Tag Archives: 2012

二月 27 2015

The advantage of resource queues over spot resource markets: decision coordination in experiments under resource uncertainty

Fonseca, Miguel A., Alexander Pfaff, and Daniel Osgood. “The advantage of resource queues over spot resource markets: decision coordination in experiments under resource uncertainty." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94.5 (2012): 1136-1153. [oxfordjournals.org]; [Open Access PDF]

==Notes by yinung==

本文用實驗法探討灌溉水源 (以 water queues 的形式) 的事前分配 (用 bidding) vs 事後水源拍賣，對生產決策 (種高/低水量需求作物) 之影響。以2007-08 英國 Exeter 大學學生和巴西農業區半工半讀的學生或公務員為受試者，實驗結果證明，事前的 water queues 制度，相對於事後的 spot market 分配水源的制度，有助於提昇效率。
其原因主要是在，決策者面對 environmental and strategic 兩種不確定之下, 可以利用先知道對手對環境不確定之選擇，用來當做生產決策協調之依據。
[引文] The advantage of resource queues over spot markets concerns two types of uncertainty, environmental and strategic.
(較早寫的)
此篇用經濟實驗法, 研究農民在灌溉用水不確定下之決策; 投入種子、肥料、整地的成本, 但利潤取決於不確定供水。在環境不確定 (雨量多寡) 前，先以 bidding (water queues) 決定用水優先序，可做為投入種植決策之協調機制，使得在事前 water queues 制度下， 比雨量確定後才拍賣決定水權制度更有效率。

==abstract==

Farmers have to make key decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil, before knowing how much water they will get. They face losses if they make costly decisions but do not receive water, and they may forego profits if they receive water without being prepared. We consider the coordination of farmers’ decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil when farmers must divide an uncertain water supply. We compare ex-ante queues (pre-decision) to
an ex-post spot market (post-decision & post-rain) in experiments in rural Brazil and a university in England. Queues have greater coordination success than does the spot market.

==References==

Lefebvre, M., L. Gangadharan, and S. Thoyer. 2012. “Do Security-Differentiated Water Rights Improve the Performance of Markets?” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. doi:10.1093/ajae/aas060.
本文回顧到這篇:
The most relevant experiment of which we are aware is that of Lefebvre et al. (2012), which studies profits with security-differentiated water rights (mimicking the essence of a queue) versus non-differentiated, equal share rights. The differentiated rights are seen to have profit and risk-management benefits relative to the non-differentiated rights.
六月 3 2013

Production economics in the presence of risk

Shankar, S. (2012). Production economics in the presence of risk*. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 56(4), 597-620.  Wiley;

==original Abstract==

This paper provides an overview of the literature on production under the influence of risk. Various specifications of stochastic production function such as models with additive and multiplicative uncertainty, Just and Pope model, output-cubical, state-allocable and state-general models are discussed. Further, criteria determining optimal producer behaviour are derived for deterministic production technology and for various kinds of state-contingent technologies such as output-cubical, state-specific, state-allocable and state-general technologies. Finally, a brief discussion is presented about the drawbacks of each of these specifications of technology.

References

  • Arrow, K.J. (1953). Le des valeurs boursiers pour la repartition la meillure des risques. Technical report, Cahiers du Seminair d’Economie, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris.
  • Briec, W. and Cavaignac, L. (2009). An extension of the multi-output statecontingent production model, Journal of Economic Theory 39, 43–64.
  • Chambers, R.G. and Quiggin, J. (1998). Cost functions and duality for stochastic technologies, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80(2), 288–295.
  • Chambers, R.G. and Quiggin, J. (2000). Uncertainty, Production, Choice and Agency: The State-Contingent Approach. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
  • Chambers, R.G. and Quiggin, J. (2002). The state-contingent properties of stochastic production functions, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84(2), 513–526.
    Direct Link:
  • Chambers, R.G. and Quiggin, J. (2003). Price stabilization and the risk-averse firm, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(2), 336–347.
    Direct Link:
  • Chavas, J.-P. (2008). A cost approach to economic analysis under state-contingent production uncertainty, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90(2), 435–446.
    Direct Link:
  • Debreu, G. (1952). A social equilibrium existence theorem, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (38), 886–893.
  • Hirshleifer, J. and Riley, J.G. (1992). The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  • Jaramillo, P.E., Useche, P., Barham, B.L. and Foltz, J.D. (2010). The state contingent approach to farmers’ valuation and adoption of new biotech crops: Nitrogen-fertilizer and drought tolerance traits. July 2010 Annual Meeting. Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, Denver, CO.
  • Just, R.E. (2003). Risk research in agricultural economics: opportunities and challenges for the next twenty-five years, Agricultural Systems 75, 123–159.
  • Just, R.E. and Pope, R.D. (1978). Stochastic specification of production functions and economic implications, Journal of Econometrics 7(1), 67–86.
  • Kumbhakar, S.C. (2002). Specification and estimation of production risk, risk preferences and technical efficiency, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84(1), 8–22.
    Direct Link:
  • Love, H.A. and Buccola, S.T. (1991). Joint risk preference-technology estimation with a primal system, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73(3), 765–774.
  • Love, H.A. and Buccola, S.T. (1999). Joint risk preference-technology estimation with a primal system: reply. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81(1), 245–247.
  • Nauges, C., O’Donnell, C. and Quiggin, J. (2009). Uncertainty and technical efficiency in finnish agriculture. Number (53rd) Conference, Cairns, Australia. Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  • O’Donnell, C.J. and Griffiths, W.E. (2006). Estimating state-contingent production frontiers, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 88(1), 249–266.
    Direct Link:
  • O’Donnell, C.J., Chambers, R.G. and Quiggin, J. (2010). Efficiency analysis in the presence of uncertainty, Journal of Productivity Analysis 33, 1–17.
  • Quiggin, J. and Chambers, R.G. (1998). Risk premiums and benefit measures for generalized-expected-utility theories, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 17(2), 121–137.
  • Rasmussen, S. (2003). Criteria for optimal production under uncertainty. the state-contingent approach, The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 47(4), 447–476.
  • Rasmussen, S. (2004). Optimizing production under uncertainty: generalisation of the state-contingent approach and comparison of methods for empirical application. Unit of Economics Working papers 24184, Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Food and Resource Economic Institute.
  • Sandmo, A. (1971). On the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty, The American Economic Review 61(1), 65–73.
  • Shephard, R.W. (1953). Cost and Production Functions. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  • Shephard, R.W. (1970). Theory of Cost and Production Functions. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  • Yaari, M.E. (1969). Some remarks on measures of risk aversion and on their uses, Journal of Economic Theory 1(3), 315–329.
四月 13 2013

