引自: Daniel Friedman and Alessandra Cassar, Economics Lab: An Intensive Course in Experimental Economics, Routledge, London and New York (2004) pp. 248


Hertwig, R. and Ortman, A. (2001) “Experimental practices in economics: a challenge for psychologist? ” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24:383–403. link to PDF

兩學門間有4 種主要之差異 (p.18)

  1. Script versus open-ended

  2. Repeated trials versus one-shot

  3. Salient pay

  4. Deception

主要差異項目 經濟實驗 心理實驗
實驗說明 script 強調完整之角色定義, 互動模式, 報酬如何決定
Economists (drawing on Siegel’s tradition) almost always include detailed formal written instructions for subjects defining their roles, interactions, and payoffs. Psychologists in recent decades seldom use written instructions and usually are quite casual about describing the task to the subjects.
Psychologists in recent decades seldom use written instructions and usually are quite casual about describing the task to the subjects
實驗進行 受試者重覆試驗相同之情境 repeated trials
Economists since Smith (1962) typically have subjects repeat the task or interactions several times, and focus on data from later repetitions when they are sure that the subjects are fully adjusted to the environment.
受試者只進行一次實驗 one-shot Psychologists more commonly just give the subjects one shot at any particular task.
受試者報酬 以實驗參與之表現優劣支付現金
Economists almost always pay subjects in cash based on performance.
很少支付現金, 且是固定金額
Psychologists seldom pay cash, and when they do, they usually pay a flat amount unrelated to performance.
資訊真實性 幾乎不會採用誤導
Deception of any kind is taboo among experimental economists.
A large fraction of social psychology experiments attempt to mislead the subjects as to the true nature of the task.


Role of theory

Economics has a core theory that assumes self-interest, rationality, and equilibrium. Theory in psychology is more descriptive and eclectic. Hence, psychologists are less concerned with salient rewards, repeated trials, etc. that give economic theory a better shot.

Role of institutions

Following a suggestion by Sunder in Friedman and Sunder (1994), Figure 2.2 presents a spectrum of economic situations based on the institutional constraints. Personal preferences are the dominant influence in individual choice tasks but play a minor role for firms in strong institutions such as markets. Cognitive psychologists prefer to work at the weak institution end of the spectrum, while social psychologists study quite different social constraints. By contrast, economic analysis emphasizes the institutional constraints, as we will see in Chapter 3.

實驗說明 script open-ended
實驗進行 r r

實驗相關文獻 in 管理科學 Management Science

有人整理了專門發表在 Management Science 的文章,哇,沒想到有這麼多…, 以下列出一些我較有興趣、近期的實驗相關文獻

Abdellaoui, M., E. Diecidue and A. Öncüler. 2011. Risk preferences at different time periods: An experimental investigation. Management Science (May): 975-987.

Abdellaoui, M., F. Vossmann and M. Weber. 2005. Choice-based elicitation and decomposition of decision weights for gains and losses under uncertainty. Management Science (September): 1384-1399. (JSTOR link).

Abedellaoui, M., O. L’Haridon and C. Paraschiv. 2011. Experience vs. described uncertainty: Do we need two prospect theory specifications? Management Science (October): 1879-1895.

Allon, G. and A. Bassamboo. 2011. Buying from the babbling retailer? The impact of availability information on customer behavior. Management Science (April): 713-726.

Amaldoss, W. and S. Jain. 2005. Conspicuous consumption and sophisticated thinking. Management Science (October): 1449-1466. (JSTOR link).

這篇是理論, 但也有 Laboratory test

Aral, S. and D. Walker. 2011. Creating social contagion through viral product design: A randomized trial of peer influence in networks. Management Science (September): 1623-1639.

Budescu, D. V. and B. Maciejovsky. 2005. The effect of payoff feedback and information pooling on reasoning errors: Evidence from experimental markets. Management Science (December): 1829-1843. (JSTOR link).

Cason, T. N., K. N. Kannan and R. Siebert. 2011. An experimental study of information revelation policies in sequential auctions. Management Science (April): 667-688.

Chen, H., S. H. Ham and N. Lim. 2011. Designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants: An experimental study. Management Science (May): 864-883.

Chen-Ritzo, C., T. P. Harrison, A. M. Kwasnica and D. J. Thomas. 2005. Better, faster, cheaper: An experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback. Management Science (December): 1753-1762. (JSTOR link).

Ding, M., J. Eliashberg, J. Huber and R. Saini. 2005. Emotional bidders: An analytical and experimental examination of consumers’ behavior in a priceline-like reverse auction. Management Science (March): 352-364. (JSTOR link).

