一月 24 2011

On the role of consumer expectations in markets with network effects

Date: 2010

By: Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:13&r=net

We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network effects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (price-sensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when expectations are more stubborn. An increase of stubbornness i) reduces competition, ii) increases (decreases) the parameter region with a unique duopoly equilibrium (multiple equilibria), iii) reduces the conflict between consumer and social preferences for de facto standardization, and iv) reduces the misalignment between consumer and social preferences for compatibility. —

Keywords: Network Effects,Expectations,Duopoly,Compatibility,Welfare

JEL: D43

一月 24 2011

Learning (Not) To Yield: An Experimental Study of Evolving Ultimatum Game Behavior

Date: 2010-12-15

By: Judith Avrahami (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality and School of Education)
Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)
Ralph Hertwig (University of Basel, Department of Psychology)
Yaakov Kareev (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality and School of Education)
Hironori Otsubo (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-092&r=net

Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token, if proposers learn fast that low offers are doomed to be rejected and adjust their offers accordingly, pressure would be lifted from responders to learn to accept such offers. Play would converge toward equal sharing. Here we tested the hypothesis that it is regret-both material and strategic-which determines how players modify their behavior. We conducted a repeated ultimatum game experiment with random strangers, in which one treatment does and another does not provide population feedback in addition to informing players about their own outcome. Our results show that regret is a good predictor of the dynamics of play. Specifically, we will turn to the dynamics that unfold when players make repeated decisions in the ultimatum game with randomly changing opponents, and when they learn not only about their own outcome in the previous round but also find out how the population on average has adapted to previous results (path dependence).

Keywords: Ultimatum bargaining game, Reputation, Regret, Learning, Experiment

JEL: C78