The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

Hans-Theo Normann, Brian Wallace (2012) “The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment." International Journal of Game Theory, August 2012, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 707-718. link to Springer; working版本：ucl.ac.uk 提供的 [PDF]；hhu.de 提供的 [PDF]；

Note by yinung

這篇原是 DICE 的 working paper (see 本站另一篇 PO 文），現在刊出來了。

主要結論 （in abstract):

此文研究3種 PD game 實驗回合結束的方式 (告知結束回合、不告知結束回合、隨機結束)，比較合作率之不同。 1. 三種結束方式不影響合作率 2. 隨機結束方式不會提高合作率 (相對於告知結束回合)；不同繼續玩 (隨機結束) 之機率高低 (continuation probability) 亦不影響合作率 3. 結束方式會影響 over time 和 end-game 行為 4. 預期玩的回合愈長，合作率愈高

可引述

三種 termination rule:

  • finite horizon: Flood (1952) and Rapoport and Chammah (1965) … it is well known that stable cooperation does occur also in finitely repeated games
  • unknown horizon: Fouraker and Siegel 1963
  • random-stopping rule: to terminate the experiment (Roth and Murnighan1978; Axelrod 1980)

End-game effects: Morehous (1966) … defection rates increase towards the end of the game when the horizon of the game is known to be finite. … used a probabilistic termination rule so that “end-game effects were successfully avoided” (Axelrod 1984, p. 42). Murnighan and Roth (1983, p. 284) argue that “consideration of end-game play is less critical” with the random termination rule. Holt (1985, p. 320) makes the same point. 也有人在分析結果時，去掉最後幾回合 贊同應用隨機結束 With finitely many periods, the theory is bland; by contrast, the random termination rule “permits the nature of the equilibrium outcomes to be controlled” (Roth and Murnighan 1978, p. 191) Selten and Stoecker (1983) further noted that subjects learn to anticipate the endgame effect in that this effect is shifted to earlier rounds when a supergame with a finite horizon is repeated several times (see also Andreoni and Miller 1993) 隨機結束機率高者，使合作率較高 （與本文結果不一致），但重覆的實驗不能確定此一結果 Roth and Murnighan (1978) found that a random stopping rule with higher continuation probability does lead to more cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. However, in the modified setup analyzed in Murnighan and Roth (1983), this could not be confirmed. Dal Bo (2005) 發現隨機結束機率(在 supergame 玩 10 次後) 有重要影響

本文之實驗

至少玩 22 回合 (??? 不知何義，待了解… 因為結束回合數不一定一樣), 4 情境、每情境有15組人

  • Know
  • Unknow
  • RandomHigh (5/6 繼續機率)
  • RandomLow (1/6 繼續機率)

supergame 不重覆 （？？）Subjects were rematched after the first supergame. 另外有 Shorter Horizon 額外較短實驗

  • Known5 （9組，2人一組）
  • Known10 （11組）
  • Random5+5 (11組；至少5回，5/6 繼續機率，平均期望值＝10回，恰與 Known10 對照)

合作率 要小心合作率的定義！（各文獻不一定相同) 其 Table 2 中的合作率是 cooperte choices (不是 cooperate outcome, 所以22回合中才最多有 44 個 cooperate choices) 此文皆是利用 cooperate choice 來分析，Harvey Wichman (1970, J of Personality and Social Psychology) 也是用此定義 有的文獻合作率的數字是 cooperate outcome (兩人皆是 cooperate choice 才算合作） (引文)…In order to take the possible dependence of observations between paired players into account, we count each participating pair as one observation. Matrix of the game 從合作到背叛，邊際利得只有 1000－800 ＝ 200, 反而對手損失 750 較多；若因此而雙方開始不合作，每期邊際損失 250，根本不值得背叛；但是一旦被背叛，當次邊際損失 700， 要3次背叛才得以報復。 

================================
       背叛              合作 
背叛  (350, 350)      (1000, 50)
合作  (50, 1000)      (800, 800)
================================

文中所述之 5 個 results

  • Result 1. The termination rule does not significantly affect average cooperation.

2種隨機結束和告知回合、不告知 等 treatment 合作率無顯著不同 (Kruskal-Wallis test)

  • Result 2. There is a negative and significant time trend in treatments Known and RandomLow.

Known 和 RandomLow 合作率有下降趨勢 (significant time trend)

  • Result 3. A significant end-game effect occurs in all treatments except Unknown。
2種隨機結束和告知回合都有 End-game effect (在最後幾回合作率顯著逐漸下降的情況)。 折現率~= 4/13 時，{C,C} is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the infinitely repeated game if and only if the discount factor is larger than 4/13 ~ 0.31.
  • Result 4 The termination rule does not significantly affect average cooperation rates in treatments Known5, Known10, Random5+5.
  • Result 5 The length of the horizon of the game significantly increases cooperation rates.

