| Date: | 2015 |
| By: | Dominik Heinisch (University of Kassel) Önder Nomaler (Eindhoven University of Technology) Guido Buenstorf (University of Kassel) Koen Frenken (Utrecht University) Harry Lintsen (Eindhoven University of Technology) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201527&r=net |
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It has long been argued that geographic co-location supports knowledge spillovers. More recently, this argument has been challenged by showing that knowledge spillovers mainly flow through social networks, which may or may not be localized at various geographic scales. We further scrutinize the conjecture of geographically bounded knowledge spillovers by focusing on knowledge flows between academia and industry. Looking into citations to non-patent literature (NPL) in 2,385 Dutch polymer patents, we find that citation lags are shorter on average if Dutch rather than foreign NPLs are cited. However, when excluding individual and organizational self-citations, geographically proximate NPLs no longer diffuse faster than foreign NPLs. This suggests that knowledge is not “in the air” but transferred by mobile individuals and/or direct university-industry collaboration. Our findings moreover suggest an important role of international conferences in the diffusion of recent scientific knowledge.
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| Keywords: | Non-patent literature, citation lags, knowledge spillovers, university-industry interaction, polymer industry |
| JEL: | O33 R10 L65 |
Category Patent
Intellectual Property and Innovation in Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
| Date: | 2015-11 |
| By: | Stefano Comino (University of Udine) Fabio Maria Manenti (University of Padua) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc97541&r=net |
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The aim of this study is to provide a structured review of the role of IPR in fostering innovation and economic growth in the European ICT sector. Typically IPR analysis of industries focuses on patents. In practice, however, IPR strategies are developed combining the use of different IP rights. The scope of analysis considers this and looks at the joint use of patents, trademarks and industrial designs, each protecting a different type of knowledge-based asset. Based on these characteristics, the focus of the research is to provide an overview of the mechanisms typically employed in order to appropriate the returns from R&D investments. For each formal IPR, we briefly review the main contributions to the economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the rationale for its existence and the effects it generates on firms’ behaviour and market outcomes. We then highlight the most important emerging issues. In the final section of the study, we focus on the software industry.
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| Keywords: | Patents, copyright, trademarks, information and communication technologies, patent thickets, open source, software, mobile applications |
| JEL: | L11 L24 L96 O25 O31 O32 O34 O38 O52 |
Network Form and Performance. The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising
==notes by yinung==
以前的實證文獻多指向 MUF 優於 SUF (single-unit franchising).
兩種 MUF 授權方式 (franchising): 區域 & 循序
Two types of multi-unit franchising are distinguished: area development franchising and sequential multi-unit franchising (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, 2005)
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Area development franchising is based on a contract that allows a franchisee to run several outlets at a certaintime in a specified geographical area. It is often associated with a territorial exclusivity right.
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Sequential multi-unit franchising refers to a contract that transfers to the franchisee the right to open a new unit in addition to the existing one.
| Date: | 2015-03-09 |
| By: | Muriel Fadairo (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS – UCBL – Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 – UL2 – Université Lumière – Lyon 2 – Université Jean Monnet – Saint-Etienne – PRES Université de Lyon – ENS Lyon – École normale supérieure – Lyon) Cintya Lanchimba (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne – Groupe d’analyse et de théorie économique – CNRS – UCBL – Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 – UL2 – Université Lumière – Lyon 2 – Université Jean Monnet – Saint-Etienne – PRES Université de Lyon – ENS Lyon – École normale supérieure – Lyon) Josef Windsperger (University of Vienna [Vienna]) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01128075&r=net |
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(定義) Multi-unit franchising (MUF) is a governance form inside franchising networks where the franchisor transfers to the franchisees the right to own and operate more than one outlet. While previous empirical literature has revealed various advantages of MUF as compared to single-unit franchising (SUF), we study the impact of this governance form on the network performance, taking into account different contexts. Our results from propensity score matching show that MUF leads to higher performance. However, non-parametric estimations highlight thresholds suggesting that a mix of SUF and MUF is a more efficient governance form than a pure MUF network.
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A Short Survey of Network Economics
Shy, Oz. “A short survey of network economics." Review of Industrial Organization 38.2 (2011): 119-149.
Abstract
This article surveys a variety of topics that are related to network economics. Topics covered include: consumer demand under network effects, compatibility decisions and standardization, technology advances in network industries, two-sided markets, information networks and intellectual property, and social influence.
