Monthly Archives: 二月 2022

二月 17 2022

「零元效應」有助抑制醫療浪費

中研院經濟研究…表示，日本以7至14歲兒少就醫研究發現，門診部分負擔從0元小幅提高至2美元（約新台幣55元）時，門診次數顯著降低，並減少非必要抗生素使用；不過，若從55元變成110元，則變化有限。

自由時報電子報: 健保部分負擔將改革 學者：「零元效應」有助抑制醫療浪費. https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/breakingnews/3832255

二月 9 2022

Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions?

Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions?

Experimental Economics volume 25, pages203–228 (2022)Cite this article

Abstract

When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much to trade. We conducted an experiment where traders decided first whether to trade in an (efficient) double-auction institution or in a posted-offers one (favoring sellers), and second how much to trade. When sellers face decreasing returns to scale (increasing production costs), fast coordination on the double-auction occurs, with the posted-offers institution becoming inactive. In contrast, under constant returns to scale, both institutions remain active and coordination is slower. The reason is that sellers trade off higher efficiency in a market with dwindling profits for biased-up profits in a market with vanishing customers. Hence, efficiency alone might not be sufficient to guarantee coordination on a single market institution if the surplus distribution is asymmetric. Trading behavior approaches equilibrium predictions (market clearing) within each institution, but switching behavior across institutions is explained by simple rules of thumb, with buyers chasing low prices and sellers considering both prices and trader ratios.

二月 9 2022

If you could read my mind–an experimental beauty-contest game with children

If you could read my mind–an experimental beauty-contest game with children

Experimental Economics volume 25, pages229–253 (2022)Cite this article

Abstract

We develop a new design for the experimental beauty-contest game (BCG) that is suitable for children in school age and test it with 114 schoolchildren aged 9–11 years as well as with adults. In addition, we collect a measure for cognitive skills to link these abilities with successful performance in the game. Results demonstrate that children can successfully understand and play a BCG. Choices start at a slightly higher level than those of adults but learning over time and depth of reasoning are largely comparable with the results of studies run with adults. Cognitive skills, measured as fluid IQ, are predictive only of whether children choose weakly dominated strategies but are neither associated with lower choices in the first round nor with successful performance in the BCG. In the implementation of our new design of the BCG with adults we find results largely in line with behavior in the classical BCG. Our new design for the experimental BCG allows to study the development of strategic interaction skills starting already in school age.

 

二月 9 2022

Inequality, role reversal and cooperation in multiple group membership settings

Inequality, role reversal and cooperation in multiple group membership settings

Experimental Economics volume 25, pages68–110 (2022)Cite this article

Abstract

We investigate the role of endowment inequality in a local and global public goods setting with multiple group membership and examine the effect of temporal role reversal on cooperation decisions. Subjects can contribute to a global public good which benefits all subjects and two local public goods which benefit only subjects of either their own group or the group of the other endowment type. Endowment inequality per-se decreases contributions of subjects with a high endowment to the global public good, but increases cooperation of subjects with a low endowment on their local public good, thereby aggravating income disparities. Exogenously induced role reversal for several periods affects cooperation behavior of subjects with a high endowment positively and induces them to contribute more to the global good. Cooperation in unequal environments thus appears to be more stable when all parties have experienced the public goods game from the disadvantageous perspective.

二月 9 2022

Belief adjustment: a double hurdle model and experimental evidence

Experimental Economics volume 25, pages26–67 (2022) Cite this article

Abstract

We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs related to reported beliefs. We attempt to control for risk aversion using the Offerman et al. (Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1461–1489, 2009) technique. Against the baseline of Bayesian updating, we test for belief adjustment underreaction and overreaction and model the decision making process of the agent as a double hurdle model where agents with inferential expectations first decide whether to adjust their beliefs and then, if so, decide by how much. We also test the effects of increased inattention and complexity on belief updating. We find evidence for periods of belief inertia interspersed with belief adjustment. This is due to a combination of random belief adjustment; state-dependent belief adjustment, with many subjects requiring considerable evidence to change their beliefs; and quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment, with aggregate insufficient belief adjustment when a belief change does occur. Inattention, like complexity, makes subjects less likely to adjust their stated beliefs, while inattention additionally discourages full adjustment.