Friend or Foe? A Natural Experiment of the Prisoner’s Dilemma*

John A. List (2006) “Friend or Foe? A Natural Experiment of the Prisoner’s Dilemma."  August 2006, Vol. 88, No. 3, Pages 463-471. Posted Online October 4, 2006. (doi:10.1162/rest.88.3.463); NBER; rps-chicago.com 提供的 [PDF]

Notes by yinung

1. 這是用一個  Friend or Foe game show 參賽者所玩的 PD game 的資料所寫成的 paper; 其實驗發現重點摘要如下：
2. 25％ （of 117 場），雙方皆選擇 “不合作”， 因此得 0 （未拿走的獎金累計 100,000美元)約 25％ 雙方皆選擇 “合作”
3. 獎金多寡不影響實驗策略選擇之結果
4. 個人合作率顯示無 social discrimination 存在；但選擇 partner 的資料卻顯示 biased against 年紀大的參賽者

Abstract

This study examines data drawn from the game show Friend or Foe? which is similar to the classic prisoner’s dilemma tale: partnerships are endogenously determined, and players work together to earn money, after which they play a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game over large stakes: varying from $200 to (potentially) more than $22,000. The data reveal several interesting insights; perhaps most provocatively, they suggest that even though the game is played in front of an audience of millions of viewers, some of the evidence is consistent with a model of discrimination. The observed patterns of social discrimination are unanticipated, however.

Friend or Foe

Expectations of Returns and Expected Returns

Robin Greenwood and Andrei Shleifer (2013) “Expectations of Returns and Expected Returns." NBER Working Paper No. 18686, January 2013, JEL No. G02,G12,G14. [PDF]

==original abstract==

We analyze time-series of investor expectations of future stock market returns from six data sources between 1963 and 2011. The six measures of expectations are highly positively correlated with each other, as well as with past stock returns and with the level of the stock market. However, investor expectations are strongly negatively correlated with model-based expected returns. We reconcile the evidence by calibrating a simple behavioral model, in which fundamental traders require a premium to accommodate expectations shocks from extrapolative traders, but markets are not efficient.

Games with Unawareness

Games with Unawareness

Date:	2012-08
By:	Feinberg, Yossi (Stanford University)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:2122&r=net
	We provide a tool to model and solve strategic situations where players’ perceptions are limited, in the sense that they may only be aware of, or model, some of the aspects of the strategic situations at hand, as well as situations where players realize that other players’ perceptions may be limited. We define normal, repeated, incomplete information and dynamic (extensive) form games with unawareness using a unified methodology. A game with unawareness is defined as a collection of standard games (of the corresponding form). The collection specifies how each player views the game, how she views the other players’ perceptions of the game and so on. The modeler’s description of perceptions, the players’ description of other players’ reasoning, etc. are shown to have consistent representations. We extend solution concepts such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium to these games and study their properties. It is shown that while unawareness in normal form games can be mapped to incomplete information games, the extended Nash equilibrium solution is not mapped to a known solution concept in the equivalent incomplete information games, implying that games with unawareness generate novel types of behavior.
JEL:	C72

The Intellectual Property Marketplace: Emerging Transaction and Investment Vehicles*

Malackowski, J. E., Cardoza, K., Gray, C., & Conroy, R. (2007). The Intellectual Property Marketplace: Emerging Transaction and Investment Vehicles. Licensing Journal, 27(2), 1-11. **

==notes by yinung==

p. 9 提到以證券交易的概念來「發行IP」，以專業評估決定發行「授權數量」（例如100 million units over
five years），然後 IP 擁有的公司再決定釋出多少授權數目， 每個授權（例如 70 million units at three cents a unit），由市場進行交易

IP 交易係由  or litigation 之壓力下所形成； 其交易成本很大，交易完成時間需 6－18 個月

… the historic IP marketplace, there are a number of key conclusions. First, the market was primarily motivated by the threat of patent enforcement or litigation. Second, there were very high transaction costs associated with transferring IP rights. .. it often takes 6 to 18 months to complete a deal, and this comes at significant costs.

第一次 Ocean Tomo 的 IP auction in San Francisco, April 2006.

1200 patent 中有 430 項列入拍賣，分成 78 lots, 400 人出席，交易金額 8.5 m 美元； 44 ％ 成交 （一般汽車拍賣成交率約 1/3 ｀ 1／2），此外還有 off the floor 交易

第二次 auction 成交金額 2.39 m

Should I sell or should I license 賣斷還是授權？

===引文===

over the last 30 years the labor and industrial economy has been supplanted by the knowledge economy.

無形資產的重要性

In 1975, more than 80 percent of the US market’s value was composed of tangible assets: factories, machines, and inventory. Now in 2006, less then 20 percent of the market’s value is composed of tangible assets, with the 80 percent balance associated with intangible assets.

Ocean Tomo 300 指數 in 2006

On September 13, 2006, Ocean Tomo launched the Ocean Tomo 300™ Patent Index—the first equity index based on the value of corporate IP.

… First published on May 26, 1896, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), created by Wall Street Journal editor and Dow Jones & Company founder Charles Dow, represented the average of 12 stocks from various important US industries. … Nasdaq began trading on February 8, 1971
… On March 4, 1957, a broad, real-time stock market index, the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) was introduced.