本文所用無母數統計方法

Kruskal-Wallis test
Testing for differences in cooperation with all treatments jointly does not suggest significant results

Abstract

Cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games can usually be sustained only if the game has an infinite horizon. We analyze to what extent the theoretically crucial distinction of finite versus infinite-horizon games is reflected in the outcomes of a prisoner’s dilemma experiment. We compare three different experimental termination rules in four treatments: a known finite end, an unknown end, and two variants with a random termination rule (with a high and with a low continuation probability, where cooperation can occur in a subgame-perfect equilibrium only with the high probability). We find that the termination rules do not significantly affect average cooperation rates. Specifically, employing a random termination rule does not cause significantly more cooperation compared to a known finite horizon, and the continuation probability does not significantly affect average cooperation rates either. However, the termination rules may influence cooperation over time and end-game behavior. Further, the (expected) length of the game significantly increases cooperation rates. The results suggest that subjects may need at least some learning opportunities (like repetitions of the supergame) before significant backward induction arguments in finitely repeated game have force.

References

  1. Andreoni J, Miller JH (1993) Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma: experimental evidence. Econ J 103: 570–585 CrossRef
  2. Angelova V, Bruttel LV, Güth W, Kamecke U (2011) Can subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? An experimental test of finite-horizon folk theorems. Econ Inq (forthcoming)
  3. Axelrod R (1984) The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York
  4. Axelrod R (1980) More effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma. J Confl Resolut 24: 379–403 CrossRef
  5. Benoit J-P, Krishna V (1985) Finitely repeated games. Econometrica 53(4): 905–922 CrossRef
  6. Benoit J-P, Krishna V (1987) Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games. Int J Game Theory 16(3): 197–204 CrossRef
  7. Bolton GE, Ockenfels A (2000) ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. Am Econ Rev 90: 166–193 CrossRef
  8. Bruttel L, Kamecke U (2012) Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games? Theory Dec 72(2): 205–219
  9. Bruttel LV, Güth W, Kamecke U (2012) Finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments without a commonly known end. Int J Game Theory 41(1): 23–47 CrossRef
  10. Dal Bo P (2005) Cooperation under the shadow of the future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games. Am Econ Rev 95: 1591–1604 CrossRef
  11. Engle-Warnick J, Slonim RL (2004) The evolution of strategies in a repeated trust game. J Econ Behav Organ 55: 553–573 CrossRef
  12. Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Q J Econ 114: 817–868 CrossRef
  13. Feinberg RM, Husted TA (1993) An experimental test of discount effects on collusive behavior in dupoly markets. J Ind Econ 41(2): 153–160 CrossRef
  14. Fischbacher U (2007) Z-Tree, Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Exp Econ 10(2): 171–178 CrossRef
  15. Flood MM (1952) Some experimental games. Research Memorandum RM-789. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA
  16. Fouraker L, Siegel S (1963) Bargaining behavior. McGraw-Hill, New York
  17. Gonzales LG, Güth W, Levati V (2005) When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons. Econ Lett 88(2): 221–226 CrossRef
  18. Hollander M, Wolfe DA (1999) Nonparametric statistical methods. Wiley, New York
  19. Holt CH (1985) An experimental test of the consistent—conjectures hypothesis. Am Econ Rev 75: 314–325
  20. Kaplan T, Ruffle B (2006) Which way to cooperate? Working Paper, Ben-Gurion University
  21. Kreps DM, Milgrom P, Roberts J, Wilson R (1982) Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. J Econ Theory 27(2): 245–252 CrossRef
  22. Luce RD, Raiffa H (1957) Games and decisions: introduction and critical survey. Wiley, New York
  23. Morehous LG (1966) One-play, two-play, five-play, and ten-play runs of prisoner’s dilemma. J Confl Resolut 10: 354–361 CrossRef
  24. Murnighan JK, Roth AE (1983) Expecting continued play in prisoner’s dilemma games: a test of three models. J Confl Resolut 27: 279–300 CrossRef
  25. Neyman A (1999) Cooperation in repeated games when the number of stages is not commonly known econometrica. Econometrica 67: 45–64 CrossRef
  26. Orzen H (2008) Counterintuitive number effects in experimental oligopolies. Exp Econ 11(4): 390–401 CrossRef
  27. Rapoport A, Cammah AM (1965) Prisoner’s dilemma. A study in conflict and cooperation. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
  28. Roth AE (1995) Bargaining experiments. In: Kagel J, Roth AE (eds) Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 253–348
  29. Roth AE, Murnighan JK (1978) Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma. J Math Psychol 17: 189–198 CrossRef
  30. Samuelson L (1987) A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. International Journal of Game Theory 16(3): 187–195 CrossRef
  31. Selten R, Stoecker R (1986) End behavior in finite prisoner’s dilemma supergames. J Econ Behav Organ 7: 47–70 CrossRef
  32. Selten R, Mitzkewitz M, Uhlich GR (1997) Duopoly strategies programmed by experienced players. Econometrica 65: 517–556 CrossRef
  33. Suetens S, Potters J (2007) Bertrand Colludes more than Cournot. Exp Econ 10(1): 71–77 CrossRef
  34. Stahl DO (1991) The graph of prisoner’s dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor. Games Econ Behav 3: 360–384 CrossRef
三月 7 2013

Laboratory Evidence on Face-to-Face: Why Experimental Economics is of Interest to Regional Economists*

Björn Frank (2012) “Laboratory Evidence on Face-to-Face: Why Experimental Economics is of Interest to Regional Economists." International Regional Science Review, June 13, 2012. doi: 10.1177/0160017612449017. working paper PDF; Journal Web. **；

Notes by yinung

此文提及 death of distance" (Cairncross, 2001) or “death of geography" 意思是

…the shrinking costs for transportation, especially transportation of messages’ pure in formation content.

