House money effect – Google 學術搜尋結果

RH Thaler… – Management science, 1990 – JSTOR
We also present data from real money experiments supporting a “house money effect" (increased
risk seeking in the presence of a prior gain) and “break-even effects" (in the presence of prior
losses, outcomes which offer a chance to break even are especially attractive).
被引用 926 次相關文章全部共 6 個版本

M Weber… – Decision Analysis, 2005 – decision.highwire.org
When making sequential decisions, do prior gains induce more or less risk taking than prior
losses? Prior studies have found evidence for a housemoney effect, where risk taking increases
following gains. These studies also found seemingly contradictory evidence for escalation
被引用 43 次相關文章全部共 3 個版本

mcmaster.ca 提供的 [PDF]LF Ackert, N Charupat, BK Church… – Experimental Economics, 2006 – Springer
Abstract There is evidence that risk-taking behavior is influenced by prior monetary gains and
losses. When endowed with house money, people become more risk taking. This paper is the
first to report a house money effect in a dynamic, financial setting. Using an experimental
被引用 36 次相關文章全部共 14 個版本

J Clark – Experimental Economics, 2002 – Springer
Yet there is some empirical evidence from economics and psychology that start-up money might
create a “house money effect.” People may spend or invest such money more recklessly than
they would their own, even with wealth effects taken into account.
被引用 58 次相關文章全部共 7 個版本

K Keasey… – Economics Letters, 1996 – Elsevier
While previous studies have shown that the presence of a prior gain (or loss) can
influence the risk attitude of the decisionmaker the socalled ‘house moneyeffect
this evidence derives from a series of monetary gambles. This
被引用 45 次相關文章全部共 6 個版本

bme.hu 提供的 [PDF]D Kahneman, JL Knetsch… – The Journal of Political Economy, 1990 – JSTOR
that eliminated the possibility of an income effect or cash constraint. As shown in tables 2-4,
subjects showed almost no undertrading even in their first trial in an induced-value market.
Evidently neither bargaining habits nor any transaction costs impede trading in money tokens.
被引用 1861 次相關文章全部共 46 個版本
Noted by YI-Nung: 這篇中的 Coase theorem 係指在外部性理論中所提及的, 只要 no transaction costs, 財產權在何者手上不影響最 Coase theorem 最後 efficient outcome

uni-mannheim.de 提供的 [PDF]M Weber… – 2001 – sfb504.uni-mannheim.de
Abstract: In an experiment we study the influence of prior outcomes on risky choice. We document
a strong framing effect. By manipulating the presentation format of the decision problem we can
induce increased risk taking following a gain, ie the housemoney effect (Thaler and
被引用 12 次相關文章HTML 版全部共 8 個版本

A Frino, J Grant… – Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2008 – Elsevier
The “house money effect” describes the psychological tendency of investors to become increasingly
risk-seeking immediately following monetary gains. We observe evidence consistent with this
behavioral bias in the trades executed by professional futures traders (“locals”) on the
被引用 10 次相關文章全部共 5 個版本

psu.edu 提供的 [PDF]GW Harrison – Experimental Economics, 2007 – Springer
The house money effect is estimated to reduce the probability of providing something by 8.2
percentage points, compared to a pooled average of 73%.8 This esti- mated effect is statistically
significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.010), and the 95% confidence interval for the
被引用 20 次相關文章全部共 12 個版本

eui.eu 提供的 [PDF]RH Thaler – Financial Analysts Journal, 1999 – JSTOR
They could do so only by adding another behavioral factor: the “house money effect." The house
money effect captures the intu- ition that when gamblers are ahead (playing with what they refer
to as the “house’s money“), they become less loss averse and more willing to take
被引用 241 次相關文章全部共 8 個版本

廣告

Behavioral Economics Comes of Age

Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2006) “Behavioral economics comes of age: A review essay on advances in behavioral economics."
Journal of Economic Literature,Volume 44, Number 3, September 2006 , pp. 712-721(10).
被引用 53 次相關文章全部共 15 個版本

Noted by Yi-Nung

這篇文章簡要地敘述了近年來實驗文獻的貢獻:

Behavioral economics is organized around experimental findings that suggest inadequacies of standard economic theories.

