Tag Archives: 2010

二月 27 2015

AJAE 農經貢獻之回顧文獻

==noted by yinung==

2010年, vol. 92, 2, AJAE 回顧了過去百年以來農經學者的貢獻, 方向含括:

生產與農場管理、農產市場、農業政策、農產貿易、農業發展、自然資源與保育、環境經濟、食品與消費經濟、鄉村發展、農企業經濟與管理、計量方法之發展。值得細閱了解。

農企業研究含食品鏈的水平和垂直參與者之協調 (agribusiness economics)、與食品鏈內的決策 (agribusiness management)

1950s 出現的研究主題:on cooperatives, farm supply markets, industrial organization, vertical integration, market power of food processing and farm supply firms,antitrust decisions, and bargaining

1960s 中: marketing structure’ of the food industry, efficiency; services to consumers; market power; regulatory activities; services such as market news;and the effects of imports; Key papers on cooperative theory and agricultural finance also appeared during the 1960s
1970-80: teaching program serving the needs of the rapidly growing nonfarm segments of the food system. Work on food system structure and performance.
===有關供應鏈===
價格傳遞機能 Wohlgenant (1989, AJAE) 或者是食品供應鏈管理和制度設計、風險移轉分擔、契約設計、體系之收入成本利潤在供應鏈成員間之分配等 ，特別供應鏈體系面臨外部需求成長及風險變動增加下的相關議題 Hendrikse and Bijman (2002, AJAE)

==AJAE 該期相關目錄如下==

    • Alex McCalla,
    • Emery Castle,
    • and Vernon Eidman

    The AAEA: Ever Growing and Changing Research Challenges

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 334–355 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq013

  • Select this article
    • Jean-Paul Chavas,
    • Robert G. Chambers,
    • and Rulon D. Pope

    Production Economics and Farm Management: a Century of Contributions

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 356–375 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq004

  • Select this article
    • Robert J. Myers,
    • Richard J. Sexton,
    • and William G. Tomek

    A Century of Research on Agricultural Markets

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 376–403 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq014

  • Select this article
    • Daniel A. Sumner,
    • Julian M. Alston,
    • and Joseph W. Glauber

    Evolution of the Economics of Agricultural Policy

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 403–423 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq015

  • Select this article
    • Tim Josling,
    • Kym Anderson,
    • Andrew Schmitz,
    • and Stefan Tangermann

    Understanding International Trade in Agricultural Products: One Hundred Years of Contributions by Agricultural Economists

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 424–446 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq011

  • Select this article
    • Christopher B. Barrett,
    • Michael R. Carter,
    • and C. Peter Timmer

    A Century-Long Perspective on Agricultural Development

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 447–468 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq005

  • Select this article
    • Erik Lichtenberg,
    • James Shortle,
    • James Wilen,
    • and David Zilberman

    Natural Resource Economics and Conservation: Contributions of Agricultural Economics and Agricultural Economists

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 469–486 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq006

  • Select this article
    • Catherine L. Kling,
    • Kathleen Segerson,
    • and Jason F. Shogren

    Environmental Economics: How Agricultural Economists Helped Advance the Field

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 487–505 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq012

  • Select this article
    • Laurian Unnevehr,
    • James Eales,
    • Helen Jensen,
    • Jayson Lusk,
    • Jill McCluskey,
    • and Jean Kinsey

    Food and Consumer Economics

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 506–521 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq007

  • Select this article
    • Elena G. Irwin,
    • Andrew M. Isserman,
    • Maureen Kilkenny,
    • and Mark D. Partridge

    A Century of Research on Rural Development and Regional Issues

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 522–553 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq008

  • Select this article
    • Robert P. King,
    • Michael Boehlje,
    • Michael L. Cook,
    • and Steven T. Sonka

    Agribusiness Economics and Management

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 554–570 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq009

  • Select this article
    • David A. Bessler,
    • Jeffrey H. Dorfman,
    • Matthew T. Holt,
    • and Jeffrey T. LaFrance

    Econometric Developments in Agricultural and Resource Economics: The First 100 Years

    Am. J. Agr. Econ. (2010) 92 (2): 571–589 doi:10.1093/ajae/aaq010

 

一月 2 2013

Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?

