‘Lead, Follow or Cooperate’: Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games.

‘Lead, Follow or Cooperate’: Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games.

Date: 2011
By: Marco Marini (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino “Carlo Bo" and CREI, Università di Roma III)
Giorgio Rodano (Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica “Antonio Ruberti", Università di Roma “La Sapienza")
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:urb:wpaper:11_12&r=net
The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their actions coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play as singletons with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players’ actions in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early (as a grand coalition) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when playersstrategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is a¤ected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players’ best-replies appears crucial both for the success of cooperation as well as for the players’ choice of sequencing their market actions.
Keywords: Endogenous Timing, Cooperation
JEL: C70

Critical mass 實驗可能的相關文獻

A Etziony… – 2001 – faculty.biu.ac.il
Such markets are characterized by the necessity for consumers to believe that a certain minimum number of people will buy the good (the critical mass) in order to make purchase worthwhile. In our experiment, consumers were offered the option of buying a good at a certain
被引用 11 次相關文章HTML 版全部共 6 個版本;
biu.ac.il 提供的 [PDF]
G Devetag – Economics Letters, 2005 – Elsevier
JEL classification: C72; C92. Article Outline. 1. Introduction 2. Description of the experiment 2.1.
The minimum effort game 2.2. The critical mass game 2.3. Experimental design and
implementation 3. Results Acknowledgements References. 1. Introduction.
被引用 19 次相關文章全部共 7 個版本
G Devetag – Experimental economics, 2003 – Springer
Due to the high number of subjects required, the three information treatments were tested
only for the Critical Mass game in this first round of experiments, while only the FULL
INFORMATION condition was tested for the Increasing Returns game.
被引用 20 次相關文章全部共 16 個版本;
psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]
TW Valente – Social Networks, 1996 – Elsevier
1–8. E. Oliver Pamela, Gerald Marwell and Ruy Teixeira, A theory of the critical mass. 15–24.
Bryce Ryan and Neal C. Gross, Acceptance and Diffusion of Hybrid Corn Seed in Two Iowa
Communities, Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, Research Bulletin No. 372 (1950).
被引用 301 次相關文章全部共 9 個版本;
nsdl.org 提供的 [PDF]
SK Grumbacher, KM McEwen… – American Journal of Physics, Volume 61, Issue 4, pp. 329-335 (1993) – physics.udel.edu
The experiment described in this article allows students to observe universal phenomena in a “sandpile" which can be explained by a power-law “GA Held, DH Solina, DT Keane, WJ Haag, PM Horn, and G. Grinstein, “Experimental study of criticalmass fluctuations in an
被引用 38 次相關文章全部共 5 個版本;
udel.edu 提供的 [PDF]


V Mak… – 2006 – papers.ssrn.com
Page 1. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=947688 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Betting on the Trend: An Experimental Study on Network Externalities with Continuous Demand Vincent Mak

Mechanism Experiments and Policy Evaluations

Ludwig, Jens, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2011. “Mechanism Experiments and Policy Evaluations." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3): 17–38.

Abstract Randomized controlled trials are increasingly used to evaluate policies. How can we make these experiments as useful as possible for policy purposes? We argue greater use should be made of experiments that identify the behavioral mechanisms that are central to clearly specified policy questions, what we call “mechanism experiments." These types of experiments can be of great policy value even if the intervention that is tested (or its setting) does not correspond exactly to any realistic policy option.