行為 (指以實驗為主的研究) 經濟主要的發現是指出標準經濟理論之不適當處;

主要可分為 4 點
(1) failures of expected utility theory;
(2) the endowment effect;
(3) hyperbolic discounting and
(4) social preferences.

重要名詞:

prospect theory

reference point

… the experimenter may frame a lottery L as (i) x with probability p and y with probability 1 − p; or, alternatively, as (ii) a payment of z and a subsequent lottery of x − z > 0 with probability p and the lottery y − z < 0 with probability 1 − p. The difference in the two lotteries is interpreted as a manipulation of the reference point.

first-order risk aversion

endowment effect

people place a higher value on objects they own than objects that they do not

Hyperbolic Discounting (immediacy effect)

subjects have a tendency to choose earlier, smaller rewards over later, larger rewards

Social Preferences

Original Abstract:
Advances in Behavioral Economics contains influential second-generation contributions to behavioral economics. Building on the seminal work by Kahnemann, Strotz, Thaler, Tversky, and others, these contributions have established behavioral economics as an important field of study in economics. In this essay, I discuss aspects of the research strategy and methodology of behavioral economics, as exemplified by the contributions to Advances.

A World without Intellectual Property? A Review of Michele Boldrin and David Levine’s Against Intellectual Monopoly

Gilbert, Richard. 2011. “A World without Intellectual Property? A Review of Michele Boldrin and David Levine’s Against Intellectual Monopoly." Journal of Economic Literature, 49(2): 421–32.
DOI:10.1257/jel.49.2.421

==original Abstract ==

In their recent book, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Michele Boldrin and David Levine conclude that patents and copyrights are not necessary to provide protection for either innovation or creative expression and should be eliminated. The authors note the many flaws of the U.S. system of intellectual property protection and argue that other means are available to appropriate the benefits of invention and creative expression. While the authors overlook important functions of intellectual property, they provide support for further reforms of intellectual property law. (JEL K11, O31, O34)

Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property

Kevin G. Rivette, David. Kline (2000) “Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property." Harvard Business Review, http://hbr.org/2000/01/discovering-new-value-in-intellectual-property/ar/1

Summarized by Yi-Nung

此文可以當做引言: Why IP 在實務界中的重要性。

… Thoman, who was appointed CEO of the $20 billion Xerox Corporation last summer, … “My focus is intellectual property,” he declares. “I’m convinced that the management of intellectual property is how value added is going to be created at Xerox. And not just here, either. Increasingly, companies that are good at managing IP will win. The ones that aren’t will lose.”

linked PDF

Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment

Buccafusco, Christopher J. and Sprigman, Christopher Jon ,Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment: An Experiment (March 11, 2010). Cornell Law Review, Vol. 91, 2010; Chicago-Kent Intellectual Property, Science & Technology Research Paper No. 10-029; Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2010-04. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568962

Noted by Yi-Nung

這是一個有趣的實驗:

實驗 A. Contest “Eyes Closed” Method

1. 找10個人當 Author 各寫一首詩, 假裝參加 haiku-writing competition 競賽, 第1名可得獎金 $50.

2. 找 10 個人當 bidder, 每一個 author 寫的詩, 指定給一個 bidder,

3(a). Bidder 去評估 (被指的那一首) 詩是否能得獎, 然後「願意付多少錢」(WTP)得到這個機會

4. Author 則選擇「願意接受多少錢」(WTA) 賣掉這個得獎的機會 (但仍然保留著作權)

5. 另外找人當 Owner, 每人隨機指定 1 首 Author 寫的詩, 並令其回答「願意接受多少錢」(WTA) 賣掉這個得獎的機會

實驗 B. The Contest: “Eyes Open”

與上述 5 點相同, 除了所有的人都看過所有的 1o 首詩 (perfect information?)

