Literature on three person/outside options/information ultimatum game

Information in ultimatum games: An experimental study

RTA Croson – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1996 – Elsevier
Considerations of fairness and strategy: Experimental data from sequential games.
Game-theoretic models and the role of information in bargaining. Bargaining and market
behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An experimental study.

[PDF] Two-level ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information: An experimental study

W Güth, S Huck, P Ockenfels – The Economic Journal, 1996 – JSTOR
I73-85. Frankfurt. Guth, W. and van Damme, E. (I 994) -‘Information, strategic behavior
and fairness in ultimatum bargaining – an experimental study. Working Paper,
CentER/Tilburg. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K. and Smith, VA (I994).

==Three person==

Bargaining outside the lab–a newspaper experiment of a threeperson ultimatum game*

W Güth, C Schmidt, M Sutter – The Economic Journal, 2007 – Wiley Online Library
Werner Gu® th, Carsten Schmidt and Matthias Sutter 5,132 readers of the German weekly,
Die Zeit, participated in a threeperson bargaining experiment. In our data analysis we focus
on (1) the influence of age, gender, profession and medium chosen for participation and (

Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study

W Güth, E Van Damme – Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1998 – Elsevier
This paper reports on an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining situations in which an
inactive third player is present. The proposerXsuggests an allocation (x, y, z) on how to
divide a cake betweenX, Y, andZ. A messagemthat (partially) reveals this proposal is sent

Tests of fairness models based on equity considerations in a threeperson ultimatum game

JH Kagel, KW Wolfe – Experimental Economics, 2001 – Springer
Abstract Two recent models incorporating fairness considerations into the economics
literature based on agents’ concerns about the distribution of payoffs between themselves
and others (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114 (3), 769–816;

Incentive contracts versus trust in threeperson ultimatum games: an experimental study

S Büchner, LG González, W Güth, MV Levati – European Journal of Political …, 2004 – Elsevier
Whether incentive contracts outperform trust in terms of productive efficiency is usually
explored by principal-agent experiments. We investigate this question using the simpler and
more neutral frame of a threeperson ultimatum experiment. We find that (mutual) trust is

On ultimatum bargaining experiments—A personal review

W Güth – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995 – Elsevier
355-384. Oppewal, H. and E. Tougareva, 1992, A threeperson ultimatum game to investigate
effects of differences in need, sharing rules and observability on bargaining behaviour. Information,
fairness, and strategic behaviour in 3person ultimatum bargaining.

Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more “rational” players?

G Bornstein, I Yaniv – Experimental Economics, 1998 – Springer
Abstract This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum
game played by individuals with the same game played by threeperson groups.
In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group

A threeperson ultimatum game to investigate effects of differences in need, sharing rules and observability on bargaining behaviour

H Oppewal, E Tougareva – Journal of economic psychology, 1992 – Elsevier
Abstract This paper describes an extension of the well-known simple two-person ultimatum
game. The extended game includes differences between players in their need for the
payoffs and it includes a third person who shares with the person who accepts an offer. In

[PDF] Responder behavior in threeperson ultimatum game experiments

A Riedl, J Vyrastekova – 2003 –
Abstract We extend the standard ultimatum game to a three person game where the
proposer chooses a three-way split of a pie and two responders independently and
simultaneously choose to accept or reject the proposal. We investigate whether a

[引言] Testing between alternative models of fairness: a new three person ultimatum game

J Kagel, K Wolfe – 1999 – mimeo

Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis

H Oosterbeek, R Sloof, G Van De Kuilen – Experimental Economics, 2004 – Springer
and Carnevale, 1997; Messick et al., 1997). – Nor did we include the threeperson
ultimatum game with one proposer and two respon- ders as studied by Güth and Van
Damme (1998). – We also excluded a study in which subjects

Take it or leave it for something better? Responses to fair offers in ultimatum bargaining

R Nelissen, DSI van Someren, M Zeelenberg – Journal of Experimental …, 2009 – Elsevier
In order to investigate whether responders in ultimatum bargains show true concerns for
egalitarianism, we investigated their decisions in a modified version of the ultimatum game that
presented responders with an outside option that was larger than their payoff from accepting