==一些名詞==

patent enforcement

patent trolls

(refer to them more appropriately as Patent Licensing and Enforcement Companies or “P-LECs”)

==參考網站==

• Ocean Tomo： IP 交易公司http://www.oceantomo.com/mission: To be the premier merchant banc and the first choice for all financial services related to Intellectual Capital Equity value.
• ICAP Ocean Tomo 秋季公開叫價拍賣待售28項專利組合（STPI, 財團法人國家實驗研究院科技政策研究與資訊中心)

Alternative damage rules and probabilistic intellectual property rights: Unjust enrichment, lost profits, and reasonable royalty remedies*

Jay Pil Choi (2009) “Alternative damage rules and probabilistic intellectual property rights: Unjust enrichment, lost profits, and reasonable royalty remedies." Information Economics and Policy, Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2009, Pages 145–157. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2008.11.001; *

==original Abstract==

This paper investigates how alternative damage rules in patent infringement cases shape competition when intellectual property rights are probabilistic. More specifically, I develop a simple model of oligopolistic competition to compare two main liability doctrines that have been used in the U.S. to assess infringement damages – the unjust enrichment rule and the lost profit rule. I show that the lost profit rule provides more protection to the patent holder than the unjust enrichment rule if the patent holder and infringer are equally efficient. When the lost profits from the infringement cannot be proved, the court accepts a “reasonable royalty rate” that would have been negotiated in a hypothetical bargaining situation as an alternative measure of damage. However, I point out that the concept of “reasonable” royalty rates lacks logical consistency when intellectual property rights are probabilistic.

Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?

Alvin E. Roth (2010) “Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?" Forthcoming in Fréchette, Guillaume and Andrew Schotter (editors) The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics, Oxford University Press. harvard.edu 提供的 [PDF]

 

Introduction

The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress, and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the field several decades ago, when it and we were younger. So it will help to begin by reconstructing what some of those anticipations were.

When I surveyed parts of experimental economics in Roth (1986-7,1988), I hoped that experimentation would facilitate and improve three kinds of work in economics, which I called Speaking to Theorists, Searching for Facts, and Whispering in the Ears of Princes. By speaking to theorists I meant testing the empirical scope and content of theories (including especially formal theories that might depend on factors hard to observe or control outside the lab), and in particular testing how well and on what domains their quantitative and qualitative predictions might serve as (at least) useful approximations. By searching for facts I meant exploring empirical regularities that may not have been predicted by existing theories, and might even contradict them, but whose contours, once they had begun to be mapped by experiments, could form the basis for new knowledge and new theories. And by whispering in the ears of princes I meant formulating reliable advice, as well as communicating, justifying, and defending it.

Of course, whether experimental economics is living up to its promise could also be a question about how experimental economists are doing at developing a body of experimental methods … (see harvard.edu 提供的 [PDF])

End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach

Reinhard and Selten (1986) “End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Volume 7, Issue 1, March 1986, Pages 47–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1. systemsci.org 提供的 [PDF];

Abstract

A learning theory is proposed which models the influence of experience on end behavior in finite Prisoner’s Dilemma supergames. The theory is compared with experimental results. In the experiment 35 subjects participated in 25 Prisoner’s Dilemma supergames of ten periods each against anonymous opponents, changing from supergame to supergame. The typical behavior of experienced subjects involves cooperation until shortly before the end of the supergame. The theory explains shifts in the intended deviation period. On the basis of parameter estimates for each subject derived from the first 20 supergames, successful predictions could be obtained for the last five supergames.

 

Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets

Charles R. Plott and Shyam Sunder (1988) “Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets." Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 5 (Sep., 1988), pp. 1085-1118. Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911360; ust.hk 提供的 [PDF].

==original Abstract==

The idea that markets might aggregate and disseminate information and also resolve conflicts is central to the literature on decentralization (Hurwicz, 1972) and rational expectations (Lucas, 1972). We report on three series of experiments all of which were predicted to have performed identically by the theory of rational expectations. In two of the three series (one in which participants trade a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities and a second in which all participants have identical preferences), double auction trading leads to efficient aggregation of diverse information and rational expectations equilibrium. Failure of the third series to exhibit such convergence demonstrates the importance of market institutions and trading instruments in achievement of equilibrium.

Bias in judgment: Comparing individuals and groups

Kerr, Norbert L.; MacCoun, Robert J.; Kramer, Geoffrey P. (1996) “Bias in judgment: Comparing individuals and groups." Psychological Review, Vol 103(4), Oct 1996, 687-719. http://psycnet.apa.org/?fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.687. uci.edu 提供的 [PDF]

==original abstract==

The relative susceptibility of individuals and groups to systematic judgmental biases is considered. An overview of the relevant empirical literature reveals no clear or general pattern. However, a theoretical analysis employing J. H. Davis’s (1973) social decision scheme (SDS) model reveals that the relative magnitude of individual and group bias depends upon several factors, including group size, initial individual judgment, the magnitude of bias among individuals, the type of bias, and most of all, the group-judgment process. It is concluded that there can be no simple answer to the question, “Which are more biased, individuals or groups?," but the SDS model offers a framework for specifying some of the conditions under which individuals are both more and less biased than groups.

The Performance of Groups and Individuals in Financial Decision-Making

Christoph Gort and Anke Gerber (2008) “The Performance of Groups and Individuals in Financial Decision-Making." Working Paper No. 460, National Centre of Competence in Research Financial Valuation and Risk Management. [link to PDF]; http://www.ufsp.uzh.ch/finance/documents/WP460_A1.pdf; uzh.ch 提供的 [PDF]

==original Abstract==

On financial markets many investment decisions are taken by groups and not by individuals. The evidence, however, whether groups perform better than individuals, is ambiguous. We analyze the portfolios of groups and individuals in an asset allocation task on an experimental market. We find that groups on average outperform individuals, i.e., achieve higher Sharpe ratios but the difference is not significant. However, there are also large performance discrepancies across groups and the best groups significantly outperform individuals. An important determinant of the success a group in our experiment is the degree of information exchange between group members as a higher level is linked to a significantly better performance.