實驗 A 和 B 的結果: WTP 和 WTA 間有很大的統計顯著差異 (gap) (顯示支持 Endownment Effect);
而角色不同的 Author 和 Owner 之間的 WTA 並無顯著差異。

image

實驗 C. The Lottery: “Blind”

與上述 5 點相同, 但是不是以評審方式決定哪一首詩得獎, 而告訴全部人, 此次是用抽獎的方式決定誰得獎
(照理說, 這個 treatment 應該可以去除 Endowment Effects)

實驗 C 的結果: WTA/WTP 的 gap 更大! (即Endowment Effects 仍然存在)  但是 Authro、Owner、Buyer 三者的 WTA/WTP 都小於實驗 A/B。

image

待釐清事項:

  • 如何定義本文中所謂的「efficiency」問題…

Original Abstract:

In this article we report on the results of an experiment we performed to determine whether transactions in intellectual property (IP) are subject to the valuation anomalies commonly referred to as “endowment effects”. Traditional conceptions of the value of IP rely on assumptions about human rationality derived from classical economics. The law assumes that when people make decisions about buying, selling, and licensing IP they do so with fixed, context-independent preferences. Over the past several decades, this rational actor model of classical economics has come under attack by behavioral data showing that people do not always make strictly rational decisions. Perhaps the most important research in this field is that related to the “endowment effect” – the discovery that, contrary to economic predictions, people value the same object more when they own it than when they do not.

To date, the endowment effect has been observed for a variety of goods including mugs, lottery tickets, and hunting permits. Our experiment establishes a substantial valuation asymmetry between authors of poems and potential purchasers of them. As we explain in detail in the article, we constructed a market for the poems that was modeled on a market for licensing IP. The observed differences in valuation indicate that IP licensing markets may be substantially less efficient that previously believed. Our results suggest that (1) the preferences of IP creators, owners, and purchasers are unstable and dependent on the initial distribution of property rights in creative works, and (2) large gaps arise between purchasers’ willingness to pay and sellers’ willingness to accept even though the poems are non-rival property and the contemplated alienation of the property is therefore only partial.

Our findings suggest that private transactions in creative goods may face significant transaction costs arising from cognitive biases that drive the price that creators and owners of IP are likely to demand for transfers considerably higher than what buyers will, on average, be willing to pay. This does not mean, of course, that transactions in IP will not take place – we see such transactions happening out in the world every day. Our research suggests, however, that IP transactions may occur at a level that is significantly suboptimal, and that the baleful effect of cognitive and affective biases is likely to be more serious for transactions in works of relatively low commercial value, or for which no well-established custom or pattern helps to inform valuation. These results have considerable implications for the structuring of IP rights, IP formalities, IP licensing, and fair use.

==Cited by==

Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher Jon Sprigman (2011) THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: The Creativity Effect, 78, U. Chi. L. Rev. 31.

The timing of bids in internet auctions: Market design, bidder behavior, and artificial agents

A Ockenfels, AE Roth – AI Magazine, 2002 – aaai.org (創刊於 1980, SCI, ) 下載 [pdf]

Game theorists and market designers focus on the impact of the rules of the game on the behavior of the participants. Participants in internet markets can be human bidders bidding in person or artificial agents used by human bidders. Thus, the per- formance of market rules …

Google: 被引用 92 次 – 相關文章 – 全部共 22 個版本

Noted by Yi-Nung

In particular, we identify three distinct kinds of bidding wars: (1) with incremental bidders, (2) with like-minded late bidders, and (3) with uninformed bidders who look to others’ bids to determine the value of an item.

1. Bidding Late to Avoid Bidding Wars with Incremental Bidders

Last-minute bidding can be a best reply toincremental bidding.