==Outside Options==

Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments

MJ Knez, CF Camerer – Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 – Elsevier
We conducted ultimatum games in which a proposer offers a division of 10toarespondent,
,withoutsideoptionsof 2 and 4.Therateofrejectedofferswashigherthaninsimi…,around50%, …

被引用 131 次 相關文章 全部共 7 個版本 引用


On perceptions of fairness: The role of valuations, outside options, and information in ultimatum bargaining games

PM Schmitt – Experimental Economics, 2004 – Springer
Abstract This study examines fairness perceptions in ultimatum bargaining games with
asymmetric payoffs, outside options, and different information states. Fairness perceptions
were dependent on treatment conditions. Specifically, when proposers had higher chip

Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional rejections of ultimatum offers

MM Pillutla, JK Murnighan – Organizational Behavior and Human Decision …, 1996 – Elsevier
hypotheses in this accept offers that are less than the value of their out- context straightforward:
Rational models suggest that side option. responses to ultimatum offers will only be affected by
The third variable, information, was first investi- the size of offers and outside options.

Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games

R Croson, T Boles, JK Murnighan – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2003 – Elsevier
Our experimental design uses a finitely repeated ultimatum game with an outside option
for the responder and two-sided asymmetric information (about that outside option for
the proposer and about the size of the pie for the responder).

An outside option experiment

K Binmore, A Shared, J Sutton – The Quarterly Journal of …, 1989 –
0, and b1 + b2 .^. M. Breakdown will be assumed to be precipitated by one or other of the players
leaving the negotiation table for good in order to take up his outside option b4.

An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: Information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers

PG Straub, JK Murnighan – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995 – Elsevier
27 (1995) 345-364 349 nothing. Although the results from multiple trial demand games with
outside options suggested that equal outcomes were not particularly salient, the question
remains whether fairness is a consideration in one-shot ultimatum games.

[PDF] A general experiment on bargaining in demand games with outside options

LM Kahn, JK Murnighan – The American Economic Review, 1993 – JSTOR
when s = 10 percent, p = 0.5, and d = 0.8 (although it is nearly as large when d = 1). When p is
0.5, the negotiation resembles an ultimatum game, and the existence of a 10-percent outside
option does not greatly affect the equilibrium compared to a game with no outside option.

Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game

J Gale, KG Binmore, L Samuelson – Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 – Elsevier
toughness. Even when we do play anonymously, outside options are often available.
For experiments. Short-run refusals of positive offers in the pure Ultimatum Game
therefore create no problem for orthodox game theory. However

Why people reject advantageous offers—Non-monotonic strategies in ultimatum bargaining: Evaluating a video experiment run in PR China

H Hennig-Schmidt, ZY Li, C Yang – Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2008 – Elsevier
Numerous symmetric ultimatum game experiments (UG in the following) with zero outside
options have shown that individual proposers typically offer 30–50 percent of the pie,
with the equal split often being the modal and median offer.

Social utility in ultimatum bargaining

MJJ Handgraaf, E Van Dijk, D De Cremer – Social Justice Research, 2003 – Springer
Presence of Outside Options Introducing an outside option to the ultimatum game (ie, giving
one or both players the opportunity to receive endowments when no agreement is reached)
may greatly influence the weights of equity and self-interest.

An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: Information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers

PG Straub, JK Murnighan – Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995 – Elsevier
Binmore, Kenneth, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton, 1989, An Outside Option
Experiment, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 753-770. An Outside Option
Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (1989), pp. 753–770.

Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options

K Chatterjee, CC Lee – Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 – Elsevier
3; KG Binmore, A. Shaked, J. Sutton; An Outside Option Experiment. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 104 (1989), pp. 753–770. Full Text via CrossRef. 4; Chatterjee, K. Dutta, B. 1995,
Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners, Pennsylvania State University

A general experiment on bargaining in demand games with outside options

LM Kahn, JK Murnighan – The American Economic Review, 1993 – JSTOR
1264 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Participants in the experiment were 118
undergraduates (typically juniors and se- niors) in marketing and management classes who were
randomly assigned to be player 1 or player 2. Each player 2 had an outside option, paid in the

Outside options in a bargaining model with decay in the size of the cake

A Dalmazzo – Economics Letters, 1992 – Elsevier
Binmore, KG, A. Shaked and J. Sutton, 1989, An outside option experiment, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 104, 753-770. An outside option experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104
(1989), pp. 753–770. Full Text via CrossRef. Chae and Yang, 1988; S. Chae, J.-A. Yang

Fairness, escalation, deference, and spite: strategies used in labor-management bargaining experiments with outside options

J Carpenter, MA Rudisill – Labour Economics, 2003 – Elsevier
Approximately the same number of interactions ended at each of the two ultimatum
subgames (half those firms that searched took the outside option). Outside options and
social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments.



Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results

W Güth, R Tietz – Journal of Economic Psychology, 1990 – Elsevier
The fold theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information.
Econometrica 54, 533-554. Gdth, W., 1988. pp. 703-717. Gh, W. and R. Tietz, 1985. `Strategic
power versus distributive justice. Homans, GC, 1961. Social behavior: Its elementary forms.

Endogenous vs. Exogenous Transmission of Information: An Experiment

==notes by yinung==

此實驗研究資訊傳遞效率 (利用 matching game 為基本設計)
player2 和 player1 若選擇 (和 nature played by player 1, 隨機)一致, 則獲利 = 1;否則得 0
treatment: 有C/無NC online chat
所謂 endogenous communication:
… several type 1 players make an intentional mistake to induce a change in type 2’s behavior. Several type 2 players, by looking at type1’s actions, make some kind of guess about the future actions of nature.
Date: 2013
By: Aurora García-Gallego (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)
Penélope Hernández-Rojas (ERI-CES & Department of Economic Analysis, University of Valencia, Spain)
Amalia Rodrigo-González (Department of Business Finance, University of Valencia, Spain)
Based on Gossner, Hernández and Neyman’s (2006) 3-player game (hereafter GHN) we analyze communication efficiency in the lab. In that game, player 1 represents random nature an i.i.d. procedure, player 2 is a fully informed player (wiser), and player 3 is the less informed player (agent). The game is repeated and players 2 and 3 get 1 if both actions match nature’s actions and 0 otherwise. We propose an experiment following this game. We implement two treatments: one without chat (NC) and one with chat (C). In the treatment with chat, players may first send messages to each other through an online chat application, and then play the game. After the chat time, only the wiser player has perfect information on the realized (random) sequence played by nature. The players then play the finitely repeated binary game. In treatment NC, subjects just play the game. In the experiment we observed endogenous communication treatment NC as well as exogenous in treatment C, both of which result in higher payoffs. Furthermore, when explicit communication is possible we observe a chat effect which can be interpreted as a higher level of efficiency in communication. Strategies used by subjects are in line with GHN strategies.
Keywords: communication, transmission of information, efficiency, experiments

Accepting Zero in the Ultimatum Game: Selfish Nash Response?

Date: 2012-01
By: Gianandrea Staffiero (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Filippos Exadaktylos (BELIS, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies,Istanbul Bilgi University)
Antonio M. Espín
The rejection of unfair proposals in ultimatum games is often quoted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. In this paper we focus on those responders who accept any proposals, setting the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) at zero. While this behavior could result from the randomization between the two payoff-maximizing strategies (i.e. setting MAO at zero or at the smallest positive amount), it also implies that the opponent’s payoff is maximized and the “pie†remains intact. We match subjects’ behavior as ultimatum responders with their choices in the dictator game, in two large-scale experiments. We find that those who set MAO at zero are the most generous dictators. Moreover, they differ substantially from responders whose MAO is the smallest positive offer, who are the greediest dictators. Thus, an interpretation of zero MAOs in terms of selfish, payoff-maximizing behavior could be misleading. Our evidence indicates that the restraint from punishing others can be driven by altruism and by the desire to maximize social welfare.
Keywords: ultimatum game, dictator game, altruism, social welfare, costly punishment, selfishness, social preferences
JEL: C93

Literature about Tournaments from John List’s syllabus


• Bull, Clive, Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt, “Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study." JPE, 1987, 1-33.
•  Schotter, Andrew and Keith Weigelt, “Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results." QJE,
1992, 511-39.
•  Nalbantian, Haig and Andrew Schotter, “Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study." AER, June 1997, 314-341.
•  Gneezy, U., and R. Smorodinsky “All-pay auction: An experimental study."  Working paper, University of Chicago.
•  Orrison, Alannah, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt. “On the Design of Optimal Organizations Using Tournaments: An Experimental Examination.”
1998, Management Science.
•  List, John A. et al., 2009. “Toward an Understanding of Optimal Contest Design,”
working paper, University of Chicago.