Alvin E. Roth (2010) “Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?" Forthcoming in Fréchette, Guillaume and Andrew Schotter (editors) The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics, Oxford University Press. harvard.edu 提供的 [PDF]

 

Introduction

The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress, and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the field several decades ago, when it and we were younger. So it will help to begin by reconstructing what some of those anticipations were.

When I surveyed parts of experimental economics in Roth (1986-7,1988), I hoped that experimentation would facilitate and improve three kinds of work in economics, which I called Speaking to Theorists, Searching for Facts, and Whispering in the Ears of Princes. By speaking to theorists I meant testing the empirical scope and content of theories (including especially formal theories that might depend on factors hard to observe or control outside the lab), and in particular testing how well and on what domains their quantitative and qualitative predictions might serve as (at least) useful approximations. By searching for facts I meant exploring empirical regularities that may not have been predicted by existing theories, and might even contradict them, but whose contours, once they had begun to be mapped by experiments, could form the basis for new knowledge and new theories. And by whispering in the ears of princes I meant formulating reliable advice, as well as communicating, justifying, and defending it.

Of course, whether experimental economics is living up to its promise could also be a question about how experimental economists are doing at developing a body of experimental methods … (see harvard.edu 提供的 [PDF])

十二月 31 2012

Do financial advisors exhibit myopic loss aversion?*

Kristoffer W. Eriksen, and Ola Kvaløy (2010) “Do financial advisors exhibit myopic loss aversion?."  Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, June 2010, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 159-170.

==original Abstract==

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been proposed as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, and a number of experiments on students indicate that people do exhibit MLA. However, many people do not rely on their own judgment when making investment decisions, but obtain help from financial investment advisors on how to allocate their wealth. The preferences and choices of financial advisors are thus important for understanding investment behavior. In this paper we make use of 50 professional financial advisors to examine whether they exhibit behavior consistent with MLA. Indeed, we find that they behave consistently with MLA to a larger extent than students.

==selected references==

  1. Bellemare, C., Krause, M., Kröger, S., Zhang, C.: Myopic loss aversion, information dissemination, and the equity premium puzzle. Econ. Lett. 87, 319–324 (2005) CrossRef
  2. Benartzi, S., Thaler, R.: Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. Q. J. Econ. 110, 73–92 (1995) CrossRef
  3. Canner, N., Mankiew, N.G., Weil, D.N.: An asset allocation puzzle. Am. Econ. Rev. 87, 181–191 (1997)
  4. Capon, N., Fitzsimons, G., Prince, R.: An individual level analysis of the mutual fund investment decision. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 10, 59–82 (1996) CrossRef
  5. De Giorgi, E., Hens, T.: Making prospect theory fit for finance. Financ. Mark. Portf. Manag. 20, 339–360 (2006) CrossRef
  6. Fellner, G., Sutter, M.: Causes, consequences and cures of myopic loss aversion—An experimental investigation. Econ. J. 119, 900–916 (2009) CrossRef
  7. Feng, L., Seasholes, M.S.: Do investor sophistication and trading experience eliminate behavioral biases in financial markets? Rev. Finance 9, 305–351 (2005) CrossRef
  8. Gneezy, U., Potters, J.: An experiment on risk taking and evaluation rounds. Q. J. Econ. 102, 631–645 (1997)
  9. Gneezy, U., Kapteyn, A., Potters, J.: Evaluation rounds and asset prices in a market experiment. J. Finance 58, 821–837 (2003) CrossRefHaigh, M.S., List, J.A.: Do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis. J. Finance 60, 523–534 (2005) CrossRef
  10. Harrison, G.W., Rutström, E.E.: Risk aversion in the laboratory. Res. Exp. Econ. 12, 41–196 (2008) CrossRef
  11. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A.: Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 263–291 (1979) CrossRef
  12. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A.: Choices, values and frames. Am. Psychol. 39, 341–350 (1984) CrossRef
  13. Langer, T., Weber, M.: Does binding of feedback influence myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis. CEPR Discussion Paper 4084, London (2003)
  14. List, J.A.: Does market experience eliminate market anomalies? Q. J. Econ. 118, 41–71 (2003) CrossRef
  15. Mehra, R., Prescott, E.: The equity premium: A puzzle. J. Monet. Econ. 15, 145–161 (1985) CrossRef
  16. Rabin, M.: Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem. Econometrica 68, 1281–1292 (2000) CrossRef
  17. Siebenmorgen, N., Weber, M.: A behavioral model for asset allocation. Financ. Mark. Portf. Manag. 17, 15–42 (2003) CrossRef
  18. Siegel, J.J., Thaler, R.: Anomalies: The equity premium puzzle. J. Econ. Perspect. 11, 191–200 (1997)
  19. Sutter, M.: Are teams prone to myopic loss aversion? An experimental study on individual versus team investment behavior. Econ. Lett. 97, 128–132 (2007) CrossRef
  20. Thaler, R.: Mental accounting and consumer choice. Mark. Sci. 4, 199–214 (1985) CrossRef
  21. Thaler, R., Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., Schwartz, A.: The effect of myopia and loss aversion on risk taking: An experimental test. Q. J. Econ. 102, 647–661 (1997)
  22. Tversky, A., Kahneman, D.: Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertain. 5, 297–323 (1992) CrossRef
十二月 7 2012