Last-minute bids can be a best response to this kind of incremental bidding because bidding near the deadline of the auction would not give the incremental bidder sufficient time to respond to being outbid.

2. Bidding Late to Avoid Bidding Wars with Like-Minded Bidders
?? Like-Minded Bidders: 同樣想法的 bidders?

3.Bidding Late to Protect Information in Auctions with Interdependent Values
There are additional strategic reasons to bid late in auctions with interdependent values (common value auctions).

…the bids of others can carry valuable information about the item’s value that can provoke a bidder to increase his/her willingness to pay. This creates incentives to bid late because by bidding late, less informed bidders can incorporate into their bids the information they have gathered from the earlier bids of others, and experts can avoid giving information to others through their own early bids.

…the uninformed bidder should not bid unless the expert submitted a bid earlier and, thus, signaled that the coin is genuine.

…Such conditional bidding behavior of uninformed bidders creates, in turn, an incentive for experts to submit the bid for a genuine item very late to, as esnipe.com puts it, “prevent other bidders from cashing in on their expertise.”

Strategic versus Nonstrategic Hypotheses for Late Bidding

There are other, nonstrategic reasons for late bidding, including procrastination, use of search engines that make it easy to find auctions about to end, endowment effects, or management of bidding in multiple auctions in which similar objects might be offered.

However, regardless of the causes for incremental bidding, incremental bidders are likely to drive last-minute bidding.

Indeed, a substantial share of both, one-bid bidders (12 percent) and multiple bidders (16 percent), bid as late as in the last 10 minutes of the eBay auctions (Ockenfels and Roth 2001). However, the data also reveal that …one-bid bidders submit their bid later than incremental bidders.

Thus, many incremental bidders bid late, but one-bid bidders tend to bid even later.

…the data indicate that incremental bidding significantly diminishes with experience (as measured by the bidders’ feedback numbers), but last-minute bidding increases with experience.

…eBay would face a number of choices. One would be to recapture the sniping market by offering a sniping option on eBay itself…. Of course, if all bidders used this option, the auction would precisely be a sealed-bid auction. eBay, and sellers who list items for sale on eBay, might prefer not to encourage this development…

Online Auctions

Axel Ockenfels, David Reiley, Abdolkarim Sadrieh

NBER Working Paper No. 12785,  Issued in December 2006 (This paper is available as PDF (883 K) or via email.)

NBER Program(s): IO

Original Abstract

The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner’s-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).

被引用 57 次相關文章全部共 19 個版本

Notes by Yi-Nung

此文有提到 seller 為何要選 buy-now option?
The existence and increasing popularity of the buy-now option are puzzling from the point of view of auction theory. An auction’s primary benefit is that it relieves the seller of the job of determining an item’s price, instead allowing bidders to determine the price by competing with each other. Introducing a buy price could potentially decrease a seller’s revenue, because when exercised it rules out the possibility of higher prices reached by competitive bidding. … why is the buy-now option so popular with sellers?
One of the first proposed explanations for the observed popularity of the buy-now option is the risk aversion of bidders or sellers. Budish and Takeyama (2001) show that adding a permanent buy-now option to an ascending auction can increase the seller’s revenue… Reynolds and Wooders (2003)… demonstrating that it holds for both types of buy-now options. They show that optimally chosen buy-now prices are never exercised in equilibrium when the bidders are risk-neutral. In contrast, when the bidders are risk- averse, the optimal buy-now prices are exercised with a positive probability, providing insurance value to risk-averse bidders and increasing the risk-neutral seller’s revenue.Durham, Roelofs, and Standifird (2004) … the authors conclude that the buy-now option increases seller revenue, … Because the buy-now auctions also tended to have higher minimum bids than the non-buy-now auctions, it is hard to tell whether the cause was the buy-now price or the higher minimum bid. (這是有爭議的部份, p.39)

