哈佛商評:打造雙邊市場策略

==YNY 摘要==

URL: https://www.hbrtaiwan.com/article_content_AR0003412.html

不太一樣的雙邊市場策略

在某些產業,例如,銀行、軟體、媒體等,這類公司的獲利方式,是把顧客網絡不同邊的市場連結起來,像是連結讀者和廣告主。這些行業的特性與眾不同,所以在制定策略時,需要運用新的方法。

  • 把雙邊網絡裡的兩群使用者連結起來的產品和服務,稱為「平台」(platform)
  • 平台對這兩群使用者提供服務,都需要負擔成本,也能從這兩群使用者賺取收入,不過,我們會談到,往往有一邊是受到補貼的。
    雙邊網絡平台的供應商能從兩邊賺取收入。但大部分時候,補貼一部分使用者的做法,是有道理的。但很重要的策略問題是:應該補貼哪一邊的使用者,以及補貼多久?
  • 這兩群使用者彼此吸引,經濟學家稱為網絡效應(network effect)

對雙邊網絡提供服務的平台,並不是新的現象

  • 汽車駕駛人,以及遍布各地的加油站連結 ()
  • 廣告主和上網搜尋的人
  • 零售電力市場變成平台,撮合消費者和特定的發電廠 (傳統行業也重新架構轉型為平台,例如,)
  • 更多實例

雙邊市場面臨的挑戰

1:平台訂價
一般來說,雙邊網絡有一個「補貼邊」(subsidy side)。這群使用者如能大量上門,另一群使用者,也就是「金錢邊」(money side)會覺得很有價值
2:贏家通吃
像索尼建立Betamax 錄影帶標準投入的心血,最後輸給 VHS錄影帶標準
因平台共享時,整個市場的規模會變大,是很大的誘因。但爭奪網絡主控地位的得失很大,因此各家公司初期必須投入龐大的經費
3:包圍威脅
鄰近的平台供應商,可能會覬覦你的平台,採取「包圍」攻勢,進軍你的市場,常導致市場的界限趨於模糊。

===註===
設戶(homing)成本是指網絡使用者為了建立和維護與平台的關係,必須承擔的所有費用,包括平台的採用、運作,以及時間的機會成本。使用者在好幾個平台設「戶」,支出便會增加。舉例來說,絕大多數的個人電腦使用者都使用單一作業系統(幾乎全是Windows),因為採用多套作業系統的成本很貴,需要額外增加硬體、軟體和訓練等方面的支出。同樣地,距離也會限制消費者一次能造訪的購物商場家數,這就會限制賣場的家數。如果多處設戶的成本很高,使用者需要很好的理由,才會和多座平台保持往來。

==來源==

: https://www.hbrtaiwan.com/article_content_AR0003412.html
策略規畫

打造雙邊市場策略

Strategies for Two-sided Markets
ar0003412_1

 

廣告

Applying behavioural economics at the Financial Conduct Authority

2013 PDF
The FCA was the first financial regulator with a behavioural economics unit and published an influential paper on the organisation’s use of behavioural economics back in 2013. Our more recent work includes lab and field experiments on fund charges, overdraft alerts and credit card repayments.

Effects of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making in the Ultimatum Game

Wu, Yujia; Gao, Li; Wan, Yan; Wang, Fang; Xu, Sihua; Yang, Zijing; Rao, Hengyi; Pan, Yu (2018). Effects of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making in the Ultimatum Game. Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal, 46(3), 499-516. (DOI: https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.6966)

==abstract==

As little is yet known about the influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on fairness consideration in decision making, we examined whether a proposer’s facial trustworthiness and gender would influence a responder’s willingness to accept the proposer’s monetary offer. Participants in our study were 79 Chinese undergraduate students (responders) who played the Ultimatum Game with 4 proposers (2 male and 2 female) with different facial trustworthiness. As predicted, responders were more willing to accept offers from trustworthy-looking proposers. We found that facial trustworthiness was a more salient cue when proposers were men than when they were women and, furthermore, that the students’ emotional response to faces was correlated with their fairness consideration. Considering the implicit influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making, potentially there are broader implications of our findings for certain business activities, such as negotiation and bargaining.

Experimental Economics, Vol. 21, Issue 2 – New Issue Alert

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New Issue Alert
04/27/2018
Dear Reader,

We are pleased to deliver your requested table of contents alert for Experimental Economics. Volume 21 Number 2 is now available online.

