Monthly Archives: 九月 2011

九月 8 2011

發表在 MIS Quarterly 的實驗類型文獻

Interactive Decision Aids for Consumer Decision Making in E-Commerce: The Influence of Perceived Strategy Restrictiveness

Author: Weiquan Wang and Izak Benbasat
Year: 2009 / Volume: 33 / Issue: 2

Using an Attribute-Based Decision Support System for User-Customized Products Online: An Experimental Investigation

Author: Arnold Kamis, Marios Koufaris, and Tziporah Stern
Year: 2008 / Volume: 32 / Issue: 1

Dressing Your Online Auction Business for Success: An Experiment Comparing Two eBay Businesses

Author: Dawn G. Gregg and Steven Walczak
Year: 2008 / Volume: 32 / Issue: 3

The Effects of Presentation Formats and Task Complexity on Online Consumers’ Product Understanding

Author: Zhenhui (Jack) Jiang and Izak Benbasat
Year: 2007 / Volume: 31 / Issue: 3

Incorporating Software Agents into Supply Chains: Experimental Investigation with a Procurement Task

Author: Mark E. Nissen and Kishore Sengupta
Year: 2006 / Volume: 30 / Issue: 1

The Impact of Goals on Software Project Management: An Experimental Investigation

Author: Tarek K. Abdel-Hamid, Kishore Sengupta and Clint Swett
Year: 1999 / Volume: 23 / Issue: 4

The Use of Information in Decision Making: An Experimental Investigation of the Impact of Computer-Based Decision Aids

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 373-393.
Page Scan PDF Summary

Powers-of-Ten Information Biases

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 63-77

The Effects of Anonymity on GDSS Group Process with an Idea-Generating Task

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 313-321

Computer-Based Support for Group Problem-Finding: An Experimental Investigation

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 277-296

A Study of Influence in Computer-Mediated Group Decision Making

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1988), pp. 625-644

An Experimental Validation of the Gorry and Scott Morton Framework

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Jun., 1989), pp. 183-197

Critical Factors in the User Environment: An Experimental Study of Users, Organizations and Tasks

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), pp. 75-88

The Influence of Computer Graphics on the Recall of Information

MIS Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 45-53

An Experimental Investigation of Some MIS Design Variables

Author: Izak Benbasat and Roger G. Schroeder
Year: 1977 / Volume: 1 / Issue: 1

九月 5 2011

Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment

Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment

 

Date: 2011
By: Antonio Cabrales (Departamento de Economía – Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Gary Charness (Department of Economics, University of California – University of California, Santa Barbara)
Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS : UMR5824 – Université Lumière – Lyon II – École Normale Supérieure de Lyon)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00614472&r=net
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes.
Keywords: experiment; hidden information; bargaining power; competition; efficiency