Standifird, Roelofs, and Durham (2005) report a field experiment … The authors suggest that buyers may be reluctant to use the buy-now option…
Shahriar and Wooders (2005) report laboratory experiments … The authors find that suitably chosen buy-now prices raise sellers’ revenues in both treatments. … Seifert (2006)…  The experiment shows that buy-now prices have the expected positive impact on sellers’ revenues with five active bidders, but the effect is lost when the number of active bidders falls to three…. the buy-now option remains rather poorly understood. We see few robust findings, and little ability to discriminate betweenthe different proposed theoretical explanations.… Open auctions can lead to lower revenues when bidders are risk-averse … and when ex-ante asymmetries among
bidders are strong or competition is weak (e.g., Cramton 1998). This might be part of the reason why eBay recently introduced a sealed-bid format as an option for sellers; in the ‘best offer’ format, …

可能是有關 sniping 的參考文獻

以下為 Google 學術搜尋: experiment auction sniping�� 之結果, 可能是有關的參考文獻

R Bapna – Communications of the ACM, 2003 – portal.acm.org
Typically, several bidders win a given multi-unit auction, and, because it is a discriminatory
(pay-your-bid) pricing scheme, there can be a significant spread in the lowest and highest
winning bid. back to top A Natural Experiment With a Sniping Agent.
被引用 42 次相關文章全部共 3 個版本
JC Ely, T Hossain – American Economic Journal: …, 2009 – ingentaconnect.com
We conducted a field experiment to test the benefit from late bid- ding (sniping) in online auction
markets. We compared sniping to early bidding (squatting) in auctions for newly-released DVDs
on eBay. Sniping led to a statistically significant increase in our aver- age surplus.
被引用 16 次相關文章全部共 8 個版本
AE Roth, A Ockenfels – 2002 – nber.org (nber.org 提供的 [PDF])
they appear to be unaware of eBay,s proxy-bidding system.21 Although more than 90 percent
of the responders to our survey never use sniping software, environment. In that experiment,
subjects are randomly assigned to different auction conditions,
被引用 641 次相關文章HTML 版全部共 70 個版本

A Ockenfels, AE Roth – Games and Economic Behavior, 2006 – Elsevier (psu.edu 提供的 [PDF])
RAND J. Econ. J. Asker, B. Grosskopf, CN McKinney, M. Niederle, AE Roth and G. Weizsäcker,
Teaching auction strategy using experiments administered via the Internet, J. Econ. Shilling,
squeezing sniping: Explaining late bidding in on-line second-price auctions.
被引用 210 次相關文章全部共 65 個版本

