A Ockenfels, AE Roth – AI Magazine, 2002 – aaai.org (創刊於 1980, SCI, ) 下載 [pdf]
Game theorists and market designers focus on the impact of the rules of the game on the behavior of the participants. Participants in internet markets can be human bidders bidding in person or artificial agents used by human bidders. Thus, the per- formance of market rules …
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Noted by Yi-Nung
In particular, we identify three distinct kinds of bidding wars: (1) with incremental bidders, (2) with like-minded late bidders, and (3) with uninformed bidders who look to others’ bids to determine the value of an item.
1. Bidding Late to Avoid Bidding Wars with Incremental Bidders
Last-minute bidding can be a best reply toincremental bidding.
Last-minute bids can be a best response to this kind of incremental bidding because bidding near the deadline of the auction would not give the incremental bidder sufficient time to respond to being outbid.
2. Bidding Late to Avoid Bidding Wars with Like-Minded Bidders
?? Like-Minded Bidders: 同樣想法的 bidders?
3.Bidding Late to Protect Information in Auctions with Interdependent Values
There are additional strategic reasons to bid late in auctions with interdependent values (common value auctions).
…the bids of others can carry valuable information about the item’s value that can provoke a bidder to increase his/her willingness to pay. This creates incentives to bid late because by bidding late, less informed bidders can incorporate into their bids the information they have gathered from the earlier bids of others, and experts can avoid giving information to others through their own early bids.
…the uninformed bidder should not bid unless the expert submitted a bid earlier and, thus, signaled that the coin is genuine.
…Such conditional bidding behavior of uninformed bidders creates, in turn, an incentive for experts to submit the bid for a genuine item very late to, as esnipe.com puts it, “prevent other bidders from cashing in on their expertise.”
Strategic versus Nonstrategic Hypotheses for Late Bidding
There are other, nonstrategic reasons for late bidding, including procrastination, use of search engines that make it easy to find auctions about to end, endowment effects, or management of bidding in multiple auctions in which similar objects might be offered.
However, regardless of the causes for incremental bidding, incremental bidders are likely to drive last-minute bidding.
Indeed, a substantial share of both, one-bid bidders (12 percent) and multiple bidders (16 percent), bid as late as in the last 10 minutes of the eBay auctions (Ockenfels and Roth 2001). However, the data also reveal that …one-bid bidders submit their bid later than incremental bidders.
Thus, many incremental bidders bid late, but one-bid bidders tend to bid even later.
…the data indicate that incremental bidding significantly diminishes with experience (as measured by the bidders’ feedback numbers), but last-minute bidding increases with experience.
…eBay would face a number of choices. One would be to recapture the sniping market by offering a sniping option on eBay itself…. Of course, if all bidders used this option, the auction would precisely be a sealed-bid auction. eBay, and sellers who list items for sale on eBay, might prefer not to encourage this development…