| Date: | 2014-10-18 |
| By: | Attila Ambrus (Duke University) Emilio Calvano (CSEF, Università di Napoli Federico II) Markus Reisinger (Otto Beisheim School of Management) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:378&r=net |
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In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for studying competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple outlets and use it to study the effect of strategic interaction on advertising levels, and the impact of entry and mergers. We show that novel forces come into play, which reflect the outlets’ incentives to control the composition of the customer base in addition to its size. We link consumer preferences and advertising technologies to market outcomes. The model can explain a number of empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile with existing models.
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| Keywords: | Media Competition, Two-Sided Markets, Multi-Homing, Viewer Composition, Viewer, Preference Correlation |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L82 M37 |
Monthly Archives: 十一月 2014
The Economics of Internet Media
| Date: | 2014 |
| By: | Peitz, Martin Reisinger, Markus |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:37116&r=net |
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We survey the economics literature on media as it applies to the Internet. The Internet is an important driver behind media convergence and connects information and communication technologies. While new Internet media share some properties with traditional media, several novel features have appeared: On the content side, aggregation by third parties that have no editorial policy and user-generated content have become increasingly important. On the advertiser side, fine-tuned tailoring and targeting of ads based on individual user characteristics are common features on many Internet media and social networks. On the user side, we observe increased possibilities of time-shifting, multi-homing, and active search. These changes have gone hand-in-hand with new players entering media markets, including search engines and Internet service providers. Some of these players face novel strategic considerations, such as how to present search results. In response to these changes, an emerging economics literature focuses on the allocative and welfare implications of this new media landscape. This paper is an attempt to organize these contributions and provide a selective account of novel economic mechanisms that shape market outcomes of Internet media. A large body of work has focused on the advertising part of the industry, while some studies also look at content provision and the interaction between the two.
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| Keywords: | Internet , media economics , digital media , targeting , news aggregation , search advertising , display advertising , two-sided markets |
| JEL: | L82 L86 M37 L13 D21 D22 |
Whom are you talking with? An experiment on credibility and communication structure
| Date: | 2014-10 |
| By: | Gilles Grandjean Marco Mantovani Ana Mauleon Vincent Vannetelbosch |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:285&r=net |
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The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication – i.e. who is talking with whom – on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. According to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pairs of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Nevertheless, at the individual level, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible.
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| Keywords: | cheap talk, coordination, coalitions, experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D03 D83 |
Open Access vs. Restricted Access with Two Variable Factors: On the Redistributive Effects of a Property Regime Change
| Date: | 2014 |
| By: | Ronan Congar Louis Hotte |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-51&r=net |
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We consider the factor payment effects of a transition from open access to restricted access in the resource sector in the long-run, i.e., when both labor and capital are mobile between sectors. We show that the transition benefits (harms) the factor that is initially used more (less) intensively in the manufacturing sector relative to the resource sector. Our analysis introduces a dual approach used to compare equilibria between property regime types.
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| Keywords: | Property Rights, Natural Resources, Mobile Capital, Factor Payments, Income Distribution, Dual Approach. |
| JEL: | D02 D23 D33 K11 Q2 N5 O13 |
An Experimental Study of Persuasion Bias and Social Influence in Networks
==Noted by yinung==
這篇和我之前的想法有點像, 不同處在於, 我是以小團體 (例如委員會) 中的資訊發表 (或擴散) 模式來探討, 並以多數決、一致決、不同意見發表能見度機率…來建構實驗; 這篇則是以連結數為主的設計 (比較適合一般網路世界)。
突然產生一個研究想法, 若 one of the committee members 想要增加他自已的影響力, 他才有過度發表 (宣傳) 他的意見的動機; 故在實驗設計中:
1. 每個 agent 有自已的 private signals (各有準確的機率), 或某些人還有 public reputation (比自己的 private signal 準確率高/低)
2. 每個 agent 動機都是為 group 好 / 加入 agent 自已的 utility, 認同他的人愈多, 則 utility 愈大)
3. 這個特別的 agent 可能是經理, 主席, 社團領袖, 只是普通的組員 (強調不同決策形成模式)
經理: 獨裁但負全責
主席: 多數決, 責任分擔
社團領袖: 共識決, , 責任分擔
普通組員: 非意見領袖
| Date: | 2014-10 |
| By: | Jordi Brandts (Institutd’AnalisiEconomica(CSIC)) Ayça Ebru Giritligil (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies) Roberto A. Weber (Department of Economics, University of Zurich) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:beb:wpbels:201403&r=net |
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In many areas of social life individuals receive information about a particular issue of interest from multiple sources. When these sources are connected through a network then proper aggregation of this information by an individual involves taking into account the structure of this network. The inability to aggregate properly may lead to various types of distortions. In our experiment a number of agents all want to find out the value of a particular parameter unknown to all. Agents receive private signals about the parameter and agents can communicate their estimates of the parameter repeatedly through a network, the structure of which is known by all players. We present results from experiments with four different networks. We find that the information of agents who have more outgoing links in a network gets more weight in the information aggregation of the other agents than it optimally should. Our results are consistent with the model of “persuasion bias” of De Marzo et al. (2003) and at odds with an alternative heuristic according to which the most influential agents are those with more incoming links.
