Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. “Incentives and prosocial behavior." American economic review 96.5 (2006): 1652-1678. [PDF] princeton.edu
What is, therefore, the broader set of motives that shape people’s social conduct, and how do these motives interact with each other and the economic environment?
Smith, Vernon L. “Theory and experiment: What are the questions?." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 73.1 (2010): 3-15. [PDF];[my notes]
Smith 提到了 OPM (other person’s money) 問題，可以用以下的方式解決
We could give the constant positive sum ultimatum game economic content as follows: Each player provides $M of his own money. Some procedure is used for pairing the subjects, and determining who is to be Player 1 and who Player 2; this procedure in some variations might incorporate an earned and/or investment feature. It is understood that their pairing has economic significance in the sense that there are synergistic gains from the interaction equal to some fixed sum y > 2M. The experimenter provides only the surplus above 2M which represents the gains from specialization and exchange, as this is the one reliable source of a “free lunch” that converts economic systems into non-zero sum games. Hence, the total to be shared under the property right rules of the game is 2M + y, making it feasible for each to receive a share of the jointly created net gain above their pooled initial contribution, 2M.
Wu, Yujia; Gao, Li; Wan, Yan; Wang, Fang; Xu, Sihua; Yang, Zijing; Rao, Hengyi; Pan, Yu (2018). Effects of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making in the Ultimatum Game. Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal
(3), 499-516. (DOI: https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.6966
As little is yet known about the influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on fairness consideration in decision making, we examined whether a proposer’s facial trustworthiness and gender would influence a responder’s willingness to accept the proposer’s monetary offer. Participants in our study were 79 Chinese undergraduate students (responders) who played the Ultimatum Game with 4 proposers (2 male and 2 female) with different facial trustworthiness. As predicted, responders were more willing to accept offers from trustworthy-looking proposers. We found that facial trustworthiness was a more salient cue when proposers were men than when they were women and, furthermore, that the students’ emotional response to faces was correlated with their fairness consideration. Considering the implicit influence of facial trustworthiness and gender on decision making, potentially there are broader implications of our findings for certain business activities, such as negotiation and bargaining.
==notes by yinung==
又出現有關 group decision 的研究:
* 專家意見的影響 (在人數多的委員會不佳)
This paper shows theoretically and experimentally that hearing expert opinions can be a double-edged sword for collective decision making. We present a majoritarian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not only private information, but also expert information that is more accurate than private information and observed by all members. In theory, there are Bayesian Nash equilibria where the committee members’ voting strategy incorporates both types of information and access to expert information enhances the efficiency of the majority decision. However, there is also a class of potentially inefficient equilibria where a supermajority always follow expert information and the majority decision does not aggregate private information. In the laboratory, the majority decisions and the subjects’ voting behaviour were largely consistent with those in the class of inefficient equilibria. We found a large efficiency loss due to the presence of expert information especially when the committee size was large. We suggest that it may be desirable for expert information to be revealed only to a subset of committee members.
||committee decision making, voting experiment, expert information, strategic voting
||C92 D72 D82
==noted by yinung==
分組, 在圈形的網路 topoloty 中, 隨機選兩組進行貿易, 但 transport 經過各組 node 時要付費
- S. Choi, A. Galeotti, S. Goyal.Trading in networks: theory and experiments, -Cambridge-INET Working Paper, 2014
M. Kosfeld. Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey, Institute for Empirical Research
in Economics, University of Zurich, 2015.
||Paul Johnson (Department of Economics and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage)
Qiujie Zheng (Department of Economics and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage)
This paper describes a classroom experiment that demonstrates coordination and competition between traders in a network. Students test theoretical predictions concerning the emergence of equilibrium and the division of surplus between buyers and sellers. The experiment is appropriate for use in teaching intermediate microeconomics, industrial organization, transportation economics and game theory.
||Experimental Economics, Classroom Experiment, Trading in Networks
||A22 B21 C92