Harbaugh, R., J. W. Maxwell and B. Roussillon. 2011. Label confusion: The Groucho effect of uncertain standards. Management Science (September): 1512-1527.

Harbring, C. and B. Irlenbusch. 2011. Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a laboratory experiment. Management Science (April): 611-627.

Kalkanci, B., Y. Chen and F. Erhun. 2011. Contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information: An experimental evaluation. Management Science (April): 689-704.

Katok, E. and E. Siemsen. 2011. Why genius leads to adversity: Experimental evidence on the reputational effects of task difficulty choices. Management Science (June): 1042-1054.

Oiu, J. and E. Steiger. 2011. Understanding the tow components of risk attitudes: An experimental analysis. Management Science (January): 193-199.

Stecher, J., T. Shields and J. Dickhaut. 2011. Generating ambiguity in the laboratory. Management Science (April): 705-712.

Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences

Falk, Armin and James J. Heckman (2009), “Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences," Science , 326, 23 October, 535-8.

==Notes by yinung==

這篇在 Science 刊出的文章, 簡要地回顧實驗經濟之貢獻, 和對此一研究方法質疑之答辯。

FAQ of 經濟與行為實驗

1. 經濟實驗室之實驗脫離現實 (realism)

一般人認為,相對於現地實驗 (field experiment) 而言,實驗室之經濟實驗脫離現實,但 Falk 和 Heckman (2009) 認為,各種研究法的重點在於是否能有效區隔不同因素之影響,以能明白確定因果關係。Lab 實驗可以對其它條件有更多的控制,然而 field 實驗提供更多接近現實的其它條件之變異程度。兩者應該是互補關係,而非替代。

2. 實驗室之實驗報酬太低,使得受試者之誘因不足

Colin F. Camerer and Robin M. Hogarth (1999) 的 survey 文章回顧 74 篇實驗文獻,其中包含給予受試者低或高、甚至是零報酬的實驗。他們的結論是實驗中實際報酬對受試者的動機影響不一且複雜。兩種對給予受試者報酬的極端論點: (1) 貨幣報酬 (monetary rewards) 動機對受試者絕無影響; (2) 貨幣報酬可以完全消除受試者不理性之行為,皆是不正確的。而且許多實驗, 貨幣動機大小並不影響受試者的平均表現 (特別是市場交易的實驗),有些是毫無影響,甚至有些反而有反效果 (即貨幣報酬動機愈大,受試者反而表現愈不好)。

3. 受試者或觀察值過少

4. 受試者在被觀察之下的行為異於實驗室外的行為 (又稱 「Hawthorne 效果」)

如同在實驗室中的人決策行為, 一般人在真實世界的許多行為也是可被觀察的。lab 實驗反而可以研究 不同"被觀察程度" 對實驗結果之影響,例如 (以影像紀錄, single-blind, double-blind 等不同實驗進行方式)

5. 受試者是志願報名,故樣本有自我選擇之偏誤

這個問題同樣存在於 field 和 social experiment s, 並非只存在於 lab experiment。lab 實驗反而可以篩選控制受試者的背景,甚至研究不樣本篩選下,對實驗結果之影響。

==original Abstract==

Laboratory experiments are a widely used methodology for advancing causal knowledge in the physical and life sciences. With the exception of psychology, the adoption of laboratory experiments has been much slower in the social sciences, although during the past two decades the use of lab experiments has accelerated. Nonetheless, there remains considerable resistance among social scientists who argue that lab experiments lack “realism” and generalizability. In this article, we discuss the advantages and limitations of laboratory social science experiments by comparing them to research based on nonexperimental data and to field experiments. We argue that many recent objections against lab experiments are misguided and that even more lab experiments should be conducted.


以下幾篇文章引自 Al Roth網頁


幾下的文章, 待閱讀、消化與整理


Various critiques of experimental and behavioral economics:

… to be continued


Falk, Armin and James J. Heckman (2009), “Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences," Science , 326, 23 October, 535-8. (詳見本站另一頁之注; 按: Heckman 為 2000年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主)


  • Ken Binmore and Avner Shaked (2010) “Experimental economics: Where next?" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 73 (2010) 87–100. link to PDF
    此篇是利用 inequality aversion 為案例來批評實驗方法,並提及 public good game、auctioning game、contract gamez。

Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

source: Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

由 Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith 主編, 回顧各種實驗之結果, 出版於 2008年, ISBN: 9780444826428


Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 1st Edition,Charles Plott,Vernon Smith,ISBN9780444826428Experimental methods in economics respond to circumstances that are not completely dictated by accepted theory or outstanding problems. While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appear blurred and may produce results that vary from strong support to little or partial support of the relevant theory.
At a recent conference, a question was asked about where experimental methods might be more useful than field methods. Although many cannot be answered by experimental methods, there are questions that can only be answered by experiments. Much of the progress of experimental methods involves the posing of old or new questions in a way that experimental methods can be applied.
The title of the book reflects the spirit of adventure that experimentalists share and focuses on experiments in general rather than forcing an organization into traditional categories that do not fit. The emphasis reflects the fact that the results do not necessarily demonstrate a consistent theme, but instead reflect bits and pieces of progress as opportunities to pose questions become recognized.
This book is a result of an invitation sent from the editors to a broad range of experimenters asking them to write brief notes describing specific experimental results. The challenge was to produce pictures and tables that were self-contained so the reader could understand quickly the essential nature of the experiments and the results.

Table of Contents


注意 ch7. 中的這篇, 是有關報酬效果和風險偏好
Susan K. Laury and Charles A. Holt, “Payoff Scale Effects and Risk Preference Under Real and Hypothetical Conditions"

注意 ch 8. 其中的這一篇是有關有 lottery 程序控制風險偏好
Joyce E. Berg, Jhon W.Dickhaut and Thomas A.Rietz, “On the Performance of the Lottery Procedure for Controlling Risk Perferences"

Alvin E. Roth (艾文‧羅斯)

實驗經濟學的大師級人物: 艾文‧羅斯

艾文‧羅斯 (Alvin E. Roth) 是美國哈佛大學經濟系教授

史丹佛大學博士。著作等身,並編有 Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995), Princeton University Press. 研究專長為賽局理論、實驗經濟、和市場機制設計 (market design)。


Spring 2012 course in Experimental Economics (Ec 2040/HBS 4160)

Fall 2011 Market Design course (supplemented by a Market Design Blog)

有關用實驗進行 policy evaluations

Roth 的 papers

  • Roth, Alvin E. 2002. “The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation
    as Tools for Design Economics.” Econometrica 70 (4): 1341–78.
  • Roth, Alvin E. 2007. “Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets.” Journal of Economic Perspectives
    21 (3): 37–58.
  • Roth, Alvin E. 2008. “What Have We Learned from Market Design?” Economic Journal 118 (527):

Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate

Kessler, Judd B., and Alvin E. Roth. 2012. “Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate." American Economic Review, 102(5): 2018–47. DOI:10.1257/aer.102.5.2018; Download Data Set

==noted by yinung==

哇! 器管捐贈也可以進行 lab 行為實驗來評估等候名單優先序之政策。

又見 Alvin Roth 的新作。不過除了實驗之外, 此文還建立了一個 simple model 理論模型來討論, 難怪可以上 AER…

器管捐贈註冊 (registry) 可以視為公共財 (因為 no medically eligible candidate can be excluded under present US law), …In other words, registering to be an organ donor resembles a public good ex ante that is a private good ex post. … the allocation rules allow for nondonors to be excluded (or to have a smaller probability of receiving an organ), effectively turning the registry into a club good…

分配法則將 public good 轉為 club good, 故可提高捐贈之意願…


Organ donations from deceased donors provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists might impact donations. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration. (JEL C91, D64, I11)

Economics in the Laboratory

Vernon L. Smith (1994) “Economics in the Laboratory." Journal of Economic Perspectives ,Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter, 1994 , pp. 113-131. (link to JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138154) (AEAWeb:JEP (PDF))

==Summary by yinung==

Smith 在此文回顧了實證經濟學的重要貢獻 (其題為 “為何經濟學家要做實驗?" (why do economists conduct experiments?)), 他列舉以下 7 大理由,其實就是經濟實驗的主要功能:


1. Test a theory,or discriminate between theories

2. Explore the causes of a theory’sfailure.

3. Establish empirical regularities as a basis for new theory

4. Compare environments.

5. Compare institutions

6. Evaluate policy proposals.

7. The laboratory as a testing ground for institutional design.


Smith 並總結了經濟實驗多年來所發現之重要結論 (基於 制度 (institutions)、環境 (environments)、與行為 (behaviors) 之架構; 不過我認為還要加上「資訊」(information) 和 「預期之形成」(expectations formation) ):

