End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach

Reinhard and Selten (1986) “End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames: A Learning Theory Approach." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Volume 7, Issue 1, March 1986, Pages 47–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1. systemsci.org 提供的 [PDF];


A learning theory is proposed which models the influence of experience on end behavior in finite Prisoner’s Dilemma supergames. The theory is compared with experimental results. In the experiment 35 subjects participated in 25 Prisoner’s Dilemma supergames of ten periods each against anonymous opponents, changing from supergame to supergame. The typical behavior of experienced subjects involves cooperation until shortly before the end of the supergame. The theory explains shifts in the intended deviation period. On the basis of parameter estimates for each subject derived from the first 20 supergames, successful predictions could be obtained for the last five supergames.



Are N+1 heads better than one? The case of mutual fund managers*

Prather, L.J., Middleton, K.L., 2002. Are N+1 heads better than one? The case of mutual fund managers. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 47, 103–120. DOI.


Recent studies find that mutual funds exhibit differential and persistent performance which is frequently attributed to superior managerial decision making. We extend the literature by examining the impact of the fund’s management structure on performance outcomes. Specifically, we examine directly whether superior outcomes, in terms of risk-adjusted returns, may be explained by behavioral decision making theory that asserts that teams make better decisions than individuals. Empirical results are consistent with the classical decision making theory and the efficient market hypothesis.

Does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis

Thomas Langer, Martin Weber, (2008),Does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 810–819. LINK TO JEBO

Notes by yinung

這篇將投資期間長/短 , 和資訊迴饋頻率 (frequent/infrequent) 兩種因素進行交叉實驗, 實驗結果和 Bellemare et al. (2005) 的並不十分一致; Bellemare et al. (2005) 主要實驗設計在於資訊迴饋頻率 frequent/infrequent, 其 treatment 有三種:

H: 投資期間1期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
M: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
L: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每3期

Bellemare et al. (2005) 實驗結果是: 投資額度 L~M>H

本文有 3 個主要結論:

  • 定期定額 (binding decisions, 連續3期) 可降低短視現象 (myopic, 對風險資產投資比例較高), 且這個現象不會隨著時間增長而改變
First, binding decisions cause people to be less myopic, perhaps because they must think through the implications of a longer time horizon.
  • 提供較低頻率報酬結果迴饋資訊, 有助於降低短視現象, 即隨著時間增長, 可使持有/投資風險資產比例升高
Second, providing less frequent feedback seems to help people learn over time that it is better to go with the risky prospect (i.e. to be less myopic).
  • 定期定額和資訊迴饋頻率之間似乎有複雜的混合效果 (mixed treatment effects):
    • 最強效果 (應該指的是投資風險資產比例最高) 出現在 “定期定額和高資訊迴饋頻率"
    • 「定期定額和資訊迴饋頻率」 下之投資風險資產比例 > 「定期定額和資訊迴饋頻率」 下之投資風險資產比例
Third, there is no simple main effect from combining commitment and feedback, but an interaction between these two variables.

It seems that if people are committed to their decisions, more frequent feedback is helpful because over time it becomes more salient that occasional losses are outweighed by ultimate gains.


只要資訊頻率降低, 即可讓投資風險資產意願提高…
Our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion.
In this paper, we argue that the relation between myopia and the attractiveness of a lottery sequence is less general than previously suggested in the literature.
主要 hypotheses


Hypothesis 3

. For all treatments, the proportion of wealth α(t) invested in the risky asset increases over time.


實驗結果 (圖、表)

image image image image image image


Empirical research has demonstrated that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer period of commitment decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest in a risky asset. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and commitment to analyze how each individual variable contributes to the change in myopia and how they interact. We find that the period of commitment exerts a substantial impact and the feedback frequency a far less pronounced impact. There is a strong interaction between both variables. The results have significant implications for real world intertemporal decision making.


Theory and experiment: What are the questions?

Theory and experiment: What are the questions?

  • Vernon L. SmithCorresponding author contact information, E-mail the corresponding author
  • ESI at Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, United States


This paper deals generally with testing questions that arise both when experimental observations are in accord with the actions we predict, and when they are not. In both cases the inference of truth from observation is inherently ambiguous, and we face the daunting challenge of using our experimental skills and imagination to reduce this ambiguity. Primarily and most difficult of all we have to constantly reevaluate everything, including ourselves, especially in examining how we talk about and interpret our data. Although I will be drawing on examples and experience from laboratory experiments, the issues I consider apply just as meaningfully to other empirical studies whether from field experiments or observations from past records of socioeconomic processes.

JEL classification

  • B41;
  • C92


  • Experimental economics;
  • Game theory;
  • Methodology of science

Theory and experiment: What are the questions? 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.008 : Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | ScienceDirect.com.