How to License Intangible Property

Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro. “How to license intangible property." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 101.3 (1986): 567-589. 提供的 [PDF]


We examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors. We consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture. We show that (1) demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit-maximizing licensing strategy; (2) the seller’s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive; (3) the seller’s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low; (4) larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation, and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs; and (5) a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation.


Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent

Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y. (1986). Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471-491. [PDF in utexas]

==original abstract==

We compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost-reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product, by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty. Our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n + 1 players: the inventor and the n firms. In this game the inventor acts as a Stackelberg leader, and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers. Only a “drastic” innovation is licensed to a single producer.

Futures markets and the theory of the firm under price uncertainty*

Feder, G., Just, R. E., & Schmitz, A. (1980). Futures markets and the theory of the firm under price uncertainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94(2), 317-328.*******

==Notes by yinung==

related to Sandmo (1971);


The  theory  of  the  firm  under  price  uncertainty  has  been  the subject  of  a  considerable  number  of  studies.  While  the  papers  by Sandmo  [1971], Leland  [1972], Batra  and Ullah  [1974], and  others  have undoubtedly advanced the understanding of the decision making of firms under uncertainty,  the theory is not complete unless forward  delivery  contracts  are  considered.  Such  contracts,  referred  to  as  “futures," are playing an increasingly  important  role in a number of  commodity  markets.


This paper examines the behavior of a competitive firm under price uncertainty where a futures market exists for the commodity produced by the firm. Working with the Sandmo approach, we found that production decisions depend only on the futures market price and input costs; the subjective distribution of future spot price affects only the firm’s involvement in futures trading. Conditions are then determined under which a firm will either hedge, speculate by buying futures contracts, or speculate by selling futures contracts. The results indicate that an important social benefit derived from the existence of a futures market is to eliminate output fluctuations due to variation in producers’ subjective distributions of future spot price.

Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle

Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler  (1995) “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 73-92. ; doi: 10.2307/2118511 ; 提供的 [PDF]

==notes by yinung==

Prospect theory, myopic loss aversion (MLA) 和 equity premium puzzle 的重要文獻

==original Abstract==

The equity premium puzzle refers to the empirical fact that stocks have outperformed bonds over the last century by a surprisingly large margin. We offer a new explanation based on two behavioral concepts. First, investors are assumed to be “loss averse,” meaning that they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, even long-term investors are assumed to evaluate their portfolios frequently. We dub this combination “myopic loss aversion.” Using simulations, we find that the size of the equity premium is consistent with the previously estimated parameters of prospect theory if investors evaluate their portfolios annually.

Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?*

List, John A. 2003. “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1): 41–71.

==notes by yinung==


First, consistent with previous studies, I observe a significant endowment effect in the pooled data.

Second, I find sharp evidence that suggests market experience matters: across all consumer types, marketlike experience and the magnitude of the endowment effect are inversely related.

In addition, within the group of subjects who have intense trading experience (dealers and experienced
nondealers), I find that the endowment effect becomes negligible. Both of these observations extend quite well to statements of value in auctions, where offers and bids are significantly different for naive consumers, but statistically indistinguishable for experienced consumers.

===無母數統計: Fisher exact test===

R 的 vcd package 可以進行此檢定, see

==Original Abstract==

This study examines individual behavior in two well-functioning marketplaces to investigate whether market experience eliminates the endowment effect. Field evidence from both markets suggests that individual behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as market experience increases. In an experimental test of whether these observations are due to treatment (market experience) or selection (e.g., static preferences), I find that market experience plays a significant role in eliminating the endowment effect. I also find that these results are robust to institutional change and extend beyond the two marketplaces studied. Overall, this study provides strong evidence that market experience eliminates an important market anomaly.