必需有 face-to-face 溝通的原因是

… widely agreed that communication often must be face-to-face in order to be effective. But why?

1. nonverbal 和 verbal 同時發生，減少誤解(Storper and Venables, 2004; Winger, 2005, sections 4 – 6; and Hildrum, 2007, p. 469 with further references).

2. 比較有意義 （？？？待了解）

3. 發現想看到的，也發現原來沒想看到的隱含事務

4. buzzing (流言???)

5. face-to-face 溝通成本高，可視為建立長期關係之投資

6. 建立互信的必要條件

以上是理論，經濟實驗 （不含心理實驗）之證據為此文之回顧重點

匿名實驗結果有時不具參考性，此文同意此觀點 （至少用 email 溝通知道名字）

幾個與 face-to-face 相關因素

  1. 即時回應之效果 and 冷淨作用 Cooling effects: effect of spontaneity (decision time)  in Sec. 2
  2. trust 和合作受到 face-to-face 之影響 in Sec. 3
  3. 細節因素，如 smiling 和 eye contact  在 f2f 中之角色

冷靜效果

..experiment on the effect of a substantive cooling off period in an experiment was invented by Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz (2008).

在 ultimatum game 中，8:2 和 5：5 的分餅被提出，看對手是否接受。24小時後，接受的決定可以被修改。餅獎金大小分別有 2，5，8 euros. Cooling off period 並未導致拒絕率大幅降低 (from 42.6% to 39.4%) ，且不顯著。但將 reward 變大 （期望值相同，用 lottery 方式），則拒絕率顯著大幅下降 fom 27.7% to 20.5%.

增加決策時間之壓力也有同樣的效果 （提高拒絕率） increased time pressure might well increase the rejection rate by Sutter, Kocher and Strauß (2003). 決策時間減少 (100秒 mm> 10 秒)，拒絕率增加從 40.3 to 78.2％。 Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008) 也有類似的發現 （180秒 vs 30 秒）。情感區 (affective system) 和 (deliberative system) 在大腦中並不相同。

Implications:

在 UG 中，拒絕率上升，代表效率下降。出價者將會喜歡拒絕率降低 (因此可降低 offer); 反之，回應者將喜歡拒絕率上升。故，出價者將偏好 face-to-face 溝通。不過要注意的是 UG 是單向一次 negotiation, 一般的談判會有雙向回應

建立互信 ＆ 合作

Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998)

（註： 有時互信和合作很難區分 see ）

兩人買賣股票，出價B

只有 seller 知道 V； Seller 會接受 if B>V; seller 得到 (B-V);

Buyer 只知 V～uniform(0,100), 真實 V 要等 Buyer 買到以後才知道。真實價值 ＝ 1.5V; buyer 得到 (1.5V-B);

Buyer 問 seller V=?, 但 seller 可以 lie; 不過 face-to-face 之下，seller 顯著地比較不可能 lie （face-to face 只有 1 of 14, 7% lie; 電話 55％ lie; 不匿名witten 33% lie). 有些 face-to-face 的 buyer 並沒有問 seller V；

結果發現 face-to-face 導致比較多的 Pareto improving deals.

Pareto deals (雙方皆獲益)：

face-to-face: 51.7% (out of n=21) 成交; 顯著大於 written comm. 但不顯著大於 telephone comm.

written comm.: 22.2% (未成交 52％ 接近理論值）

telephone comm.: 38.1%

Non-Pareto deals (buy’s loss):

face-to-face: 23.8%

written comm.: 25.9%

telephone comm.: 47.6%

Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) PD game （應是 public good game)

5人一組玩多人 PD game 共 15 回合; 前 8 回合用 (a) 事先沒有 comm.; (b) email (c) face-to-face;

每人在每回合決定貢獻 0～10 給 group, 留下其餘。

S=5人貢獻之加總； 每人皆領回 0.4S

理論：每人皆貢獻 10， 則 S ＝ 50，每人皆領回 0.4S = 20; 若每人皆貢獻 0， 則每人只得 10；

實驗結果

各 treatment 之平均貢獻 (前 8回合）

(a) 沒有 comm: 2.9

(b) email: 7.6

(c) face-to-face: 9.99

9回合以後（皆沒有 comm.)

Contributions in groups with previous face-to-face communication quickly collapse to the level of the e-mail-groups.

face-to-face 效果持續多久？

一回合就夠了？ (Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann, 2003; Bochet et al., 2006)

Rocco (1998).

6人一組玩28回合的 public good game；在第 10，15，20加入 face-to-face comm.;

每一回合貢獻 x of 13 tokens; 全部人之貢獻加總= S; 每人之 Payoffs = ？？？

face-to-face comm. 有助於 maximize group welfare 在後半段實驗； Email comm. 並沒有較高的合作；但實驗前一天 email comm. 的人 face-to-face 之後，卻有類似的效果。

Bochet et al. (2006)

4人10回合的 PG game；比較 5分鐘的實驗前 face-to-face vs 第 1，4，7回合 online 討論 in a chat room；

實驗結果

兩者差異沒有後大, 其平均貢獻：

chat room: 81.4%

face-to-face: 96.2%

但在第10回合有 drop, chat romm ->52.1%; face-to-face -> 78.1

Naquin, Kurtzberg and Belkin (2008),

玩 threshold PG game; 4 人一組；若至少有 3人 捐出 1 張餐券，則每人獲兩張 ￥7餐券 2 張；

比較 非匿名之 email 和 face-to-face 決策：

email: 35.8% of the participants 捐出

face-to-face: 69.9%

其它溝通媒介

Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003)

