Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field: An Experiment in Public Transportations

==noted by yinung==
讀過一些經濟實驗學者主張, 在實驗中不能欺騙受試者的這種說法。然而, 虛者實、實則虛, 為了讓受試者的行為無異於真實世界, 有時卻得要「因地制宜」
Date: 2016
By: Zhixin Dai (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)
Fabio Galeotti (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)
Marie Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1605&r=net
We conduct an artefactual field experiment using a diversified sample of passengers of public transportations to study attitudes towards dishonesty. We find that the diversity of behavior in terms of dis/honesty in laboratory tasks and in the field correlate. Moreover, individuals who have just been fined in the field behave more honestly in the lab than the other fare-dodgers, except when context is introduced. Overall, we show that simple tests of dishonesty in the lab can predict moral firmness in life, although frauders who care about social image cheat less when behavior can be verified ex post by the experimenter.
Keywords: Dishonesty, fare-dodging, field experiment, external validity, public transportations
JEL: B41 C91 C93 K42
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Same Place, Same Knowledge – Same People? The Geography of Non-Patent Citations in Dutch Polymer Patents

Date: 2015
By: Dominik Heinisch (University of Kassel)
Önder Nomaler (Eindhoven University of Technology)
Guido Buenstorf (University of Kassel)
Koen Frenken (Utrecht University)
Harry Lintsen (Eindhoven University of Technology)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201527&r=net
It has long been argued that geographic co-location supports knowledge spillovers. More recently, this argument has been challenged by showing that knowledge spillovers mainly flow through social networks, which may or may not be localized at various geographic scales. We further scrutinize the conjecture of geographically bounded knowledge spillovers by focusing on knowledge flows between academia and industry. Looking into citations to non-patent literature (NPL) in 2,385 Dutch polymer patents, we find that citation lags are shorter on average if Dutch rather than foreign NPLs are cited. However, when excluding individual and organizational self-citations, geographically proximate NPLs no longer diffuse faster than foreign NPLs. This suggests that knowledge is not “in the air” but transferred by mobile individuals and/or direct university-industry collaboration. Our findings moreover suggest an important role of international conferences in the diffusion of recent scientific knowledge.
Keywords: Non-patent literature, citation lags, knowledge spillovers, university-industry interaction, polymer industry
JEL: O33 R10 L65

Should dark PoolS be banned from regulated exchangeS?

Date: 2016-01-12
By: Nathalie Oriol (GREDEG – Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion – CNRS – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique – UNS – Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)
Alexandra Rufini (GREDEG – Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion – CNRS – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique – UNS – Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)
Dominique Torre (GREDEG – Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion – CNRS – Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique – UNS – Université Nice Sophia Antipolis)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01254447&r=net
European financial markets experiment a strong competition between historical players and new trading platforms, including the controversial dark pools. Our theoretical setting analyzes the interaction between heterogeneous investors and trading services providers in presence of market externalities. We compare different forms of organization of the market, each in presence of an off-exchange and an incumbent facing a two-sided activity (issuers and investors): a consolidated exchange with the incum- bent only, and fragmented exchanges with several platforms, including lit and dark pools, in competition for order ows. By capturing investors from off-exchange, dark trading may enhance market externalities and market stakeholders’ welfare.
Keywords: Microstructure, dark pools , Over-The-Counter market, liquidity, market externalities, two-sided markets

Bank networks from text: interrelations, centrality and determinants

==noted by yinung=

使用路透社新聞資料庫 Reuters online news archive

Date: 2016-01
By: Rönnqvist, Samuel
Sarlin, Peter
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20161876&r=net
In the wake of the still ongoing global financial crisis, bank interdependencies have come into focus in trying to assess linkages among banks and systemic risk. To date, such analysis has largely been based on numerical data. By contrast, this study attempts to gain further insight into bank interconnections by tapping into financial discourse. We present a text-to-network process, which has its basis in co-occurrences of bank names and can be analyzed quantitatively and visualized. To quantify bank importance, we propose an information centrality measure to rank and assess trends of bank centrality in discussion. For qualitative assessment of bank networks, we put forward a visual, interactive interface for better illustrating network structures. We illustrate the text-based approach on European Large and Complex Banking Groups (LCBGs) during the ongoing financial crisis by quantifying bank interrelations and centrality from discussion in 3M news articles, spanning 2007Q1 to 2014Q3. JEL Classification: E
Keywords: bank networks, information centrality, systemic risk, text analysis

Can a single theory explain coordination? An experiment on alternative modes of reasoning and the conditions under which they are used

Date: 2016-01-18
By: Marco Faillo (University of Trento)
Alessandra Smerilli (PFSE-Auxilium)
Robert Sugden (University of East Anglia)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:16-01&r=net
We investigate experimentally the conditions under which bounded best response and collective optimality reasoning are used in coordination games. Using level-k and team reasoning theories as exemplars, we study games with three pure-strategy equilibria, two of which are mutually isomorphic. The third is always team-optimal, but whether it is predicted by level-k theory differs across games. We find that collective optimality reasoning is facilitated if the collectively optimal equilibrium gives more equal payoffs than the others, and is inhibited if that equlibrium is Pareto-dominated by the others, considered separately. We suggest that coordination cannot be explained by a single theory.
Keywords: team reasoning, level-k theory, coordination games
JEL: C7 C9