J Asker, B Grosskopf, CN McKinney… – The Journal of Economic …, 2004 – JSTOR (psu.edu 提供的 [PDF])
This leads naturally into the discussion of sniping, as last minute bids are called on eBay and
the benefits to an informed bidder of bidding so late that Some internet auctions (such as eBay)
have a fixed time at which the auction ends, like those used in this experiment.
被引用 7 次相關文章全部共 22 個版本
D Ariely, A Ockenfels… – The RAND Journal of Economics, 2005 – JSTOR (psu.edu 提供的 [PDF])
A great deal of late bidding has been observed on eBay, which employs a second price auction
with a fixed deadline. Much less late bidding has been observed on Amazon, which can only
end when ten minutes have passed without a bid. In controlled experiments, we find that
被引用 152 次相關文章全部共 54 個版本
A Ockenfels, AE Roth – AI Magazine, 2002 – aaai.org (創刊於 1980, SCI, )
Game theorists and market designers focus on the impact of the rules of the game on the behavior
of the partici- pants. Participants in internet markets can be human bidders bidding in person
or artificial agents used by human bidders. Thus, the per- formance of market rules
被引用 92 次相關文章全部共 22 個版本
JE Heyman, Y Orhun… – Journal of Interactive Marketing…, 2004 – Wiley Online Library
JOURNAL OF INTERACTIVE MARKETING VOLUME 18 / NUMBER 4 / AUTUMN 2004 Published
online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/dir.20020 The results
of two experimental auctions—one involving hypothetical bids At 4 minutes to 7:00 on
被引用 77 次相關文章全部共 8 個版本
S Anwar, R McMillan… – European Economic Review, 2006 – Elsevier
Much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one
another, with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. However, in many online
auctions, a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid
被引用 63 次相關文章全部共 20 個版本
A Ockenfels, DH Reiley Jr… – 2006 – nber.org
This paper has been prepared as a draft chapter for the Handbook of Economics and Information
Systems, Terrence Hendershott, ed., Elsevier Science, 2006. We thank David Caballero and
Jason McCoy for their research assistance. Axel Ockenfels gratefully acknowledges
被引用 57 次相關文章全部共 19 個版本
此文有提到 seller 為何要選 buy-now option?
The existence and increasing popularity of the buy-now option are puzzling from the point of view of auction theory. An auction’s primary benefit is that it relieves the seller of the job of determining an item’s price, instead allowing bidders to determine the price by competing with each other. Introducing a buy price could potentially decrease a seller’s revenue, because when exercised it rules out the possibility of higher prices reached by competitive bidding. … why is the buy-now option so popular with sellers?
One of the first proposed explanations for the observed popularity of the buy-now option is the risk aversion of bidders or sellers. Budish and Takeyama (2001) show that adding a permanent buy-now option to an ascending auction can increase the seller’s revenue… Reynolds and Wooders (2003)… demonstrating that it holds for both types of buy-now options. They show that optimally chosen buy-now prices are never exercised in equilibrium when the bidders are risk-neutral. In contrast, when the bidders are risk- averse, the optimal buy-now prices are exercised with a positive probability, providing insurance value to risk-averse bidders and increasing the risk-neutral seller’s revenue.

Durham, Roelofs, and Standifird (2004) … the authors conclude that the buy-now option increases seller revenue, … Because the buy-now auctions also tended to have higher minimum bids than the non-buy-now auctions, it is hard to tell whether the cause was the buy-now price or the higher minimum bid. (這是有爭議的部份, p.39)

Standifird, Roelofs, and Durham (2005) report a field experiment … The authors suggest that buyers may be reluctant to use the buy-now option…
Shahriar and Wooders (2005) report laboratory experiments … The authors find that suitably chosen buy-now prices raise sellers’ revenues in both treatments. … Seifert (2006)…  The experiment shows that buy-now prices have the expected positive impact on sellers’ revenues with five active bidders, but the effect is lost when the number of active bidders falls to three…. the buy-now option remains rather poorly understood. We see few robust findings, and little ability to discriminate between the different proposed theoretical explanations.

… Open auctions can lead to lower revenues when bidders are risk-averse … and when ex-ante asymmetries among
bidders are strong or competition is weak (e.g., Cramton 1998). This might be part of the reason why eBay recently introduced a sealed-bid format as an option for sellers; in the ‘best offer’ format, …

eBay.BIN2-每輪15回合.有時間(2009-碩專班)

