Does Experience Affect Fairness and Reciprocity in Lab Experiments?

Does Experience Affect Fairness and Reciprocity in Lab Experiments?

Date:	2016-07
By:	Tiziana Medda (University of Cagliari) Vittorio Pelligra (University of Cagliari) Tommaso Reggiani (LUMSA University)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsa:wpaper:wpc09&r=net
	One of the most common criticisms about the external validity of lab experiments in economics concerns the representativeness of participants usually considered in these studies. The ever-increasing number of experiments and the prevalent location of research centers in university campuses produced a peculiar category of subjects: Students with high level of laboratory experience built through repeated participations in experimental sessions. We investigate whether the experience accumulated in this way biases subjects’ behaviour in a set of simple games widely used to study social preferences (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma Game). Our main finding shows that subjects with a high level of experience in lab experiments do not behave in a significantly different way from novices.
Keywords:	Experimental Methodology, External Validity, Experience, Lab Experiment
JEL:	D03 D83 C91 C92

Giving and sorting among friends: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment

Giving and sorting among friends: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment

Date:	2013
By:	Binzel, Christine Fehr, Dietmar
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2013207&r=net
	Among residents of an informal housing area in Cairo, we examine how dictator giving varies by the social distance between subjects – friend versus stranger – and by the anonymity of the dictator. While giving to strangers is high under anonymity, we find – consistent with Leider et al. (2009) – that (i) a decrease in social distance increases giving, (ii) giving to a stranger and to a friend is positively correlated, and (iii) more altruistic dictators increase their giving less under non-anonymity than less altruistic dictators. However, friends are not alike in their altruistic preferences, suggesting that an individual’s intrinsic preferences may not necessarily be shaped by his (or her) peers. Instead, reciprocal motives seem important, indicating that social relationships may be valued differently when individuals are financially dependent on them. —
Keywords:	giving,reciprocity,social distance,networks, sorting
JEL:	C93 D64 L14 O12

Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Date:	2013-03
By:	Hitoshi Matsushima (The University of Tokyo) Tomomi Tanaka (Economic Development & Global Education, LLC) Tomohisa Toyama (Kogakuin University)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf309&r=net
	We examine repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and random termination where the termination probability is low. We run laboratory experiments and show subjects retaliate more severely when monitoring is more accurate. This experimental result contradicts the prediction of standard game theory. Instead of assuming full rationality and pure self-interest, we introduce naivete and social preferences, i.e., reciprocal concerns, and develop a model that is consistent with, and uniquely predicts, the observed behavior in the experiments. Our behavioral model suggests there is a trade-off between naivete and reciprocity. When people are concerned about reciprocity, they tend to make fewer random choices.

Equity and Efficiency in Multi-Worker Firms: Insights from Experimental Economics

Equity and Efficiency in Multi-Worker Firms: Insights from Experimental Economics

Date:	2011-05
By:	Abeler, Johannes (University of Nottingham) Altmann, Steffen (IZA) Goerg, Sebastian (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) Kube, Sebastian (University of Bonn) Wibral, Matthias (University of Bonn)
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5727&r=net
	In this paper, we discuss recent evidence from economic experiments that study the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such work environments: individual pay-for-performance schemes maximize efficiency but might lead to inequitable outcomes. We present findings from laboratory experiments that show under which circumstances partially incomplete contracts can create equitable work environments while at the same time reaching surprisingly efficient outcomes.
Keywords:	incentives, wage setting, equity, gift exchange, reciprocity, incomplete contracts, organizational economics, laboratory experiments
JEL:	J33

New Zealand Economic Papers: Special Issue: Economic Psychology and Experimental Economics

New Zealand Economic Papers: Special Issue: Economic Psychology and Experimental Economics, 2011, Volume 45, Issue 1 & 2, 1-207.

Introduction

Psychology and economics: An introduction to the special issue
Simon Kemp; Gabrielle Wall
Pages 1 – 4
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Research articles

From anecdotes to novels: Reflective inputs for behavioural economics
Peter E. Earl
Pages 5 – 22
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Aspiration formation and satisficing in search with(out) competition
Werner Güth; Torsten Weiland
Pages 23 – 45
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Are conditional cooperators willing to forgo efficiency gains? Evidence from a public goods experiment
M. Vittoria Levati; Matteo Ploner; Stefan Traub
Pages 47 – 57
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Who makes the pie bigger? An experimental study on co-opetition
Juan A. Lacomba; Francisco Lagos; Tibor Neugebauer
Pages 59 – 68
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An experimental examination of the effect of potential revelation of identity on satisfying obligations
Lucy F. Ackert; Bryan K. Church; Shawn Davis
Pages 69 – 80
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Gender differences in trust and reciprocity in repeated gift exchange games
Ananish Chaudhuri; Erwann Sbai
Pages 81 – 95
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Do separation rules matter? An experimental study of commitment
Filip Vesely; Vivian Lei; Scott Drewianka
Pages 97 – 117
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Overcapitalization and cost escalation in housing renovation
Ti-Ching Peng
Pages 119 – 138
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Over-indebtedness and the interplay of factual and mental money management: An interview study
Bernadette Kamleitner; Bianca Hornung; Erich Kirchler
Pages 139 – 160
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Coherence and bidirectional reasoning in complex and risky decision-making tasks
C. Gustav Lundberg
Pages 161 – 181
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Outwit, outplay, outcast? Sex discrimination in voting behaviour in the reality television show Survivor
Gabrielle Wall
Pages 183 – 193
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Ambiguity, the certainty illusion, and the natural frequency approach to reasoning with inverse probabilities
John Fountain; Philip Gunby
Pages 195 – 207
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