Communication and coordination: Experimental evidence from farmer groups in Senegal:

Date: 2015
By: Aflahagah, Fo Kodjo Dzinyefa
Bernard, Tanguy
Viceisza, Angelino
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1450&r=net
Coordination failures are at the heart of development traps. Although communication can reduce such failures, to date experimental evidence has primarily been lab based. This paper studies the impact of communication in stag hunt coordination games played by members of Senegalese farmer groups—a setting where collective commercialization has suffered from coordination failure, as in many rural contexts. We find that communication increases coordination only in larger experimental groups, where it matters most from the standpoint of poverty traps. We also find that these effects are driven by communication’s impact on perceptions of strategic uncertainty. Some policy implications are discussed.
Keywords: coordination, communication, cooperatives, field experimentation, development, strategic uncertainty,
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Playing the game the others want to play : Keynes’ beauty contest revisited

Date: 2015
By: Camille Cornand (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France)
Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira (BETA-Strasbourg University, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire – 67085 Strasbourg Cedex, France; Catolica Lisbon School of Business and Economics)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1501&r=net
In Keynes’ beauty contest, agents have to choose actions in accordance with an expected fundamental value and with the conventional value expected to be set by the market. In doing so, agents respond to a fundamental and to a coordination motive respectively, the prevalence of either motive being set exogenously. Our contribution is to consider whether agents favor the fundamental or the coordination motive as the result of a strategic choice that generates a strong strategic complementarity of agents’ actions. We show that the coordination motive tends to prevail over the fundamental one, which yields a disconnection of activity away from the fundamental. A valuation game and a competition game are provided as illustrations of this general framework.
Keywords: beauty contest, financial markets, indeterminacy, oligopolistic competition,strategic complementarities
JEL: D43 D84 E12 E44 L13

Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Date: 2015
By: Tjaša Bjedov (Université de Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France; University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland)
Thierry Madiès (University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland)
Marie Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1507&r=net
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate.
Keywords: Coordination, communication, turn taking, conflict, experiment
JEL: C91 D74 L15 H71

Whom are you talking with ? An experiment on credibility and communication structure

Date: 2014-11-05
By: GRANDJEAN, Gilles (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles)
MANTOVANI, Marco (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles; DEMS, University of Milan – Bicocca)
MAULEON, Ana (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles; Universit√© catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium)
VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent (CEREC, Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2014042&r=net
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication Рi.e. who is talking with whom Рon the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. According to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pair of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Nevertheless, at the individual level, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible.

Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

Date: 2015-03
By: Bjedov, Tjaša (University of Fribourg)
Madies, Thierry (University of Fribourg)
Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8953&r=net
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate.
Keywords: coordination, communication, turn taking, conflict, experiment
JEL: C91 D74 L15 H71

An experimental online matching pennies game

Date: 2015
By: Aurora García-Gallego (University Jaume I, LEE & Department of Economics)
Penelope Hernández-Rojas (University of Valencia, ERI-CES & Department of Economics Analysis)
Amalia Rodrigo-González (University of Valencia, Department of Corporate Finance)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2015/03&r=net
The theoretical communication model by Gossner et al. (2006) (GHN henceforth) based on the matching pennies game has recently been implemented by García-Gallego et al. (2013) (GHR henceforth) in the lab, emphasizing the transmission of information among players with aligned incentives. The present work contributes to characterize the optimal structure of the equilibrium strategies or the set up under consideration. Also, we establish the length of the sequence of the experimental game for which the players’ optimal strategy is the majority rule, considering a minimal length of 3. Finally, we aim at testing the model by GHN (2006). Experimental findings give! support to the theoretical results in GHN (2006).
Keywords: experiments, coordination, cheap-talk, efficiency
JEL: D8 C91 C73

Whom are you talking with? An experiment on credibility and communication structure

Date: 2014-10
By: Gilles Grandjean
Marco Mantovani
Ana Mauleon
Vincent Vannetelbosch
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:285&r=net
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication – i.e. who is talking with whom – on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. According to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pairs of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Nevertheless, at the individual level, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible.
Keywords: cheap talk, coordination, coalitions, experiment
JEL: C72 C91 D03 D83

The Impact of Information Provision on Agglomeration Bonus Performance: An Experimental Study on Local Networks

Date: 2013
By: Banerjee, Simanti
de Vries, Frans P.
Hanley, Nick
van Soest, Daan
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:570&r=net
The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is a mechanism to induce adjacent landowners to spatially coordinate their land use for the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland. This paper uses laboratory experiments to explore the performance of the AB in achieving the socially optimal land management configuration in a local network environment where the information available to subjects varies. The AB poses a coordination problem between two Nash equilibria: a Pareto dominant and a risk dominant equilibrium. The experiments indicate that if subjects are informed about both their direct and indirect neighbors’ actions, they are more likely to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium relative to the case where subjects have information about their direct neighbors’ action only. However, the extra information can only delay – and not prevent – the transition to the socially inferior risk dominant Nash equilibrium. In the long run, the AB mechanism may only be partially effective in enhancing delivery of ecosystem services on farming landscapes featuring local networks.
Keywords: Agglomeration bonus, agri-environment schemes, biodiversity conservation, ecosystem services, information spillovers, Payments for Ecosystem Services, spatial coordination,

An Experimental Study on the Effect of Ambiguity in a Coordination Game

An Experimental Study on the Effect of Ambiguity in a Coordination Game
Date: 2014
By: David Kelsey (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)
Sara le Roux (Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exe:wpaper:1410&r=net
We report an experimental test of the influence of ambiguity on behaviour in a coordination game. We study the behaviour of subjects in the presence of ambiguity and attempt to determine whether they prefer to choose an ambiguity safe option. We fi?nd that this strategy, which is not played in either Nash equilibrium or iterated dominance equilibrium, is indeed chosen quite frequently. This provides evidence that ambiguity aversion infl?uences behaviour in games. While the behaviour of the Row Player is consistent with randomising between her strategies, the Column Player shows a marked preference for avoiding ambiguity and choosing his ambiguity-safe strategy.
Keywords: Ambiguity; Choquet expected utility; coordination game; Ellsberg urn, experimental economics.
JEL: C72 C91 D03 D81