In this issue
Original Paper

Measuring higher order ambiguity preferences

Aurélien Baillon, Harris Schlesinger & Gijs van de Kuilen

» Abstract » Full text PDF
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Experimental study of cursed equilibrium in a signaling game

Nichole Szembrot

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Original Paper

Loss aversion and the quantity–quality tradeoff

Jared Rubin, Anya Samek & Roman M. Sheremeta

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Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

Charles Bellemare, Alexander Sebald & Sigrid Suetens

» Abstract » Full text PDF
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Does the paradox of plenty exist? Experimental evidence on the curse of resource abundance

Andreas Leibbrandt & John Lynham

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Peer effects in computer assisted learning: evidence from a randomized experiment

Marcel Fafchamps & Di Mo

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The BCD of response time analysis in experimental economics

Leonidas Spiliopoulos & Andreas Ortmann

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Higher-order risk preferences in social settings

Timo Heinrich & Thomas Mayrhofer

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Focusing on volatility information instead of portfolio weights as an aid to investor decisions

Christian Ehm, Christine Laudenbach & Martin Weber

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New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships

Crawford, Vincent P. “New directions for modelling strategic behavior: Game-theoretic models of communication, coordination, and cooperation in economic relationships." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.4 (2016): 131-50.

URL:http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.30.4.131

==original Abstract==

In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory’s principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking" and “learning" rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments

Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics

The reproducibility of scientific findings has been called into question. To contribute data about reproducibility in economics, we replicate 18 studies published in the American Economic Review and the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 2011-2014. All replications follow predefined analysis plans publicly posted prior to the replications, and have a statistical power of at least 90% to detect the original effect size at the 5% significance level. We find a significant effect in the same direction as the original study for 11 replications (61%); on average the replicated effect size is 66% of the original. The reproducibility rate varies between 67% and 78% for four additional reproducibility indicators, including a prediction market measure of peer beliefs.

Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics.pdf

經濟學是科學嗎?

經濟學是科學嗎?

來源:科學月刊,2014 年 5 月號。

諾貝爾經濟獎於 1969 年設立,在 48 年的頒獎中,總共有 24 年均有當時在芝加哥大學任教或研究的經濟學家。沙勒兒是第 34 位獲此殊榮的芝加哥大學學者,但他的理論卻完全與「芝加哥經濟學派」(Chicago school of economics)的理性經濟學說相反!

    P9.pdf

    ESA-announce WZB Berlin oTree Hackathon 26-29 October

    The first WZB oTree Hackathon, to be held 26-29 October 2017 at Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) in Berlin.

    Jointly sponsored by WZB and LEEPS lab, University of California Santa Cruz, the hackathon is intended to bring the sprawling oTree community together. Programmers and researchers will connect and exchange ideas, and will extend oTree’s capabilities. Participants will form teams with 2-5 members and intensively develop a project helpful for their own research and for the oTree community. The event is targeted both at seasoned programmers who want to develop new oTree techniques and economists interested in using oTree in their research. Also, we will be organizing a crash course for folks unfamiliar with oTree.

    If you want to find out more about the WZB oTree hackathon (or what a hackathon is) visit our Hackathon website at https://www.wzb.eu/en/events/wzb-otree-hackathon

    Registration is open till October 15. If you want to atted, please send an email to gebhard.glock by October 15, indicating your name and institution.

    Accomodation is available at Motel One (An der Urania 12, 10787 Berlin) and can be booked until September 28 by sending the hotel reservation form to the hotel. Accommodation costs during the hackathon can be reimbursed for graduate students, and food for all participants will be provided at WZB. Airfare or any other transportation costs cannot be reimbursed.

    We hope to see you soon in Berlin!

    Perceived social presence reduces fact-checking

    Jun, Y., Meng, R., & Johar, G. V. (2017). Perceived social presence reduces fact-checking. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(23), 5976–5981.

    人們一旦覺察到其他讀者的存在,進行事實查核的意願便會降低

    主要的實驗流程是這樣的:實驗參與者必須登入某新聞網站並在上面閱讀三十多個新聞標題,但這些標題有真有假,參與者的工作便是決定哪些標題是真的哪些標題是假的。每答對一題得一分,但若答錯一題也會被扣一分,最終的分數會被換算成金錢發放給參與者。選項有三個,除了「真」和「假」之外,還有「事實查核」這第三個選項。如果參與者在某一題選了「事實查核」這個選項,那他就可以在實驗結束時得知這一題的正確答案。

    ……
    參與者被分成兩組,其中一組人在登入新聞網站後,會見到自己的名字顯示在網頁角落,在此將這組稱之為「單獨」組。另一組人在登入後,除了自己的名字外,還會看到另外 102 個正在線上的其他使用者的名字,稱之為「群體」組。

    接下來的實驗更神奇了。研究者把原本的「新聞網站」改成「Facebook」,也就是讓參與者在Facebook的介面上讀這些新聞標題並判斷真偽。結果當介面換成 Facebook 這種社交網站之後,「單獨」組選擇「事實查核」的比例竟然降得跟「群體」組一樣低。

    最後一個實驗中,研究者想知道人們的警覺是不是造成「群體」組事實查核比例較低這個現象的原因之一,於是便要求參與者在開始讀新聞之前先回想自己過去和現在的職責、義務與責任(duties, obligations, and responsibilities)。這麼一做果然讓「群體」組選擇「事實查核」的比例增加到跟「單獨」組一樣高!

    來源:pansci.asia/archives/123642