如何得知期刊是否收錄於Web of Science資料庫?

引自臺大圖書館:http://tul.blog.ntu.edu.tw/archives/2598

可利用資料庫出版社提供的 Master Journal List 進行查找。茲將查找方式說明如下:【English version please see this article

1. 請連線Master Journal List網頁:http://mjl.clarivate.com/

2. 若欲瀏覽期刊收錄清單,請點選網頁下方的資料庫名稱。

SCIE 全稱為 Science Citation Index Expanded
SSCI 全稱為 Social Sciences Citation Index

以 Agricultural Finance Review 為例, 蒐尋結果如下

 

廣告

Theory and experiment: What are the questions?

Smith, Vernon L. “Theory and experiment: What are the questions?." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 73.1 (2010): 3-15. [PDF];[my notes]

==YNY==

Smith 提到了 OPM (other person’s money) 問題,可以用以下的方式解決

We could give the constant positive sum ultimatum game economic content as follows: Each player provides $M of his own money. Some procedure is used for pairing the subjects, and determining who is to be Player 1 and who Player 2; this procedure in some variations might incorporate an earned and/or investment feature. It is understood that their pairing has economic significance in the sense that there are synergistic gains from the interaction equal to some fixed sum y > 2M. The experimenter provides only the surplus above 2M which represents the gains from specialization and exchange, as this is the one reliable source of a “free lunch” that converts economic systems into non-zero sum games. Hence, the total to be shared under the property right rules of the game is 2M + y, making it feasible for each to receive a share of the jointly created net gain above their pooled initial contribution, 2M.

2010 JEBO, On the Methodology of Experimental Economics

J. Barkley Rosser, Catherine Eckel,
Introduction to JEBO special issue on “Issues in the Methodology of Experimental Economics”,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 1-2,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.017.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002790)

William S. Neilson,
Lessons from a behavioral economics success story: Comment on theory and experiment: What are the questions?,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 62-64,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.016.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002686)

Daniel Houser, Erte Xiao,
Understanding context effects,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 58-61,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.01.006.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002674)

Ken Binmore, Avner Shaked,
Experimental economics: Where next?,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 87-100,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.019.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002820)
Abstract: Where should experimental economics go next? This paper uses the literature on inequity aversion as a case study in suggesting that we could profit from tightening up our act.

Jörg Oechssler,
Searching beyond the lamppost: Let’s focus on economically relevant questions,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 65-67,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.017.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002698)
Abstract: Experimental economics is in danger of behaving like the famous drunk who searches for his keys under the light even though he lost them in some dark corner. It is argued that we are wasting our time (and endangering the respect that other economists have for experimentalists) by playing too much with some of our favorite toys, like the dictator game, rather than focus on new and economically relevant designs.
Keywords: Economic experiments; Methodology; Dictator game; Bubbles

Glenn W. Harrison,
The behavioral counter-revolution,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 49-57,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.007.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002662)

Gary Bolton,
Testing models and internalizing context: A comment on “Theory and Experiment: What are the questions?”,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 16-20,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.11.002.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002595)

Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt,
Comments on Vernon Smith’s—“Theory and experiment: What are the Questions?”,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 44-48,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.015.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002650)
Abstract: When commenting on Vernon Smith’s inspiring paper, we first argue that game theory in its “reasoning about knowledge” tradition is not truly behavioral and try to categorize different approaches. We then go on by considering specific topics, discussed by Vernon Smith, before concluding with some methodological reflections.
Keywords: Game theory; Behavioral economics; Game and auction experiments; Entitlement; Institutional or mechanism design

Mark Pingle,
Looking under the hood: Exploring assumptions and finding behavioral economics,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 73-76,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.018.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002716)
Abstract: Cognitive scarcity is a fundamental economic fact, but the standard maximization assumption abstracts from this fact. Much of behavioral economics can be framed as “exploring the maximization assumption.” By applying the tools of behavioral economics to explore this important assumption, we can learn why presuming maximization works, when it works, even when we know the assumption is not accurately descriptive. We can also learn why theory fails when the assumption does not proximately hold.
Keywords: Bounded rationality, Cognitive scarcity, Deliberation cost, Transactions cost, Assumptions