4人一組，10回合 PG game; 其貢獻 of endowment

audio comm.: 48%

anonymous: 57%

video comm: 93%

face-to-face: 97% (後兩者顯著高於前兩者)

照片 出現 10 秒： 貢獻率低於 anonymous

Face-to-face 可能隱含的影響因素

Smiling

Scharlemann et al. (2001) 在 trust game 中，發現微笑有助於合作

 Player 1 — [$1, 0.5]
|
Player 2 — [0.8, 1.25]
|
Player 1 — [1.20, 1.20]

Player 1 是受試者，Player 2 是電腦但 show 照片 (treatment 是否微笑，取自相片資料庫)，只要 Player 1 選擇 trust 策略，則電腦 (Player 2) 必定也用 trust 回應。結果發現， Player 1 之回應

沒有微笑： 55.0% 選擇 trust 策略
有微笑：     68.3%
(是否顯著待查)

eye contact

Burnham and Hare (2007)

4人一組，6回合 PG game (對手不重覆); 其貢獻 of endowment ~ (0, 10，相當於 2 美金), 總貢獻*2 均分給 4 人.

實驗組看到金屬臉但具有人類眼睛的影像 (MIT 發明的 “Kismet” robot), 實驗結果：

所有人和6回合平均
看到眼睛：5.39
匿名：        4.17

Haley and Fessler (2005)
玩 dictator game, 分$10美金, 實驗組看到眼睛圖片，對照組看到 label, 結果

Player 1 分給 Player 2
看到眼睛：3.79
沒有看到眼睛：2.45

Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006) 在現地實驗中也發現，eye contact 會讓貢獻較多錢

在48位大學職員喝咖啡處貼眼睛海報 or 花海報各幾週，自願投幣奉獻 (honesty box) 金額

在貼眼睛海報的時候，自願投幣奉獻金額顯著較高。

Frey and Bohnet (1995) 在 PD game 中讓受試者選擇合作和背叛，合作率

visual contact + talking : 78%
visual contact + no talking ： 23%
匿名：12%

Wichman (1970) 在 PD game 中讓受試者選擇合作和背叛; 70回合，固定對手，合作率

無限制的 face-to-face: 87%
互聽到聲音： 72.1%
只有 visual contact: 47.7%
匿名40.7％

Abstract

The notion of face-to-face contacts has recently become very popular as a reason why firms still locate in proximity to others after the “death of distance.” Controlled laboratory experiments provide direct and reliable evidence on the importance of face-to-face contacts. It is the purpose of this article to survey and to organize new and developing string of literature with a special focus on its importance for regional economics. However, the article might also serve to alert more experimentalists to the importance of their work for current regional science, of which they seem not to be aware.

References (部份）

  • 冷卻效果
    Oechssler, Jörg, Andreas Roider and Patrick Schmitz (2008), Cooling-Off in Negotiations – Does It Work?, mimeo: http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/6807.html
  • 決策時間長短 in Ultimatum game
    Sutter, Matthias, Martin Kocher and Sabine Strauß (2003), Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game, Economics Letters 81, 341–347.
  • Cappelletti, Dominique, Werner Güth and Matteo Ploner (2008), Being of two minds: an ultimatum experiment investigating affective processes, mimeo.
  • 其它
    Bateson, Melissa, Daniel Nettle and Gilbert Roberts (2006), Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting, Biology Letters 2, 412–414.
  • Bochet, Olivier, Talbot Page, and Louis Putterman (2006), “Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 11-26.
  • Bohnet, Iris and Bruno S. Frey (1999), The sound of silence in prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 38, 43-57.
  • Brosig, Jeannette, Axel Ockenfels and Joachim Weimann (2003), The effect of communication media on cooperation, German Economic Review 4, 217-241.
  • Burnham, Terence C. and Brian Hare (2007), Engineering Human Cooperation. Does Involuntary Neural Activation Increase Public Goods Contributions?, Human Nature 18, 88-108.
  • Frey, Bruno S. and Iris Bohnet (1995), Institutions Affect Fairness: Experimental Investigations, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151, 286-303.
  • Frohlich, Norman and Joe Oppenheimer (1998), Some consequences of e-mail vs. face-to-face communication in experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 35, 389-403.
  • Haley, Kevin J. and Daniel M.T. Fessler (2005), Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game, Evolution and Human Behavior 26, 245–256.
  • Naquin, Charles E., Terri R. Kurtzberg and Liuba Y. Belkin (2008), E-Mail Communication and Group Cooperation in Mixed Motive Contexts, forthcoming: Social Justice Research,
  • Rocco, Elena (1998), Trust Breaks Down in Electronic Contexts but Can Be Repaired by Some Initial Face-to-Face Contact, Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems 1998, 496-502.
  • Scharlemann, Jörn P.W., Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson (2001), The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face, Journal of Economic Psychology 22, 617-640.
  • Valley, Kathleen L., Joseph Moag and Max H. Bazerman (1998), ‘A matter of trust’: Effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 211-238.
  • Valley, Kathleen, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max H. Bazerman (2002), How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games, Games and Economic Behavior 38, 127-155.
  • Wichman, Harvey (1970), Effects of Isolation and Communication on Cooperation in a Two-Person Game, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology，16, 114-120. http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/16/1/114/; DOI;

暫記

PD game
Frey and Bohnet (1995) J Inst. & Theo. Econ.
(合作率)
visual contact + talking : 78%
visual contact + no talking ： 23%
匿名：12%
Wichman (1970) J Per & Soc Psy
(合作率)
無限制的 face-to-face: 87%
互聽到聲音： 72.1%
只有 visual contact: 47.7%
匿名40.7％
UG
Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz (2008)
時間減少
Sutter, Kocher and Strauß (2003) EL
Cappelletti, Güth and Ploner (2008) mimeo

dictator game
Haley and Fessler (2005)