M TimeSpan =15
V Next Timespan = if(OR(mod(simstep,15)=14, mod(simstep,15)=0), 15,5)
M StartTime = 0
M EndTime = 90
M InitialSteps=0
M TimeFormat = "回合#0"
M NumberFormat = "#,##0.##"
V myStep=SimStep
V NOTR=15
V NR=15
V TimeLeft=NOTR-mod(SimStep,NOTR)
V base = 0.5
V UpperInc = 1
V minCr0 = if(base+0.5*base*round(randbetween(0,UpperInc))1 & v0>=previous(price3)+minCR0 & previous(winner0)=0, previous(price3)+minCR0,NA)
V bid1=if(mod(simStep,15)>1 & v1>=previous(price3)+minCR1 & previous(winner1)=0, previous(price3)+minCR1,NA)
V bid2=if(mod(simStep,15)>1 & v2>=previous(price3)+minCR2 & previous(winner2)=0, previous(price3)+minCR2,NA)
V f_bid0=if(OR(bid0=na,bid0=none),-999,bid0)
V f_bid1=if(OR(bid1=na,bid1=none),-999,bid1)
V f_bid2=if(OR(bid2=na,bid2=none),-999,bid2)
V bidHistory=if(mod(SIMSTEP,15)=0,0,if(f_bid0=-999 & f_bid1=-999,previous(bidHistory),previous(bidHistory)+1))
p bidHistory.Label="出價次數"
V price1 = if(price3>=BIN_selected, if(previous(End1)=0 & End1=1, BIN_selected,NA), 0)
V price2 = if(OR(previous(Bestoffer)>=BIN_selected,price3>=BIN_selected), if(previous(End2)=0,BIN_selected,NA), previous(Bestoffer)*BestOfferAccept)
V BestOffer=if(formatSelected=2 & mod(simStep,15)>1, if(End2=1,NA,max(bid0,bid1,bid2)),NA)
V price3 =if(mod(SimStep,15)=0 & simStep=0,0,max(if(mod(SimStep,15)=1,minP,previous(price3)),bid0,bid1,bid2))
V price4 =if(mod(SimStep,15)>1,if(max(previous(price3),bid0,bid1,bid2)>=BIN_selected,BIN_selected,max(previous(price3),bid0,bid1,bid2)),minP)
V Price =if(formatSelected=1,Price1,if(formatSelected=2,price2,if(formatSelected=3,price3,price4)))
V SoldPrice=if(mod(simStep,15)=0,0,if(price>0,price,previous(soldPrice,0)))
P SoldPrice.label="成交價"
P BIN_selected.label="你設定的直接購買 BIN"
P BestOffer.label="此次賣方出價"
P myReward.label="當期獲利"
P acc_Reward.label="累計獲利"
V secondP=if(formatSelected>2,if(mod(SIMSTEP,15)previous(price),previous(price),previous(secondP))),price)
V winner0=if(mod(SIMSTEP,15)=0,0,if(max(f_bid1,f_bid2)1 & formatSelected=1,if(price3>=BIN_Selected,1,0),0)
V End2=if(mod(simStep,15)>2 & formatSelected=2,if(OR(price3>=BIN_selected,BestOfferAccept=1),1,previous(End2,0)),if(mod(simStep,15)=0 & formatSelected=2, BestofferAccept,0))
V End3=0
V End4 = if(mod(simStep,15)>1 & formatSelected=4 & price>=BIN_selected,1,0)
V Listfee = 0
V Comissionfee=0
V myCost=0
V myReward =if(OR(formatSelected=3,formatselected = 4 & price2,mod(simStep,15)=0),previous(BIN_selected,0),NA))
D BestOfferAccept=if(mod(simStep,15)>1 & formatSelected=2 & End2=0,{0,1},NA)
P BestOfferAccept.desc = {"拒絕","接受"}
P BestOfferAccept.label="接受此出價嗎?"
T Table 1 =if(formatSelected =1, {"soldPrice","BIN_selected","BestOffer","myReward","acc_Reward"},{"soldPrice","Price","BIN_selected","BestOffer","BestOfferAccept","bidHistory","myReward","acc_Reward"})
T Table 1.color = {"#CCCCCC", "#FFFFFF"}
T Table 1.Label = "Table 1. 拍賣紀錄"
M TextInformation =if(OR(End1=1,End2=1),"eBay.End.htm",if(formatselected=1, "eBay.format1.htm",if(formatselected=2,"eBay.format2.htm",if(formatselected=3,"eBay.format3.htm","eBay.format4.htm"))))
M TextInformation.Label = "拍賣主頁"