Keywords
Survey Network economics Network industries Network effects Network externalities
JEL Classification
D4 L1 L8 Z1
Experimental evidence on the effects of innovation contests
| Date: | 2015 |
| By: | Brueggemann, Julia Meub, Lukas |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:251&r=net |
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Economic research on innovation has long discussed which policy instruments best foster innovativeness in individuals and organizations. One of the instruments easily accessible to policy-makers is innovation contests; however, there is ambiguous empirical evidence concerning how such contests should be designed. Our experimental study provides evidence by analyzing the effects of two different innovation contests on subjects´ innovativeness: a prize for the aggregate innovativeness and a prize for the best innovation. We implement a creative real effort task simulating a sequential innovation process, whereby subjects determine royalty fees for their created products, which also serve as a measure of cooperation. We find that both contest conditions reduce the willingness to cooperate between subjects compared to a benchmark condition without an innovation contest. However, the total innovation activity is not influenced by introducing innovation contest schemes. From a policy perspective, the implementation of state-subsidized innovation contests in addition to the existing intellectual property rights system should be questioned.
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| Keywords: | innovation prizes,competition,laboratory experiment,real effort task,creativity,innovation policy |
| JEL: | C91 D89 O31 |
Open Access vs. Restricted Access with Two Variable Factors: On the Redistributive Effects of a Property Regime Change
| Date: | 2014 |
| By: | Ronan Congar Louis Hotte |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-51&r=net |
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We consider the factor payment effects of a transition from open access to restricted access in the resource sector in the long-run, i.e., when both labor and capital are mobile between sectors. We show that the transition benefits (harms) the factor that is initially used more (less) intensively in the manufacturing sector relative to the resource sector. Our analysis introduces a dual approach used to compare equilibria between property regime types.
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| Keywords: | Property Rights, Natural Resources, Mobile Capital, Factor Payments, Income Distribution, Dual Approach. |
| JEL: | D02 D23 D33 K11 Q2 N5 O13 |
Patent Licensing Networks
| Date: | 2014-09 |
| By: | Doh-Shin Jeon (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR) Yassine Lefouili (Toulouse School of Economics) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1416&r=net |
| This paper investigates the patent licensing networks formed by competing firms. Assuming that licensing agreements can involve the payment of fixed fees only and that firms compete à la Cournot, we show that the complete network is always bilaterally efficient and that the monopoly network is bilaterally efficient if the patents are complementary enough. In the case of independent patents, we fully characterize the bilaterally efficient networks and find that when the cost reduction resulting from getting access to a competitor’s technology is large enough, the complete network is the only bilaterally efficient one. We also show that the bilaterally efficient networks can be sustained as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria with symmetric payoffs. This implies that the Pareto-dominance criterion selects the network that maximizes industry profits when more than one bilaterally efficient network exists. | |
| Keywords: | Licensing; Networks; Antitrust and Intellectual Property |
| JEL: | L12 L13 L41 |
Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes
Watanabe, N., & Muto, S. (2008). Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes. International journal of game theory, 37(4), 505-523. [working paper 版]
JEL Classification Numbers: C71; D45; D43
Keywords: licensing, coalition structure, bargaining set, core
==noted by yi-nung==
有簡要的 patent licensing problem 的文獻回顧：
Patent licensing problems in oligopolistic markets had been studied only by non-cooperative mechanisms; upfront fee or royalty in Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986), and auction in Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986). After these seminal papers, the main concern of researchers was focused on the optimal licensing mechanism that maximizes the licensor’s revenue from a patented technology (See, e.g., Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992), Muto (1993), Sen (2005) and Sen and Tauman (2007)). On the other hand, licensing agreements are basically contract terms signed by licensors and licensees as negotiation results. This paper hence seeks into the original and practical viewpoint and studies patent licensing as bargaining outcomes.
On this agenda, Tauman and Watanabe (2007, hereafter TW) recently provided the licensor’s payoff in the non-cooperative auction game with an interpretation from a cooperative viewpoint. Their analysis was, however, limited to the asymptotic equivalence. In practice, however, each industry has a finite number of firms operating there. For such a finite industry, Driessen, Muto and Nakayama (1992, hereafter DMN) studied a cooperative game on information trading which is similar to patent licensing。
How to License Intangible Property
Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro. “How to license intangible property." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 101.3 (1986): 567-589. sfu.ca 提供的 [PDF]
Abstract
We examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors. We consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture. We show that (1) demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit-maximizing licensing strategy; (2) the seller’s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive; (3) the seller’s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low; (4) larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation, and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs; and (5) a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation.
On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
Schmitz, Patrick W. “On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information." Journal of Economic Theory 106.1 (2002): 177-189.uni-muenchen.de 提供的 [PDF]
Abstract
Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms’ benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes serve fewer, but never more buyers when there is private information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L12, D45, D82
Keywords
- licenses;
- innovation;
- monopoly;
- private information
行為 & 經濟實驗文獻注 (備忘) by 楊奕農 