著重在投資期間短/長, 和報酬資訊迴饋高/低 對風險資產持有意願之影響, 這篇的實驗是比較同樣是 8 期一次決定的 “長期" 投資決策, 可是 treatment 是有沒有報酬資訊迴饋 (8期都有, 或是都沒有), 結果發現:
- 沒有資訊下的 “長期投資" > 有資訊下的 “長期投資"
- 有資訊下: After “aggregate loss" 的 “長期投資" < After “aggregate gain " 的 “長期投資" (這好像是 house money effects)
- 無資訊下: After “aggregate loss" 的 “長期投資" ~= After “aggregate gain " 的 “長期投資"
本文主旨係針對 Fellner and Sutter (2009) 實驗指出「短期資訊對長期投資無影響」來研究 (其實 Langer and Weber (2008) 也有類似發現)
引文：
[They] found that when the investment horizon was three periods, feedback frequency had no effect on the allocation to the
risky asset. …
[They] found that when the investment horizon was three periods, feedback frequency had no effect on the allocation to the
risky asset. …
Adaptive reaction to feedback implies under-diversification (待了解) (Benzion et al., 2010; De Bondt and Thaler, 1990; Nosic and Weber, 2009)
作者的解釋
引文
(1) individuals tend to rely on small samples of past experiences for decision-making, which leads them to chase after past returns in the financial markets (Barron and Erev, 2003; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998).
(1) individuals tend to rely on small samples of past experiences for decision-making, which leads them to chase after past returns in the financial markets (Barron and Erev, 2003; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998).
(2) disappointment aversion: …Fielding and Stracca (2007) suggested, ‘‘It is reasonable to interpret loss and disappointment aversion in terms of the losses and disappointments that one might face, not from investing at all, but rather from investing in a risky asset instead of a safe one’’ [p. 225].
Original Abstract
We present a multi-trial experiment that extends the classic experiment of Thaler et al. (1997) by adding short-term information to long-term investment. The allocation to the risky asset is reduced in the long-term, when we add short-term information.
Highlights
► We test experimentally how short-term returns’ information affects long-term investment. ► In two treatments, subjects allocated funds between two assets for eight periods in advance. ► In treatment 1, subjects received information about the aggregate and each period returns. ► In treatment 2, the subjects received information only about the aggregate return. ► The allocation to the risky asset is lower in treatment 1 than in treatment 2.
JEL classification
Keywords
- Myopic loss aversion, Regret, Multi-periods
課堂實驗與遊戲 (Classroom Experiments & Games) in Economics Network
Economics Network 有很多經濟教學實驗可參考的資源, 例如
- Economic Classroom Experiments is a chapter of the Handbook for Economics Lecturers with advice and examples.
- Simulations, Games and Role-Play is an older Handbook chapter, discussing why, when and how to use games or simulations in teaching economics, with examples.
- Classroom Experiments, Games and Role-Play a series of experiments and games from our Reflections on Teaching section.
- Using Experiments and Activities in the Principles Class by John Eaton describes a number of games, used analogously to the “lab sessions" experienced by physical science students
- John Sloman summarises seven games that can be used to increase student motivation (Powerpoint, with links to handouts and other materials)
- Jon Guest describes using classroom experiments as a more active method of teaching microeconomics in a first-year context and an intermediate context.
其它
Does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis
Thomas Langer, Martin Weber, (2008),Does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 810–819. LINK TO JEBO
Notes by yinung
這篇將投資期間長/短 , 和資訊迴饋頻率 (frequent/infrequent) 兩種因素進行交叉實驗, 實驗結果和 Bellemare et al. (2005) 的並不十分一致; Bellemare et al. (2005) 主要實驗設計在於資訊迴饋頻率 frequent/infrequent, 其 treatment 有三種:
H: 投資期間1期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
M: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
L: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每3期
Bellemare et al. (2005) 實驗結果是: 投資額度 L~M>H
本文有 3 個主要結論:
- 定期定額 (binding decisions, 連續3期) 可降低短視現象 (myopic, 對風險資產投資比例較高), 且這個現象不會隨著時間增長而改變
- p.811
- First, binding decisions cause people to be less myopic, perhaps because they must think through the implications of a longer time horizon.
- 提供較低頻率報酬結果迴饋資訊, 有助於降低短視現象, 即隨著時間增長, 可使持有/投資風險資產比例升高
- Second, providing less frequent feedback seems to help people learn over time that it is better to go with the risky prospect (i.e. to be less myopic).
