Monthly Archives: 三月 2020

三月 3 2020

Roth, Alvin E. “Laboratory experimentation in economics: A methodological overview." The Economic Journal 98.393 (1988): 974-1031. [PDF] [PDF2]

 

三月 2 2020

Laboratory experimentation in economics

Roth, Alvin E. “Laboratory experimentation in economics." Economics & Philosophy 2.2 (1986): 245-273. [PDF]

==original abstract==

TBD

 

 

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