運用行為科學研究顧客體驗

哈佛管理評論(中文版), 2003/07/31出版

作者:理查德.蔡斯(Richard B. Chase), 蘇利蘭.達蘇(Sriram Dasu)讓服務更完美的祕訣 運用行為科學研究顧客體驗

see also

服務管理這個題目,好像該說的已經被人說過了。…但是,業者並沒有仔細考慮到提供服務時的基本心理,…

行為科學提供新的視野,可以提升服務管理。… 行為科學研究的發現,轉化成五個操作原則。

  • 第一,結束時要有力:結束比開始更重要,因為留給顧客回憶的是結束時。
  • 第二,讓不好的經驗早結束早好:在一連串事件中,大家喜歡先苦後甘。
  • 第三,愉快的事情分段享受,痛苦的事情一次解決:因為任何事情如果予以分割,感覺比較長久,因此最好整合無聊或是不愉快的程序步驟,一次就解決掉。
  • 第四,讓顧客自己選擇,才能全心投入:一般人認為,能夠對整個過程,尤其是不愉快的過程有所控制,就會比較愉快。
  • 第五,提供一套奉行的儀式:大多數設計服務的人不了解,人們有多喜歡固守儀式

連續效應

人回想一段經驗時,並不會記得每個片段。對於少數顯著有意義的時刻,我們記憶鮮明,…

持續效應

人是如何注意到時間的推移,以及如何估計時間持續的長短?…(1) 專心做一件事情,不會注意到經過多久。… (2) 專心注意時間長短的話,就會高估時間。(3) …將時間分割得愈細,就會覺得時間愈長久。.

… 主宰人對時間估算的因素,似乎是這個經驗是否愉快以及安排的程序

合理化效應

人們總是希望事情要有意義,如果意外事件沒有適當的解釋,就會憑空杜撰一個。行為科學家稱之為「反事實的想法」(counterfactual thinking),不過叫做「第二種猜想」(second-guessing)比較容易理解。(YNY: 應該和「找藉口」的習慣類似)。…人們需要的是解釋,必要時會自己憑空杜撰
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Myopic Loss Aversion under Ambiguity and Gender Effects

Date: 2013-07
By: Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe Kortajarene (Universidad de Alicante)
Giovanni Ponti (Universidad de Alicante)
Josefa Tomás (Universidad de Alicante)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2013-05&r=net
Experimental evidence suggests that the frequency with which individuals get feedback information on their investments has an effect on risk-taking behavior. In particular, when they are given information sufficiently often, they take fewer risks compared with a situation in which they are informed less frequently. In this paper we find that this result still holds when subjects do not know the probabilities of the lotteries they are betting upon. We also detect significant gender effects, in that the frequency with which information is disclosed mostly affects men’s betting behavior, rather than women’s, and that men are much more risk-seeking after experiencing a loss.
Keywords: Myopic loss aversion, evaluation periods, ambiguity, gender effects
JEL: C91

Myopic loss aversion: Information feedback vs. investment flexibility

Charles Bellemare, Michaela Krausee, Sabine Krfgerf,Chendi Zhang (2005) “Myopic loss aversion: Information feedback vs. investment flexibility“. Economics Letters, vol., 87, pp.319 – 324. *****

==notes by yinung==

主要結論:

只要資訊頻率降低, 即可讓投資風險資產意願提高.

主要實驗設計:

在於資訊迴饋頻率 frequent/infrequent, 其 treatment 有三種:

H: 投資期間1期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
M: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每1期
L: 投資期間3期, 資訊迴饋頻率每3期

Bellemare et al. (2005) 實驗結果是: 投資額度 L~M>H

Results

  • We confirm the works by Gneezy and Potters (1997) and others building on it, and furthermore find that experimentally induced myopia in combination with loss aversion remained to affect investment behavior systematically even when flexibility in adjusting investment was no longer varied. MLA is driven by information feedback.

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Abstract

We experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexibility on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse investor. Our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion.