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See also Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 25, Issue 3 — Summer 2011

(2) Why Economists Should Conduct Field Experiments and 14 Tips for Pulling One Off
John A. List
In this introduction to the symposium, I first offer an overview of the spectrum of experimental methods in economics, from laboratory experiments to the field experiments that are the subject of this symposium. I then offer some thoughts about the potential gains from doing economic research using field experiments and my own mental checklist of 14 steps to improve the chances of carrying out an economics field experiment successfully.
Full-Text Access | Supplementary Materials
(4) The Role of Theory in Field Experiments
David Card, Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier
We classify all published field experiments in five top economics journals from 1975 to 2010 according to how closely the experimental design and analysis are linked to economic theory. We find that the vast majority of field experiments (68 percent) are Descriptive studies that lack any explicit model; 18 percent are Single Model studies that test a single model-based hypothesis; 6 percent are Competing Models studies that test competing model-based hypotheses; and 8 percent are Parameter Estimation studies that estimate structural parameters in a completely specified model. We also classify laboratory experiments published in these journals over the same period and find that economic theory has played a more central role in the laboratory than in the field. Finally, we discuss in detail three sets of field experiments—on gift exchange, on charitable giving, and on negative income tax—that illustrate both the benefits and the potential costs of a tighter link between experimental design and theoretical underpinnings.
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(5) Field Experiments with Firms
Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay and Imran Rasul
We discuss how the use of field experiments sheds light on long-standing research questions relating to firm behavior. We present insights from two classes of experiments—within and across firms—and draw common lessons from both sets. Field experiments within firms generally aim to shed light on the nature of agency problems. Along these lines, we discuss how field experiments have provided new insights on shirking behavior and the provision of monetary and nonmonetary incentives. Field experiments across firms generally aim to uncover firms’ binding constraints by exogenously varying the availability of key inputs such as labor, physical capital, and managerial capital. We conclude by discussing some of the practical issues researchers face when designing experiments and by highlighting areas for further research.
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IREE:2010 Special issue: Experimental Economics in the Classroom

International Review of Economics Education

(IREE), Volume 9, Issue 2, 2010

Mike Watts and Ross Guest

Discovering Economics in the Classroom with Experimental Economics and the Scottish Enlightenment
Taylor Jaworski, Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson

Teaching Opportunity Cost in an Emissions Permit Experiment
Charles Holt, Erica Myers, Markus Wrake, Dallas Burtraw and Svante Mandell

Do Classroom Experiments Affect the Number of Economics Enrollments and Majors?
Tisha Emerson and Beck Taylor

Experiential Learning with Experiments
Henrik Egbert and Vanessa Mertins

Patents and R&D: a Classroom Experiment
Amy Diduch

To Work or Not to Work … That is the Question: Labour Market Decisions in the Classroom
Arlene Garces-Ozanne and Phyll Esplin

Using Economic Classroom Experiments
Todd R. Kaplan and Dieter Balkenborg

macroeconomic experiment – Google 學術搜尋

總體經濟實驗:google 蒐尋結果

檔案類型: PDF/Adobe Acrobat – 快速檢視

This work is a continuation of a macroeconomic classroom experiment Although the number of macroeconomic experiments has increased over the past five

[PDF] Experimental Macroeconomics


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由 J Duffy 著作被引用 15 次相關文章
sociology. 2 Insights from Macroeconomic Experiments. To date, experimental macroeconomics research has yielded some important insights, including

這一篇是簡要的文獻回顧; 其中有提到其它的文獻回顧:

Surveys of experimental macroeconomics are found in Ochs (1995), Duffy (1998) and Ricciuti (2004).

  • Ochs, J. (1995), “Coordination Problems,” in J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth, eds., The Handbook of Experimental Economics Princeton: Princeton University Press, 195—251.
  • Duffy, J. (1998), “Monetary Theory in the Laboratory,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Review, 80 (September/October), 9-26.
  • Ricciuti, R. (2004) “Bringing Macroeconomics into the Lab” International Center for Economic Research, working paper no. 26.

[PDF] Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research∗


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由 J Duffy 著作2008被引用 6 次相關文章
This chapter surveys laboratory experiments addressing macroeconomic phenomena. The …. competitive equilibrium as the first macro-economic experiment.

這一篇是較完整的文獻回顧 (應該是準備要出書的)


Denise Hazlett’s Classroom Experiments in Macroeconomics

Money Supply Game  in Economics Network Economics Network of the Higher Education Academy


Course: Barcelona LeeX Experimental Economics Summer School in Macroeconomics