Vernon L. Smith,
What would Adam Smith think?,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 83-86,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.020.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726810900273X)

David M. Grether,
Comment on Vernon Smith “Theory and experiment: What are the questions?”,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 41-43,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.006.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002649)

Elinor Ostrom,
Revising theory in light of experimental findings,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 68-72,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.008.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002704)

Bart J. Wilson,
Social preferences aren’t preferences,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 77-82,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.013.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002728)
Abstract: Experimental economists robustly observe that people in the laboratory regularly make choices that result in lower payoffs for themselves. When faced with this paradox of preferences, economists posit that there must be two meanings of preferences: preferences for the self and preferences for the social. In this paper I argue that this is an example of economists forcing ordinary human behavior to fit their models. The force of my argument is to confute the notion that an individual’s expression of so-called social preferences as an action can be represented as a set of separable and private utilitarian “preferences” within him.
Keywords: Experimental economics; Semantics of economics; Rhetoric of economics

James C. Cox,
Some issues of methods, theories, and experimental designs,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 24-28,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.014.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002613)

Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt,
On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 101-108,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.12.001.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002844)
Abstract: In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr–Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences.
Keywords: Experiments; Other-regarding preferences; Inequity aversion

Gary Charness,
Laboratory experiments: Challenges and promise: A review of “Theory and Experiment: What are the Questions?” by Vernon Smith,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 21-23,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.005.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002601)

Ken Binmore, Avner Shaked,
Experimental Economics: Where Next? Rejoinder,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 120-121,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.11.008.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002832)

Herbert Gintis,
Towards a renaissance of economic theory,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 34-40,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.012.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002637)

Rachel Croson, Simon Gächter,
The science of experimental economics,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 122-131,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.008.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002339)
Abstract: In this paper we present the views of two practicing experimental economists on the role of economic experiments in the science of economics, and in particular on the interaction between economic theory and experimental design and data.
Keywords: Methodology; Experiments; Philosophy of science

Vernon L. Smith,
Theory and experiment: What are the questions?,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 3-15,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.008. [PDF]
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726810900033X)
Abstract: This paper deals generally with testing questions that arise both when experimental observations are in accord with the actions we predict, and when they are not. In both cases the inference of truth from observation is inherently ambiguous, and we face the daunting challenge of using our experimental skills and imagination to reduce this ambiguity. Primarily and most difficult of all we have to constantly reevaluate everything, including ourselves, especially in examining how we talk about and interpret our data. Although I will be drawing on examples and experience from laboratory experiments, the issues I consider apply just as meaningfully to other empirical studies whether from field experiments or observations from past records of socioeconomic processes.
Keywords: Experimental economics; Game theory; Methodology of science

Daniel Friedman,
Preferences, beliefs and equilibrium: What have experiments taught us?,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 29-33,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.011.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002625)

Catherine Eckel, Herbert Gintis,
Blaming the messenger: Notes on the current state of experimental economics,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Volume 73, Issue 1,
2010,
Pages 109-119,
ISSN 0167-2681,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.026.
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268109002819)
Abstract: Binmore and Shaked (this issue) criticize Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequality aversion. We present a considerable body of experimental research supporting the inequality aversion motive. Binmore and Shaked also urge experimentalists to adopt “a more skeptical attitude when far-reaching claims about human behavior are extrapolated from very slender data.” It is true that experimental findings indicate that the standard neoclassical model fails to predict a considerable range of strategic behaviors widely observed in the laboratory, particularly under conditions where normative behavior is prevalent in every-day social life. This is indeed a “far-reaching claim,” but one amply justified by an impressive and constantly growing body of evidence from experiments.
Keywords: Inequality aversion; Neoclassical theory; Experimental

Claims and confounds in economic experiments

Zizzo, Daniel John. “Claims and confounds in economic experiments." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization93.C (2013): 186-195. [PDF];

confounds: 使困惑

==notes by YNY==

用 「獨特性、相關性、合理性」DRP 方法來衡量實驗的困惑

==original abstract==

We present a distinctiveness, relevance and plausibility (DRP) method for systematically evaluating potential experimental confounds. A claim is a statement being inferred on the basis of experimental data analysis. A potential confound is a statement providing a prima facie reason why the claim is not justified (other than internal weakness). In evaluating whether a potential confound is problematic, we can start by asking whether the potential confound is distinctive from the claim; we can then ask whether it is relevant for the claim; and we can conclude by asking whether it is plausible in the light of the evidence.