Causes, Consequences, and Cures of Myopic Loss Aversion – An Experimental Investigation*

Fellner, G., & Sutter, M. (2009). Causes, Consequences, and Cures of Myopic Loss Aversion–An Experimental Investigation*. The Economic Journal, 119(537), 900-916. (Volume 119, Issue 537, ) DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02251.x; uibk.ac.at 提供的2008年版 [PDF]; hu-berlin.de 提供的 2005年版[PDF]; ***

==notes by yinung==

這篇有讓 subject 內生決定 H1 或 H3
(投資1期/3期)

==主要實驗結果圖表==

實驗基本設定

image

符號意義:

H1/3: investment 1/3 period
F1: Feedback, 1 period

 

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第1期決定以後不能更能 H1/3

No-profit: 沒有給 profit 資訊
Profit:有給「告訴 subject, 選 3期, 其平均 profit 較高 」資訊

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內生決定 feedback: F1/3, 但每期都可投資

Profit: 和前述相同

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第1期被指定 H1/3; 第3期開始可以自訂(每3期一次), 轉換成本 40ECU (約報酬的 2.6%)

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==original abstract==

We use an experiment to examine the causes, consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA) for investment behaviour under risk. We find that both investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally to the effects of MLA. Longer investment horizons and less frequent feedback lead to higher investments. However, when given the choice, subjects prefer on average shorter investment horizons and more frequent feedback. Exploiting the status quo bias by setting a long investment horizon or low feedback frequency as a default turns out to be a successful behavioural intervention to increase investment levels.

Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 263-291. uoregon.edu 提供的 [PDF]

==notes by yinung==
近數十年來, 影響最大的文章之一, 修正了期望效用理論的一些不合理的部份。
本文大量使用機率組合之選擇,以實驗 (問受試者) 的選擇,來解釋 EU 的不合理。
==original Abstract==
This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low probabilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling.

No myopic loss aversion in adolescents? – An experimental note

Date: 2013-03
By: Daniela Glätzle-Rützler
Matthias Sutter
Achim Zeileis
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2013-07&r=net
Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been found to play a persistent role for investment behavior under risk. We study whether MLA is already present during adolescence. Quite surprisingly, we find no evidence of MLA in a sample of 755 adolescents. This finding is at odds with previous findings, and it might be explained by self-selection effects. In other dimensions, however, we are able to replicate stylized findings in our pool of adolescents, such that teams invest higher amounts than individuals and that women invest less than men.
Keywords: myopic loss aversion, experiment, adolescents, team-decision making
JEL: C91

Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis

MICHAEL S. HAIGH and JOHN A. LIST (2005) “Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis." Journal of Finance, Volume 60, Issue 1, pages 523–534, February 2005. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00737.x; iastate.edu 提供的 [PDF];

ABSTRACT

Two behavioral concepts, loss aversion and mental accounting, have been combined to provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle. Recent experimental evidence supports the theory, as students’ behavior has been found to be consistent with myopic loss aversion (MLA). Yet, much like certain anomalies in the realm of riskless decision-making, these behavioral tendencies may be attenuated among professionals. Using traders recruited from the CBOT, we do indeed find behavioral differences between professionals and students, but rather than discovering that the anomaly is muted, we find that traders exhibit behavior consistent with MLA to a greater extent than students.

Do financial advisors exhibit myopic loss aversion?*

Kristoffer W. Eriksen, and Ola Kvaløy (2010) “Do financial advisors exhibit myopic loss aversion?."  Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, June 2010, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 159-170.

==original Abstract==

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been proposed as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, and a number of experiments on students indicate that people do exhibit MLA. However, many people do not rely on their own judgment when making investment decisions, but obtain help from financial investment advisors on how to allocate their wealth. The preferences and choices of financial advisors are thus important for understanding investment behavior. In this paper we make use of 50 professional financial advisors to examine whether they exhibit behavior consistent with MLA. Indeed, we find that they behave consistently with MLA to a larger extent than students.