Network effects in technology acceptance: Laboratory experimental evidence

Andrea Pontiggia, Francesco Virili (2010) “Network effects in technology acceptance: Laboratory experimental evidence." International Journal of Information Management, Volume 30, Issue 1, February 2010, Pages 68–77. link thruDOI

Abstract

This research analyzes network effects in technology acceptance. The hypothesis is that the size of the user network affects technology acceptance. Even today, empirical measurement of network effects is challenging and there is a lack of experimental evidence. In order to investigate and measure the relationship between network size (number of adopters) and user acceptance, technology acceptance research needs to broaden its scope and approaches. To overcome this limitation we reproduce a particular type of technology acceptance process in a laboratory experiment, controlling for user network size and testing its influence on user perceptions and, ultimately, on acceptance decisions. We measured user perceptions and analyzed the data using consolidated and tested technology acceptance models. The results confirm our hypothesis, showing a significant effect of user network size on user perceptions. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our approach and findings.

Keywords

  • Technology acceptance;
  • Network effects;
  • Network externalities;
  • Laboratory experiment
十一月 17 2012

Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties

Carl Shapiro (2010) “Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties."American Law and Economics Review, Volume 12, Issue 2,  Pp. 509-557. doi: 10.1093/aler/ahq014 ; link to ALER.

==original Abstract==

A simple model is developed to study royalty negotiations between a patent holder and a downstream firm whose product is more valuable if it includes a feature covered by the patent. The downstream firm must make specific investments to develop, design, and sell its product before patent validity and infringement will be determined. The hold-up component of the negotiated royalties is greatest for weak patents covering a minor feature of a product with a high margin between price and marginal cost. For weak patents, the hold-up component of negotiated royalties remains unchanged even if negotiations take place before the downstream firm designs its product. The analysis has implications for the use of injunctions in patent infringement cases.

==References==

Binmore, Ken, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton. 1989. “An Outside Option Experiment,” 104(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 4753–70. link to PDF.

Elhauge, Einer. 2008. “Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?” 4(3) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 3535–70.

Farrell, Joseph, and Carl Shapiro. 2008. “How Strong Are Weak Patents?” 98(4) The American Economic Review 41347–69. Available at: DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1347. 128.32.105.3 [PDF]

Federal Trade Commission. 2003. To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance Between Competition and Patent Law and Policy. October, Available at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.