Risk aversion and incentive effects: Comment

Harrison, G. W., Johnson, E., McInnes, M. M., & Rutström, E. E. (2005). Risk aversion and incentive effects: Comment. American Economic Review95(3), 897-901.   [PDF] ucsd.edu ; [PDF] ucsd.edu;[本站PDF]

==noted by yinung==

這是 Harrison et al. (2005) 對 Holt and Laury (Risk aversion and incentive effects ,2002,  AER) 這一篇的挑戰:

===重點:===

Harrison et al. (2005, AER) 對 Holt and Laury (2002, AER) 質疑有「order effects」(An order effect occurs when prior experience with one task affects behavior in a subsequent task., p.897) 並重新做實驗,比較1x10x 和只有 10x 的結果,如下圖。
(註:Hypothetical 指只有實驗中的假設報酬數字放大,並沒有實際報酬的放大)。
不過,Harrison et al. (2005) 在畫下圖的時候,不是用實際的數字,而是用 ordered probit 預測結果畫的

 

 

Risk aversion and incentive effects

Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. “Risk aversion and incentive effects." American economic review 92.5 (2002): 1644-1655. [PDF] ucsd.edu; [PDF] alaska.edu;

see also

Harrison (2005) 對上一篇的挑戰: Risk aversion and incentive effects: Comment (2005,  AER)][PDF] ucsd.edu;[本站PDF]

以及 Holt 的回應 : Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data without Order Effects (2005,  AER)

 

==Noted by yinung==

procedures:

decision task 1. 先答完10題,事後從中「隨機」選出一題來玩,並依結果付 payment。再問是否進行 decision task 2

decision task 2. 假的 20x 報酬,但和 decision task 1 相同 (high-hypothetical ONLY treatment)

decision task 3. 真的 20x 報酬,但和 decision task 1 相同 (high-hypothetical Real Only treatment)

decision task 4. 和 decision task 1 相同,用來驗證「原來在 task 1 的風險偏好是否因 wealth effects 改變」

low-payoff treatmen

high-hypothetical treatmen

  • 即使是 Holt, 在 AER 發表時,仍然要引用 Kahnenman and Tversky 的辯論 (引在最下方)
  • Incentive Effects? 什麼動機
    measured as the number of safe lottery choices in each treatment (p.1653)
  • safe (lottery) choices 安全選項(見下圖):
    指前4個選 Option

 

引文

控制 wealth effects: 要進行第2個 high-payment 實驗時,要先放棄第1個實驗得到的錢
To control for wealth effects between the high and low real-payoff treatments, subjects were required to give up what they had earned in the first low-payoff task in order to participate in the high-payoff decision.

==Harrison et al. 對本篇的 procedures 概述==

The subjects in the HL design were given sequences of three or four tasks, as shown in Table 1. Task #1 involved choices over lotteries with a baseline level of prizes, which we will refer to as the “1X scale.” Task #2 involved hypothetical choices over prizes with a scaled-up level of prizes, either 20X, 50X, or 90X. Task #3 repeated task #2, but with choices that involved real payoffs. Task #4 was a return to the baseline task with real 1X prizes. In some sessions, subjects were not given task #2 or task #3.1。(yinung: 呵… 這比Holt 寫得還簡要清楚)

==Kahnenman and Tversky==

The implication, that low laboratory incentives may be somewhat unrealistic and therefore not useful in measuring attitudes toward “real-world" risks, is echoed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979, p. 265), who suggest an alternative:

Experimental studies typically involve contrived gambles for small stakes, and a large number of repetitions of very similar problems. These features of laboratory gambling complicate the interpretation of the results and restrict their generality. By default, the method of hypothetical choices emerges as the simplest procedure by which a large number of theoretical questions can be investigated. The use of the method relies on the assumption that people often know how they would behave in actual situations of choice, and on the further assumption that the subjects have no special reason to disguise (掩飾) their true preferences. (在實驗中,受試者沒有特別理由要掩飾他們的真實偏好

