Privacy, trust and social network formation

Privacy, trust and social network formation

Date:	2015
By:	Gaudeul, Alexia Giannetti, Caterina
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:269&r=net
	We study in the laboratory the impact of private information revelation on the selection of partners when forming individual networks. Our experiment combines a “network game" and a “public-good game". In the network game, individuals decide with whom to form a link with, while in the public-good game they decide whether or not to contribute. The variations in our treatments allow us to identify the effect of revealing one´s name on the probability of link formation. Our main result suggests that privacy mechanisms affect partner selection and the consequent structure of the network: when individuals reveal their real name, their individual networks are smaller but their profits are higher. This indicates that the privacy costs of revealing personal information are compensated by more productive links.
Keywords:	privacy,social networks,public goods,trust
JEL:	D12 D85

A Fine Rule From a Brutish World? An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and Trust

==notes by yinung==

想法: 集體懲罰 (連坐法, 本文稱之為 collective punishment mechanism) versus 集體獎勵 對集體決策和個體決策之影響?

可以適用在小朋友身上? 或球隊成員身上 ==> 對幼童教育、企業組織、軍隊等不同主體之影響?

Q: 作者說, 連坐法顯著 increase trustworthiness, 且 to a lesser extent also trust; 不知 trustworthiness 和 trust 之間定義有何差異?

A Fine Rule From a Brutish World? An Experiment on Endogenous Punishment Institution and Trust

Date:	2015-09
By:	H. Sun M. Bigoni
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1031&r=net
	By means of a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment mechanism within a one-shot binary trust game. The experiment comprises three games. In the first one, the only equilibrium strategy is not to trust, and not to reciprocate. In the second we exogenously introduce a sanctioning rule that imposes on untrustworthy second-movers a penalty proportional to the number of those who reciprocate trust. This generates a second equilibrium where everybody trusts and reciprocates. In the third game, the collective punishment mechanism is adopted through majority-voting. In line with the theory, we find that the exogenous introduction of the punishment mechanism significantly increases trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also trust. However, in the third game the majority of subjects vote against it: subjects seem to be unable to endogenously adopt an institution which, when exogenously imposed, proves to be efficiency enhancing.
JEL:	C72 C92 D72

Natural Experiments in Macroeconomics

Date:	2015-05
By:	Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola Hassan, Tarek
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10628&r=net
	A growing literature relies on natural experiments to establish causal effects in macroeconomics. In diverse applications, natural experiments have been used to verify underlying assumptions of conventional models, quantify specific model parameters, and identify mechanisms that have major effects on macroeconomic quantities but are absent from conventional models. We discuss and compare the use of natural experiments across these different applications and summarize what they have taught us about such diverse subjects as the validity of the Permanent Income Hypothesis, the size of the fiscal multiplier, and about the effects of institutions, social structure, and culture on economic growth. We also outline challenges for future work in each of these fields, give guidance for identifying useful natural experiments, and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the approach.
Keywords:	Civic Capital; Fiscal Multiplier; Institutions; Multiple Equilibria; Networks; Permanent Income Hypothesis; Social Structure; Social Ties; Trust
JEL:	C1 C9 E21 E62 H31 O11 O14 O43 O50

New Zealand Economic Papers: Special Issue: Economic Psychology and Experimental Economics

New Zealand Economic Papers: Special Issue: Economic Psychology and Experimental Economics, 2011, Volume 45, Issue 1 & 2, 1-207.

Introduction

Psychology and economics: An introduction to the special issue
Simon Kemp; Gabrielle Wall
Pages 1 – 4
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Research articles

From anecdotes to novels: Reflective inputs for behavioural economics
Peter E. Earl
Pages 5 – 22
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Aspiration formation and satisficing in search with(out) competition
Werner Güth; Torsten Weiland
Pages 23 – 45
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Are conditional cooperators willing to forgo efficiency gains? Evidence from a public goods experiment
M. Vittoria Levati; Matteo Ploner; Stefan Traub
Pages 47 – 57
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Who makes the pie bigger? An experimental study on co-opetition
Juan A. Lacomba; Francisco Lagos; Tibor Neugebauer
Pages 59 – 68
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An experimental examination of the effect of potential revelation of identity on satisfying obligations
Lucy F. Ackert; Bryan K. Church; Shawn Davis
Pages 69 – 80
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Gender differences in trust and reciprocity in repeated gift exchange games
Ananish Chaudhuri; Erwann Sbai
Pages 81 – 95
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Do separation rules matter? An experimental study of commitment
Filip Vesely; Vivian Lei; Scott Drewianka
Pages 97 – 117
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Overcapitalization and cost escalation in housing renovation
Ti-Ching Peng
Pages 119 – 138
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Over-indebtedness and the interplay of factual and mental money management: An interview study
Bernadette Kamleitner; Bianca Hornung; Erich Kirchler
Pages 139 – 160
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Coherence and bidirectional reasoning in complex and risky decision-making tasks
C. Gustav Lundberg
Pages 161 – 181
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Outwit, outplay, outcast? Sex discrimination in voting behaviour in the reality television show Survivor
Gabrielle Wall
Pages 183 – 193
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Ambiguity, the certainty illusion, and the natural frequency approach to reasoning with inverse probabilities
John Fountain; Philip Gunby
Pages 195 – 207
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Comment on Promises and Partnership

Comment on Promises and Partnership

Date: 2011-04-11

By: Cary Deck

Maroš Servátka

Steven Tucker (University of Canterbury)

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:11/14&r=net

Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping was due to external influence and reputational concerns. Our data are statistically indistinguishable from those of Charness and Dufwenberg and therefore provide strong evidence that their observed effects regarding the impact of communication are due to internal factors and not due to an outside bystander.

Keywords: Experiment; promises; partnership; guilt aversion; psychological game theory; trust; lies; social distance; behavioral economics; hidden action

JEL: C70

REFERENCES

Battigalli, P. and M. Dufwenberg (2007) “Guilt in Games,” American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 97(2), 170-76.

Battigalli, P. and M. Dufwenberg (2008) “Dynamic Psychological Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 144(1), 1-35.

Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe (1995) “Trust, Reciprocity and Social History,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (1), 122-42.

Charness, G. and M. Dufwenberg (2006) “Promises and Partnership,” Econometrica 74(6), 1579-1601.

Cox, J.C. (2004) “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity” Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2), 260-81.

Cox, J. C. (2009) “Trust and Reciprocity: Implications of Game Triads and Social Contexts,” New Zealand Economic Papers. Special Issue: Laboratory Experiments in Economics, Finance and Political Science, 43(2), 89 – 104.