Gallini, Nancy. 2002. “The Economics of Patents: Lessons From Recent U.S. Patent Reform,” 16(2) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 2131–54.

Hall, Bronwyn, and Rose Marie Ziedonis. 2001. “The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995,” 32 The Rand Journal of Economics 101–28.

Heller, Michael, and Rebecca Eisenberg. 1998. “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-Commons in Biomedical Research,” 280 Science 698–701.

Lemley, Mark, and Carl Shapiro. 2005. “Probabilistic Patents,” 19(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 275–98. Available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley. edu/shapiro/patents.pdf.

Lemley, Mark, and Carl Shapiro. 2007a. “Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking,” 85(7) Texas Law Review 71991–2049. Available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/stacking.pdf. (see also Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking: Reply)

Lemley, Mark, and Carl Shapiro. 2007b. “Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking: Reply,” 85(7) Texas Law Review 72163–73.

Shapiro, Carl. 2001. “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting” in Jaffe Adam Lerner Joshua and Stern Scott, eds., Innovation Policy and the Economy National Bureau of Economics. Available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.

Sidak, J. Gregory. 2008. “Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro,” 92(3) Minnesota Law Review 3714–48.

五月 26 2012

Network effects in technology acceptance: Laboratory experimental evidence

Andrea Pontiggia, Francesco Virili (2010) “Network effects in technology acceptance: Laboratory experimental evidence." International Journal of Information Management, Volume 30, Issue 1, February 2010, Pages 68–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2009.07.001; unicas.it 提供的 [PDF]

Abstract

This research analyzes network effects in technology acceptance. The hypothesis is that the size of the user network affects technology acceptance. Even today, empirical measurement of network effects is challenging and there is a lack of experimental evidence. In order to investigate and measure the relationship between network size (number of adopters) and user acceptance, technology acceptance research needs to broaden its scope and approaches. To overcome this limitation we reproduce a particular type of technology acceptance process in a laboratory experiment, controlling for user network size and testing its influence on user perceptions and, ultimately, on acceptance decisions. We measured user perceptions and analyzed the data using consolidated and tested technology acceptance models. The results confirm our hypothesis, showing a significant effect of user network size on user perceptions. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our approach and findings.

Keywords

  • Technology acceptance;
  • Network effects;
  • Network externalities;
  • Laboratory experiment
一月 19 2012

Theory and experiment: What are the questions?

Theory and experiment: What are the questions? ☆

  • Vernon L. SmithCorresponding author contact information, E-mail the corresponding author
  • ESI at Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, United States
  • Received 30 October 2007. Revised 30 January 2009. Accepted 4 February 2009. Available online 24 February 2009.

Abstract

This paper deals generally with testing questions that arise both when experimental observations are in accord with the actions we predict, and when they are not. In both cases the inference of truth from observation is inherently ambiguous, and we face the daunting challenge of using our experimental skills and imagination to reduce this ambiguity. Primarily and most difficult of all we have to constantly reevaluate everything, including ourselves, especially in examining how we talk about and interpret our data. Although I will be drawing on examples and experience from laboratory experiments, the issues I consider apply just as meaningfully to other empirical studies whether from field experiments or observations from past records of socioeconomic processes.

JEL classification

  • B41;
  • C92

Keywords

  • Experimental economics;
  • Game theory;
  • Methodology of science

由Theory and experiment: What are the questions? 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.008 : Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | ScienceDirect.com.

一月 24 2011

On the role of consumer expectations in markets with network effects

Date: 2010

By: Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:13&r=net

We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network effects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (price-sensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when expectations are more stubborn. An increase of stubbornness i) reduces competition, ii) increases (decreases) the parameter region with a unique duopoly equilibrium (multiple equilibria), iii) reduces the conflict between consumer and social preferences for de facto standardization, and iv) reduces the misalignment between consumer and social preferences for compatibility. —

Keywords: Network Effects,Expectations,Duopoly,Compatibility,Welfare

JEL: D43