Trust game
Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998) JEBO
Scharlemann et al. (2001) (smiling 在 trust game 中) JEPsy

Public good game
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) JEBO
Rocco (1998) Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference
Bochet et al. (2006) JEBO
Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003) GER
Burnham and Hare (2007) (眼睛 contact) Human Nature

Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006) 在現地實驗(自助咖啡投幣)

一月 2 2013

Team building and hidden costs of control

Riener, Gerhard and Wiederhold, Simon (2012) “Team building and hidden costs of control." DICE Discussion Paper 66, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

==original abstract==

This paper investigates the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. We propose a simple principal-agent model with control that incorporates the existence of social groups resulting from common experiences in the past. Our laboratory experiment shows that agents with previous common experiences with their principals (CE agents) perform better than agents without such experiences (NCE agents). However, as soon as actual control exceeds their expectation, CE agents decrease their performance substantially, which has no equivalent for NCE agents. This pronounced decrease in effort when control is perceived as excessive represents a novel channel through which hidden costs of control materialize. Our results have important implications for firms’ strategies to motivate employees.

十二月 24 2012

Psychologists at the Gate: A Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow*

Shleifer, Andrei. 2012. “Psychologists at the Gate: A Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow." Journal of Economic Literature, 50(4): 1080-91. link to AEAWeb;

==Notes by yinung==

這篇文章回顧 Daniel Kahneman 的書  “Thinking, Fast and Slow”

… because the  book mentions few economic applications, I  will describe some of the economic research that has been substantially infuenced by  this work.

作者認為 Kahneman and Tversky 影響最大者在於 財務學 (或稱行為財務) … this work. My feeling is that the most profound infuence of Kahneman and Tversky’s work on economics has been in fnance, on what has now become the field of behavioral finance…

兩種常見反對將心理學引進經濟學的理由:

…two common objections to the introduction of psychology into economics,…

A. 經濟學較著重研究人類行為的一般觀點，而非特殊行為
… economists should focus on “first order things”rather than quirks （quirk 這個字原意是）.

1. 反例1，人們花太多錢在保險，只為了很小的可能損失 (這可不是特殊現象)，
individuals pay large multiples of actuarially fair value to buy insurance against small losses, as well as to reduce their deductibles (Sydnor 2010).

2. 反例2，廣告 （？？還沒看懂）
the standard economic view that persuasion is conveyance of information seems to run into a rather basic problem that advertising is typically emotional, associative, and misleading— yet nonetheless effective (Bertrand et al. 2010; DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010; Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer 2008).

3. 反例3，財務理論說，投資者應選 low-cast index fund, 但事實上大部份人卻是選 high-cost actively managed funds

B. 市場力量可消除心理因素對價格和分配之影響 （價格和效率）
… market forces eliminate the influence of psychological factors on prices and allocations.

1. 反例，Real-world arbitrage is costly and risky, and hence limited, … Dozens of empirical studies confirm that, even in markets with relatively inexpensive arbitrage, identical, or nearly identical, securities trade at different prices. With costlier arbitrage, pricing is even less efficient.

2. 市場參與者大多不理性，即是有專家之協助 （專家的動機通常值得懷疑，見(Chalmers and Reuter 2012; Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny 2012)）
Market forces often work to strengthen, rather than to eliminate, the influence of psychology.
List 研究棒球卡交易，發現專家沒有 endowment effects, 支持了此一觀點。

兩個思考體系 （two systems)

System 1: 直覺、自動、非意識性、容易 （intuitive, automatic, unconscious, and effortles）；快速反應，透過聯想、組合

System 2: 具意識性、緩慢、受控制 …但不容易 （conscious, slow, controlled, deliberate, effortful, statistical, suspicious, and lazy (costly to use)）；這是經濟學家認為的思考

Heuristics and Biases

Anchoring effects: 對未知的問題，容易受到前置性的影響 （擲俄羅斯輪盤，看到數字後，猜非洲國家佔聯合國之比例…, 看到輪盤數字小者猜小， 看到數字大者猜大)

… respondents receive all the information they need, but nonetheless do not use it correctly.

===一些結論…===

人類注意和聯想到的資訊，並非皆是在最佳決策中所需要的… 系統 1 的思考是自動反應，而非最佳化： 選擇性認知與記憶之決策行為（highly selective perception and memory … before we make decisions and choice)
… the fundamental feature of System 1 is that what our attention is drawn to, what we focus on, and what we recall is not always what is most necessary or needed for optimal decision making.

==original Abstract==

The publication of Daniel Kahneman’s book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, is a major intellectual event. The book summarizes, but also integrates, the research that Kahneman has done over the past forty years, beginning with his path-breaking work with the late Amos Tversky. The broad theme of this research is that human beings are intuitive thinkers and that human intuition is imperfect, with the result that judgments and choices often deviate substantially from the predictions of normative statistical and economic models. In this review, I discuss some broad ideas and themes of the book, describe some economic applications, and suggest future directions for research that the book points to, especially in decision theory. (JEL A12, D03, D80, D87)

==References==

有關 prospect theory

  • Barberis, Nicholas. Forthcoming. “Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives.
  • Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. 2012b. “Salience in Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect.” American Economic Review 102 (3): 47–52.
  • Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. 2012c. “Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (3): 1243–85.
  • Hart, Oliver, and John Moore. 2008. “Contracts as Reference Points.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (1): 1–48.
  • Koszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin. 2006. “A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (4): 1133–65.
  • *List, John A. 2003. “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1): 41–71.
  • Pope, Devin G., and Maurice E. Schweitzer. 2011. “Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes.” American Economic Review 101 (1): 129–57.