 

Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data without Order Effects

Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. “Risk aversion and incentive effects: New data without order effects." American Economic Review 95.3 (2005): 902-912.  source: PDF [本站]

這篇是 Holt 回應 Harrison et al. (2004) 對先前發表(Holt and Laury, 2002, AER),有無 order effects 的質礙

==主要結論是:==

payment 愈高,risk averse 愈明顯,但沒有 order effects。

==notes by yinung==

  • 用這來判斷 risk averse: The average number of safe choices(查細設定?)
  • 此新實驗改用 a single lotterychoice menu?
  • 1st treatment(odered choices): low-pay -> high-payment (20X)
  • 另外4個 (unordered) TM
    L(1x)
    L/H0
    H(20x)
    H/H0
  • 用兩個無母數檢定

螢幕快照_2019-07-19_17-17-03

==Game online==

http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/lc/lc.php

==references==

  • Harrison, G. W., Johnson, E., McInnes, M. M., & Rutström, E. E. (2005). Risk aversion and incentive effects: Comment. American Economic Review, 95(3), 897-901.
  • HOLT, Charles A.; LAURY, Susan K. Risk aversion and incentive effects. American economic review, 2002, 92.5: 1644-1655.

哈佛商評:打造雙邊市場策略

==YNY 摘要==

URL: https://www.hbrtaiwan.com/article_content_AR0003412.html

不太一樣的雙邊市場策略

在某些產業,例如,銀行、軟體、媒體等,這類公司的獲利方式,是把顧客網絡不同邊的市場連結起來,像是連結讀者和廣告主。這些行業的特性與眾不同,所以在制定策略時,需要運用新的方法。

  • 把雙邊網絡裡的兩群使用者連結起來的產品和服務,稱為「平台」(platform)
  • 平台對這兩群使用者提供服務,都需要負擔成本,也能從這兩群使用者賺取收入,不過,我們會談到,往往有一邊是受到補貼的。
    雙邊網絡平台的供應商能從兩邊賺取收入。但大部分時候,補貼一部分使用者的做法,是有道理的。但很重要的策略問題是:應該補貼哪一邊的使用者,以及補貼多久?
  • 這兩群使用者彼此吸引,經濟學家稱為網絡效應(network effect)

對雙邊網絡提供服務的平台,並不是新的現象

  • 汽車駕駛人,以及遍布各地的加油站連結 ()
  • 廣告主和上網搜尋的人
  • 零售電力市場變成平台,撮合消費者和特定的發電廠 (傳統行業也重新架構轉型為平台,例如,)
  • 更多實例

雙邊市場面臨的挑戰

1:平台訂價
一般來說,雙邊網絡有一個「補貼邊」(subsidy side)。這群使用者如能大量上門,另一群使用者,也就是「金錢邊」(money side)會覺得很有價值
2:贏家通吃
像索尼建立Betamax 錄影帶標準投入的心血,最後輸給 VHS錄影帶標準
因平台共享時,整個市場的規模會變大,是很大的誘因。但爭奪網絡主控地位的得失很大,因此各家公司初期必須投入龐大的經費
3:包圍威脅
鄰近的平台供應商,可能會覬覦你的平台,採取「包圍」攻勢,進軍你的市場,常導致市場的界限趨於模糊。

===註===
設戶(homing)成本是指網絡使用者為了建立和維護與平台的關係,必須承擔的所有費用,包括平台的採用、運作,以及時間的機會成本。使用者在好幾個平台設「戶」,支出便會增加。舉例來說,絕大多數的個人電腦使用者都使用單一作業系統(幾乎全是Windows),因為採用多套作業系統的成本很貴,需要額外增加硬體、軟體和訓練等方面的支出。同樣地,距離也會限制消費者一次能造訪的購物商場家數,這就會限制賣場的家數。如果多處設戶的成本很高,使用者需要很好的理由,才會和多座平台保持往來。

==來源==

: https://www.hbrtaiwan.com/article_content_AR0003412.html
策略規畫

打造雙邊市場策略

Strategies for Two-sided Markets
ar0003412_1