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Medical Insurance and Free Choice of Physician Shape Patient Overtreatment. A Laboratory Experiment
==Noted by yinung==
終於看到有健康與醫療的實驗研究了
| Date: | 2014-09-30 |
| By: | Steffen Huck (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)) Gabriele Lünser (University College London – Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE)) Florian Spitzer (Department of Economics, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE), University of Vienna) Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1419&r=net |
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In a laboratory experiment designed to capture key aspects of the interaction between physicians and patients in a stylized way, we study the effects of medical insurance and competition in the guise of free choice of physician. Medical treatment is an example of a credence good: only the physician (but not the patient) knows the appropriate treatment, and even after consulting, the patient is not sure whether he got proper treatment or got an unnecessary treatment, i.e. was overtreated. We find that with insurance, moral hazard looms on both sides of the market: patients consult more often and physicians overtreat more often than in the baseline condition. Competition decreases overtreatment compared to the baseline and patients therefore consult more often. When the two institutions are combined, competition is found to partially offset the adverse effects of insurance: most patients seek treatment, but overtreatment is moderated.
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| Keywords: | Credence good, Patient, Physician, Overtreatment, Competition, Insurance, Moral hazard |
| JEL: | C91 I11 I13 |
Car License Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence
| Date: | 2014-09-02 |
| By: | Lijia Tan (The Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics and MOE Key Laboratory in Econometrics, Xiamen University) Lijia Wei (School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fee:wpaper:1401&r=net |
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In Singapore and many Chinese cities, tens of thousands of people participate in car license auctions each month. In a car license auction, many car licenses are sold but each participant can only bid for one license. We examine the theoretical properties of three auction formats: Shanghai auction, Guangzhou auction, and Singapore auction. Our main results are that (1) No equilibrium of the Shanghai auction can guarantee an efficient allocation, (2) the Singapore auction allocates objects efficiently if and only if a unique market clearing price does not exist, and (3) the Guangzhou auction is efficient if bidders are symmetric. The experimental evidence confirms our theoretical prediction. Our experiment also shows that the learning effects over time are quite different among these auction formats.
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| Keywords: | Auction; Car License; Laboratory Experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D02 D04 D44 |
Sequential selling and information dissemination in the presence of network effects
| Date: | 2014-10 |
| By: | Junjie Zhou (School of International Business Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 777 Guoding Road, Shanghai, 200433, China) Ying-Ju Chen (School of Business and Management & School of Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1404&r=net |
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In this paper, we examine how a seller sells a product/service with a positive consumption externality, and customers are uncertain about the product’s/service’s value. Because early adopters learn this value, we consider the customers’ intrinsic signaling incentives and positive feedback effects. Anticipating this, the seller commits to provide price discounts to the followers, and charges the leader a high price. Thus, the profit-maximizing pricing features the cream skimming strategy. We also show that the lack of seller’s commitment is detrimental to the social welfare; nonetheless, the sequential selling still boosts up the seller’s profit. Embedding a physical network with arbitrary payoff externality among customers, we investigate the optimal targeting strategy in the presence of information asymmetry. We provide precise indices for this leader selection problem. For undirected graphs, we should simply choose the player with the highest degree, irrespective of the seller’s commitment power. Going beyond this family of networks, in general the seller’s commitment power affects the optimal targeting strategy.
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| Keywords: | revenue management; signaling; information transmission; social networks; |
| JEL: | D82 L14 L15 |
行為 & 經濟實驗文獻注 (備忘) by 楊奕農 