On the Generalizability of Experimental Results in Economics

Al-Ubaydli, Omar, and John A. List. On the generalizability of experimental results in economics. No. w17957. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012.

download in pdf format

Economists are increasingly turning to the experimental method as a means to estimate causal effects. By using randomization to identify key treatment effects, theories previously viewed as untestable are now scrutinized, efficacy of public policies are now more easily verified, and stakeholders can swiftly add empirical evidence to aid their decision-making. This study provides an overview of experimental methods in economics, with a special focus on developing an economic theory of generalizability. Given that field experiments are in their infancy, our secondary focus pertains to a discussion of the various parameters that they identify, and how they add to scientific knowledge. We conclude that until we conduct more field experiments that build a bridge between the lab and the naturally-occurring settings of interest we cannot begin to make strong conclusions empirically on the crucial question of generalizability from the lab to the field.

The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories

Schmidt, K. M. (2009). The role of experiments for the development of economic theories. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 10(s1), 14-30. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2516.2009.00304.x; 提供的 [PDF] ;


Economic experiments interact with economic theories in various ways. First of all they are used to test economic theories. However, they can neither confirm nor falsify them in a strict sense. They rather inform us about the range of applicability, the robustness and the predictive power of a theory. Furthermore, economic experiments discover and isolate phenomena and challenge economic theorists to explain them. Finally, many economic experiments are “material” models. They are used to analyze and predict how changes in the environment affect economic outcomes. However, they cannot offer an explanation for what we observe. This has to be provided by economic theory.

Myopic loss aversion: Information feedback vs. investment flexibility

Charles Bellemare, Michaela Krausee, Sabine Krfgerf,Chendi Zhang (2005) “Myopic loss aversion: Information feedback vs. investment flexibility“. Economics Letters, vol., 87, pp.319 – 324. *****

==notes by yinung==


只要資訊頻率降低, 即可讓投資風險資產意願提高.


在於資訊迴饋頻率 frequent/infrequent, 其 treatment 有三種:

H: 投資期間1期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
M: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
L: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每3期

Bellemare et al. (2005) 實驗結果是: 投資額度 L~M>H


  • We confirm the works by Gneezy and Potters (1997) and others building on it, and furthermore find that experimentally induced myopia in combination with loss aversion remained to affect investment behavior systematically even when flexibility in adjusting investment was no longer varied. MLA is driven by information feedback.



We experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexibility on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse investor. Our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion.

Causes, Consequences, and Cures of Myopic Loss Aversion – An Experimental Investigation*

Fellner, G., & Sutter, M. (2009). Causes, Consequences, and Cures of Myopic Loss Aversion–An Experimental Investigation*. The Economic Journal, 119(537), 900-916. (Volume 119, Issue 537, ) DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02251.x; 提供的2008年版 [PDF]; 提供的 2005年版[PDF]; ***

==notes by yinung==

這篇有讓 subject 內生決定 H1 或 H3





H1/3: investment 1/3 period
F1: Feedback, 1 period




第1期決定以後不能更能 H1/3

No-profit: 沒有給 profit 資訊
Profit:有給「告訴 subject, 選 3期, 其平均 profit 較高 」資訊



內生決定 feedback: F1/3, 但每期都可投資

Profit: 和前述相同



第1期被指定 H1/3; 第3期開始可以自訂(每3期一次), 轉換成本 40ECU (約報酬的 2.6%)






==original abstract==

We use an experiment to examine the causes, consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA) for investment behaviour under risk. We find that both investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally to the effects of MLA. Longer investment horizons and less frequent feedback lead to higher investments. However, when given the choice, subjects prefer on average shorter investment horizons and more frequent feedback. Exploiting the status quo bias by setting a long investment horizon or low feedback frequency as a default turns out to be a successful behavioural intervention to increase investment levels.