1. Institutions Matter

2. Unconscious Optimization in Market Interactions

3. Information: Less Can Be Better

4. Common Information is Not Sufficient to Yield Common Expectations or “Knowledge"

5. Dominated Strategies Are for Playing, Not Eliminating

6. Efficiency and Underrevelation Are Compatible

7. The Endowment Effect

8. Fairness: Taste or Expectation?


水星運行之軌道未遵循牛頓運動定律之預測,並沒有讓科學家認為該運動定律是錯誤的,反而是斷定水星和太陽中間,必定有一個未知的行星 (甚至被命名為火神星 (Vulcan) [註 1] ) 干擾了水星應該運行之路徑… (Smith, 1994, p.127)

Smith 指出,任何對理論的驗證 (test),都避免不了必要的輔助假設 (auxiliary hypotheses),如此才能將觀察的結果解釋為對該理論的驗證結果。這些「輔助假設」常有很多不同的名詞,諸如: 啟始條件 (initial conditions) 、其它條件相同 (ceteris paribus clauses)、背景資訊 (background information)、… 等。

因此可以說,所有對理論的驗證,都隱含是一種聯合檢定 (joint tests) ; 亦即,對理論的驗證皆是條件式檢定,其皆建立在輔助假設 (auxiliary hypotheses) 成立的前提之下。

這就為何實驗文獻之發現,常被批評的原因, 如同「杜恩─奎因論題」(Duhem-Quine Thesis) 所述之「指任何理論儘管出現推翻它的證據,我們只要在我們的信念網絡中作一點改變,便可以繼續接受該理論」 (see 淺談「杜咸-奎因論旨」與非充分決定性論證)

Smith 在此文並對一些對實驗經濟研究法之批評,提出反駁。例如 Harrison (1992) 認為經濟實驗所得到的錯誤觀是因為受試者的實驗報酬之機會成本太低,所以才會偏離理論之預測。Smith and Walker (1993) 的 近 30 年文獻回顧說明了受試者所獲之「貨幣報酬的確可以改善受試者之表現 (在某些條件之下)」,但其它除了「受試者報酬」之條件也同樣重要,因為增加受試者報酬並沒有讓那些偏離理論所預測的觀察消失 (many anomalies do not disappear by escalating payoffs, p.127)

… 未完成, 待續…

===3. Information: Less Can Be Better===

這是個有趣的現象:競爭者知道對手的資訊愈多,反而不利市場機𠛻運作 (TBD: 指哪些?)
Providing subjects with complete information, far from improving market competition, tends to make it worse.
市場運作:CDA 實驗發現 private info. 收歛較快 (Smith, 1991, 6); 在寡佔市場 Fouraker and Siegel (1963) for Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly; 還有 Noussair and Porter (1992) and Brown-Kruse (1992, 未出版);
Roth (1987, 一本書) 也提到Nash bargaining game 的實驗:不知道對手的 prize 比較會符合 Nash 的預測 (YNY:嫉妒?)。但Schelling (1957) 和 Siegel and Fouraker (1960) 卻提出知道別人,反而會「諒解」(more forgiving) 的看法。 Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) 把它稱做 curse of knowledge
YNY:Smith 認為
1. 更多資訊讓參與者可找到更多自利的機會,或者懲罰別人的策略 (p.119, sec 1),
2. 也有人用 folk theorem 來解釋 (多回合交手後,傾向合作而非競爭)
3. 嫉妒別人
4. 諒解別人


  • Smith, Vernon L., and James M. Walker, “Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics," Economic Inquiry,April 1993, 31, 245-61.
註 1: 水星偏離軌道 (水星的軌道偏離正圓程度很大,近日點距太陽僅四千六百萬千米,遠日點卻有7千萬千米,在軌道的近日點它以十分緩慢的速度按歲差圍繞太陽向前運行, see 背景資料:神秘的水星) 的真正原因,普遍相信可以由爱因斯坦所提出的广义相对论所解釋,即由于太阳质量较大,水星受它的引力作用也较大,在其附近的空间发生了较大的“弯曲” 所致。
  • Noussair, Charles and David Porter, “Allocating Priority with Auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, October 1992, 19, 169-195.
  • Roth, Alvin E., “Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory," in A. E. Roth (ed.)
    Laboratory Experimentation in Economics. Cambridge University Press, 1987
  • Schelling, T. C., “Bargaining, Communication and Limited War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957, 1, 19-36.
  • Siegel, Sidney and Lawrence E. Fouraker, Bargaining and Group Decision Making:
    Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
  • Camerer, Colin F., George Loewenstein and Martin Weber, “The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: Experimental Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, October 1989, 97, 1232-1254.