有關財務

  • Barberis, Nicholas, and Ming Huang. 2008. “Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting for Security Prices.” American Economic Review 98 (5): 2066–2100.
  • Barberis, Nicholas, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1998. “A Model of Investor Sentiment.” Journal of Financial Economics 49 (3): 307–43.
  • Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard H. Thaler. 1995. “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1): 73–92.
  • De Bondt, Werner F. M., and Richard H. Thaler. 1985. “Does the Stock Market Overreact?” Journal of Finance 40 (3): 793–805.
  • Frazzini, Andrea, and Owen A. Lamont. 2008. “Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2): 299–322.
  • Lakonishok, Josef, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1994. “Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk.” Journal of Finance 49 (5): 1541–78.
  • Sydnor, Justin. 2010. “(Over)insuring Modest Risks.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (4): 177–99.

其它

  • Gennaioli, Nicola, and Andrei Shleifer. 2010. “What Comes to Mind.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (4): 1399–1433.
  • House money effects
    Thaler, Richard H., and Eric J. Johnson. 1990. “Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice.” Management Science 36 (6): 643–60.
  • Framming
    Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1981. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” Science 211 (4481): 453–58.
十二月 10 2012

An Experiment on the Causes of Bank Run Contagions

Date: 2012
By: Surajeet Chakravarty (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)
Miguel A. Fonseca (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)
Todd Kaplan (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exe:wpaper:1206&r=net
To understand the mechanisms behind bank run contagions, we conduct bank run experiments in a modified Diamond-Dybvig setup with two banks (Left and Right). The banks’ liquidity levels are either linked or independent. Left Bank depositors see their bank’s liquidity level before deciding. Right Bank depositors only see Left Bank withdrawals before deciding. We find that Left Bank depositors’ actions signicantly affect Right Bank depositors’ behavior, even when liquidities are independent. Furthermore, a panic may be a one-way street: an increase in Left Bank withdrawals can cause a panic run on the Right Bank, but a decrease cannot calm markets.
Keywords: bank runs, contagion, experiment, multiple equilibria.
JEL: C72
十二月 7 2012

Fee Versus Royalty Policy in Licensing Through Bargaining: An Application of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Shin Kishimoto, Shigeo Muto (2012) “Fee Versus Royalty Policy in Licensing Through Bargaining: An Application of the Nash Bargaining Solution." Bulletin of Economic Research， Volume 64, Issue 2, pages 293–304. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00356.x. 147.46.167.195 [PDF]

==notes by yinung==

這是理論文章，證明 Royalty licensing 比 fixed fee licensing 來得好 for firms and social veiw.

裡頭有 licensing patents 的理論文獻

==引文==

理論證明 fixed 比 royalty 好 in Kamien and Tauman (1986)
…Despite the fact that a royalty is often observed, theoretical analyses including Kamien and Tauman (1986) showed that a
fixed fee was superior to a royalty for both the patent holder and consumers.

但 Kamien and Tauman (2002) and Wang (1998) 證明 royalty 比 fixed  好
…Kamien and Tauman (2002) extended the model of Wang (1998) to a Cournot oligopoly market, and showed that if the patent holder competed in the product market with a sufficiently large number of firms, then a royalty is superior to a fixed fee for
him/her.

談判方式： “take-it-or-leave-it“ (像 ultimatum game)
…These studies basically assumed a “take-it-or-leave-it” licensing manner; that is,  the patent holder first announces a level of a fixed fee (or a royalty), and then firms  decide whether or not to buy the patent. Analyses were done in terms of noncooperative game theory.

也有用合作賽局為理論架構來研究 for licensing the patent
…Tauman and Watanabe (2007) applied the Shapley value and showed that the patent holder’s profit in the Shapley value approximated his/her equilibrium profit in the noncooperative model of Kamien and Tauman (1986) as the number of firms became large. Watanabe and Muto (2008) characterized the upper bound and the lower bound of the patent holder’s profits in the bargaining set.

==original ABSTRACT==

In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent-holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost-reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view.

==references==

Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y. (1986). Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471-491.

Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y. (2002). Patent Licensing: The Inside Story. The Manchester School, 70, 7-15.

[6] Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica,  50, 97-109.
[7] Sen, D. (2005). Fee Versus Royalty Reconsidered. Games and Economic Behavior, 53, 141-147.
[8] Sen, D., Tauman, Y. (2007). General Licencing Schemes for a Cost-reducing Innovation. Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 163-186.
[9] Sempere-Monerris, J.Jos´ e., Vannetelbosch, V.J. (2001). The Relevance of Bargaining for the Licensing of a Cost-reducing Innovation. Bulletin of Economic Research, 53, 101-115.
[10] Tauman, Y .,Watanabe, N. (2007). The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results. Economic Theory, 30, 135-149.
[11] Wang, X.H. (1998). Fee Versus Royalty Licensing in a Cournot Duopoly Model. Economics Letters, 60, 55-62.
[12] Watanabe, N.,Muto, S. (2007). Stable Profit Sharing in Patent Licensing: General Bargaining Outcomes. Int. Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.