- 定期定額和資訊迴饋頻率之間似乎有複雜的混合效果 (mixed treatment effects):
- 最強效果 (應該指的是投資風險資產比例最高) 出現在 “定期定額和高資訊迴饋頻率"
- 「定期定額和高資訊迴饋頻率」 下之投資風險資產比例 > 「定期定額和低資訊迴饋頻率」 下之投資風險資產比例
- Third, there is no simple main effect from combining commitment and feedback, but an interaction between these two variables.
- 作者對此現象之詮釋
- It seems that if people are committed to their decisions, more frequent feedback is helpful because over time it becomes more salient that occasional losses are outweighed by ultimate gains.
文獻比較
- Bellemare et al. (2005) in Economics Letters 發表的實驗結果:
- 只要資訊頻率降低, 即可讓投資風險資產意願提高…
- Our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion.
- Thomas Lange and Martin Weber (2005) “Myopic prospect theory vs. myopic loss aversion: how general is the phenomenon?" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 56, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 25-38. DOI 本站
- In this paper, we argue that the relation between myopia and the attractiveness of a lottery sequence is less general than previously suggested in the literature.
- 主要 hypotheses
Hypothesis 3
- . For all treatments, the proportion of wealth α(t) invested in the risky asset increases over time.
- 實驗結果 (圖、表)
Abstract
Empirical research has demonstrated that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer period of commitment decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest in a risky asset. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and commitment to analyze how each individual variable contributes to the change in myopia and how they interact. We find that the period of commitment exerts a substantial impact and the feedback frequency a far less pronounced impact. There is a strong interaction between both variables. The results have significant implications for real world intertemporal decision making.
相關文獻
- Charles Bellemare, Michaela Krausee, Sabine Krfgerf,Chendi Zhang (2005) “Myopic loss aversion: Information feedback vs. investment flexibility“. Economics Letters, vol., 87, pp.319 – 324. yayawiki 站
國科會 國際期刊評比 與 計畫審查參考原則
國科會專題研究計畫審查方式
- 期刊排序 (國內期刊評比)
- 各學門審查參考原則
- 經濟學 (版次 101-2-13)
- 財務領域國際期刊分級及排序更新計畫(99年度)(PDF檔案)
- 管理學一 (審查參考原則 pdf檔案, 100-12-15)
第一級與行為有關: Journal of Organizational Behavior, Organization Science, Organization Studies, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Research in Organizational Behavior, Journal of International Business Studies, …
其它參考資料
Design and Analysis of Simulated Consumer Choice or Allocation Experiments: An Approach Based on Aggregate Data
Jordan J. Louviere and George Woodworth (1983) “Design and Analysis of Simulated Consumer Choice or Allocation Experiments: An Approach Based on Aggregate Data."Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Nov., 1983), pp. 350-367. (in JSTOR: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3151440)
Original Abstract:
The authors integrate concepts in conjoint analysis and discrete choice theory in econometrics to develop a new approach to the design and analysis of controlled consumer choice or resource allocation experiments. The article is concerned with estimating the parameters of conjoint-type functions from discrete choice or allocation data. Emphasis is placed on the multinomial logit model and aggregate choice or allocation data to illustrate the concepts in a series of empirical examples ranging from simple to complex. The authors present limited external validity evidence to support the approach and make comparisons with traditional conjoint approaches.
Selection Criteriain Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results
Russell W. Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Thomas W. Ross (1990) “Selection Criteriain Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results." American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 218-233. (In JSTOR: Page Scan PDF Summary)
Abstract by yinung
This paper studies a class of symmetric, simultaneous move, complete information games called coordination games which exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. Coordinationgames are at the heart of a numberof recent models in industrial organization macroeconomics. These include models of network externalities (Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro,1985), product warranties under bilateral moral hazard (Cooper-Ross,1985), team production (John Bryant, 1983); and macroeconomic models of imperfect competition. A number of selection criteriahave been proposed for games of this natureand these are reviewed. These criteria provide a number of hypotheses regarding equilibrium selection in coordination games.
…The goal of this experiment to address the following questions.First, is Nash equilibriuma good predictorof observed behavior in strategic or game settings? Second, when there are multiple Nash equilibria does one arise “naturally"as the outcome?
The main results … are summarized as follows. First, we find that the observed pattern of play is accurately predicted by the Nash equilibrium concept. Second, we find that the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium is not always the experimental outcome.
Notes:
Pareto-dominant Nash:
selected References
- Farrell, Joseph, “Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," Rand Journal of Economics, Spring 1987, 18, 34-39.
行為 & 經濟實驗文獻注 (備忘) by 楊奕農 