==selected references==

  1. Bellemare, C., Krause, M., Kröger, S., Zhang, C.: Myopic loss aversion, information dissemination, and the equity premium puzzle. Econ. Lett. 87, 319–324 (2005) CrossRef
  2. Benartzi, S., Thaler, R.: Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. Q. J. Econ. 110, 73–92 (1995) CrossRef
  3. Canner, N., Mankiew, N.G., Weil, D.N.: An asset allocation puzzle. Am. Econ. Rev. 87, 181–191 (1997)
  4. Capon, N., Fitzsimons, G., Prince, R.: An individual level analysis of the mutual fund investment decision. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 10, 59–82 (1996) CrossRef
  5. De Giorgi, E., Hens, T.: Making prospect theory fit for finance. Financ. Mark. Portf. Manag. 20, 339–360 (2006) CrossRef
  6. Fellner, G., Sutter, M.: Causes, consequences and cures of myopic loss aversion—An experimental investigation. Econ. J. 119, 900–916 (2009) CrossRef
  7. Feng, L., Seasholes, M.S.: Do investor sophistication and trading experience eliminate behavioral biases in financial markets? Rev. Finance 9, 305–351 (2005) CrossRef
  8. Gneezy, U., Potters, J.: An experiment on risk taking and evaluation rounds. Q. J. Econ. 102, 631–645 (1997)
  9. Gneezy, U., Kapteyn, A., Potters, J.: Evaluation rounds and asset prices in a market experiment. J. Finance 58, 821–837 (2003) CrossRefHaigh, M.S., List, J.A.: Do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis. J. Finance 60, 523–534 (2005) CrossRef
  10. Harrison, G.W., Rutström, E.E.: Risk aversion in the laboratory. Res. Exp. Econ. 12, 41–196 (2008) CrossRef
  11. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A.: Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 263–291 (1979) CrossRef
  12. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A.: Choices, values and frames. Am. Psychol. 39, 341–350 (1984) CrossRef
  13. Langer, T., Weber, M.: Does binding of feedback influence myopic loss aversion? An experimental analysis. CEPR Discussion Paper 4084, London (2003)
  14. List, J.A.: Does market experience eliminate market anomalies? Q. J. Econ. 118, 41–71 (2003) CrossRef
  15. Mehra, R., Prescott, E.: The equity premium: A puzzle. J. Monet. Econ. 15, 145–161 (1985) CrossRef
  16. Rabin, M.: Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem. Econometrica 68, 1281–1292 (2000) CrossRef
  17. Siebenmorgen, N., Weber, M.: A behavioral model for asset allocation. Financ. Mark. Portf. Manag. 17, 15–42 (2003) CrossRef
  18. Siegel, J.J., Thaler, R.: Anomalies: The equity premium puzzle. J. Econ. Perspect. 11, 191–200 (1997)
  19. Sutter, M.: Are teams prone to myopic loss aversion? An experimental study on individual versus team investment behavior. Econ. Lett. 97, 128–132 (2007) CrossRef
  20. Thaler, R.: Mental accounting and consumer choice. Mark. Sci. 4, 199–214 (1985) CrossRef
  21. Thaler, R., Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., Schwartz, A.: The effect of myopia and loss aversion on risk taking: An experimental test. Q. J. Econ. 102, 647–661 (1997)
  22. Tversky, A., Kahneman, D.: Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertain. 5, 297–323 (1992) CrossRef

Are teams prone to myopic loss aversion? An experimental study on individual versus team investment behavior*

Matthias Sutter (2007) “Are teams prone to myopic loss aversion? An experimental study on individual versus team investment behavior."Economics Letters, Volume 97, Issue 2, November 2007, Pages 128–132. DOI; ***

==notes by yinung==

此文之實驗研究細節,可參考 Team decision making under risk and myopic loss aversion 一文, or see 2005-Sutter-team decision-working paper

==original abstract==

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been found to have a persistent influence on individual decision making under risk. In this paper I show that team decision making attenuates MLA, but that teams are also prone to MLA

Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle

Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler  (1995) “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 73-92. ; doi: 10.2307/2118511 ;nyu.edu 提供的 [PDF]

==notes by yinung==

Prospect theory, myopic loss aversion (MLA) 和 equity premium puzzle 的重要文獻

==original Abstract==

The equity premium puzzle refers to the empirical fact that stocks have outperformed bonds over the last century by a surprisingly large margin. We offer a new explanation based on two behavioral concepts. First, investors are assumed to be “loss averse,” meaning that they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, even long-term investors are assumed to evaluate their portfolios frequently. We dub this combination “myopic loss aversion.” Using simulations, we find that the size of the equity premium is consistent with the previously estimated parameters of prospect theory if investors evaluate their portfolios annually.