十一月 11 2012

Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions

Gary Charness and Matthias Sutter (2012) “Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3): 157-76. DOI: 10.1257/jep.26.3.157; URL: AEAWeb. PDF1; PDF2

==Notes by yinung==

集體決策和個人決策之差異:

從賽局理論的角度看, 集體決策較個人決策來得理性 (rational), 因其可避免認知錯誤與限制。

不過集體決策也因此不見得會提高社會福利 (集體決策比較 self-interest)

待研究問題:

the optimal size of the group ( A useful starting point here is Forsyth’s (2006) work)

==original Abstract==

In this paper, we describe what economists have learned about differences between group and individual decision-making. This literature is still young, and in this paper, we will mostly draw on experimental work (mainly in the laboratory) that has compared individual decision-making to group decision-making, and to individual decision-making in situations with salient group membership. The bottom line emerging from economic research on group decision-making is that groups are more likely to make choices that follow standard game-theoretic predictions, while individuals are more likely to be influenced by biases, cognitive limitations, and social considerations. In this sense, groups are generally less “behavioral" than individuals. An immediate implication of this result is that individual decisions in isolation cannot necessarily be assumed to be good predictors of the decisions made by groups. More broadly, the evidence casts doubts on traditional approaches that model economic behavior as if individuals were making decisions in isolation.

==References==

  • Forsyth, Donelson R. 2006. Group Dynamics, 4th edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson Higher Education.
  • Camerer, Colin F.  2003.  Behavioural Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press.
  • Charness, Gary, Edi Karni, and Dan Levin. 2007. “Individual and Group Decision Making under Risk: An Experimental Study of Bayesian Updating and Violations of First-Order Stochastic Dominance.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 35(2): 129–48.
  • Charness, Gary, Edi Karni, and Dan Levin. 2010. “On the Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence Regarding Linda.” Games and Economic Behavior 68(2): 551–56.
  • Charness, Gary, and Dan Levin. 2005. “When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect.” American Economic Review 95(4): 1300–1309.
  • Charness, Gary, Luca Rigotti, and Aldo  Rustichini. 2007. “Individual Behavior and Group Membership.”  American Economic Review 97(4):  1340–52.
  • Chen, Yan, and Xin Li. 2009. “Group Identity and Social Preferences.” American Economic Review 99(1): 431–57.
  • Cooper, David J., and John H. Kagel. 2005. “Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games.” American Economic Review 95(3): 477–509.
  • Fahr, René, and Bernd Irlenbusch. 2011. “Who Follows the Crowd—Groups or Individuals?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 80(2): 200–209.
  • Feri, Francesco, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Matthias Sutter.  2010. “Efi  ciency  Gains  from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence.”  American Economic Review 100(4): 1892–1912.
  • Holmstrom, Bengt.  1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams.” Bell Journal of Economics 13(2): 324–40.
  • Kocher, Martin G., Sabine Strauss, and Matthias Sutter.  2006. “Individual or Team Decision-Making— Causes and Consequences of Self-Selection.” Games and Economic Behavior 56(2): 259–70.
  • Kocher, Martin G., and Matthias Sutter.  2005. “The Decision Maker Matters: Individual versus Group Behavior in Experimental Beauty-Contest Games.” Economic Journal 115(500): 200–223.
  • Kugler, Tamar, Gary Bornstein, Martin G. Kocher, and Matthias Sutter. 2007. “Trust between Individuals and Groups: Groups are Less Trusting Than Individuals But Just as Trustworthy.” Journal of Economic Psychology 28(6): 646–57.
  • Laughlin, Patrick R., Bryan L. Bonner, and Andrew G. Miner. 2002. “Groups Perform Better Than the Best Individuals on Letter-to-Numbers Problems.”  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 88(2): 606–620.
  • Levitt, Steven, and John A. List.  2007. “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2): 153–74.
  • Mas, Alexandre, and Enrico Moretti.  2009. “Peers at Work.” American Economic Review 99(1): 112–45.
  • Michaelson, Larry K., Warren E. Watson, and Robert H. Black.  1989. “A Realistic Test of Individual versus Group Consensus Decision Making.” Journal of Applied Psychology 74(5): 834–39.
  • Schopler, John, Chester A. Insko, Jennifer Wieselquist, Michael Pemberton, Betty Witcher, Rob Kozar, Chris Roddenberry, and Tim Wildschut.  2001. “When Groups Are More Competitive Than Individuals: The Domain of the Discontinuity Effect.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80(4): 632–44.
  • Sheremeta, Roman M., and Jingjing Zhang. 2010. “Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-bidding in Contests?”  Social Choice and Welfare 35(2): 175–97.
  • Song, Fei. 2008. “Trust and Reciprocity Behavior and Behavioral Forecasts: Individuals versus Group-Representatives.”  Games and Economic Behavior 62(2): 675–96.
  • Surowiecki, James. 2004. The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations. Doubleday.
  • Sutter, Matthias. 2005. “Are Four Heads Better Than Two? An Experimental Beauty-Contest Game with Teams of Different Size.”  Economics Letters 88(1): 41–46.
  • Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman.  1983. “Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.” Psychological Review 90(40): 293–315.

==cited by==

1. Ananish Chaudhuri, Tirnud Paichayontvijit, Lifeng Shen. 2012. Gender differences in trust and trustworthiness: Individuals, single sex and mixed sex groups. Journal of Economic Psychology.

 

十月 24 2012

First-Mover Advantage in Two-Sided Competitions: An Experimental Comparison of Role-Assignment Rules

Bradley J. Ruffle and Oscar Volij, (2012) “First-Mover Advantage in Two-Sided Competitions: An Experimental Comparison of Role-Assignment Rules." Discussion Paper No. 12-08, Monaster Center for Economic Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,  Israel.

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128225 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2128225. [PDF]

Abstract: 

Kingston (1976) and Anderson (1977) show that the probability that a given contestant wins a best-of-2k 1 series of asymmetric, zero-sum, binary-outcome games is, for a large class of assignment rules, independent of which contestant is assigned the advantageous role in each component game. We design a laboratory experiment to test this hypothesis for four simple role-assignment rules. Despite the fact that play does not uniformly conform to the equilibrium, our results show that the four assignment rules are observationally equivalent at the series level: the fraction of series won by a given contestant and all other series outcomes do not differ across the four rules.