Economic research on innovation has long discussed which policy instruments best foster innovativeness in individuals and organizations. One of the instruments easily accessible to policy-makers is innovation contests; however, there is ambiguous empirical evidence concerning how such contests should be designed. Our experimental study provides evidence by analyzing the effects of two different innovation contests on subjects´ innovativeness: a prize for the aggregate innovativeness and a prize for the best innovation. We implement a creative real effort task simulating a sequential innovation process, whereby subjects determine royalty fees for their created products, which also serve as a measure of cooperation. We find that both contest conditions reduce the willingness to cooperate between subjects compared to a benchmark condition without an innovation contest. However, the total innovation activity is not influenced by introducing innovation contest schemes. From a policy perspective, the implementation of state-subsidized innovation contests in addition to the existing intellectual property rights system should be questioned.
|Keywords:||innovation prizes,competition,laboratory experiment,real effort task,creativity,innovation policy|
|JEL:||C91 D89 O31|
|By:||A. Stefano Caria
We run an artefactual field experiment in rural India which tests whether farmers can create efficient networks in a repeated link formation game, and whether group categorization results in homophily and loss of network efficiency. We find that the efficiency of the networks formed in the experiment is significantly lower than the efficiency which could be achieved under selfish, rational play. Many individual decisions are consistent with selfish rationality and with a concern for overall welfare, but the tendency to link with the ‘most popular’ farmer in the network causes large efficiency losses. When information about group membership is disclosed, social networks become more homophilous, but not significantly less efficient. Networks play an important role in the diffusion of innovations in developing countries. If they are inefficiently structured, there is scope for development policies that support diffusion.
Innovation is widely recognized as being an important strategic tool for companies to increase their competitive advantage. Hereby, networks have become increasingly important as external sources for the necessary knowledge, ideas and financial resources. The main contribution of this paper is to shed light on how different network partners can explain or facilitate the different types of innovations in the agricultural sector. In contrast to other studies, we make a distinction between all four types of innovation: product, process, marketing and organizational innovation. Thus, this study has the objective to gain insight into the innovation process of farmers in terms of how they innovate, which network partners they consult in relation to innovation type, the obstacles they face, and where the network activities could be better aligned with the needs of the farmers, which could help to enable them to optimally support innovation and networking. The study is based on 36 in-depth interviews with farmers spread over five subsectors in Flanders (northern Belgium). Our most important findings are that the consulted partners and the observed barriers are different dependent on the innovation type. Hence, our study delivers a set of valuable insights and implications for farmers, network coordinators and policymakers. Farmers must be aware of the importance of partner suitability and network heterogeneity for the innovation type they are aiming at. Furthermore, farmers have to be aware of the fact that efficient networking is not the optimisation of single relationships independently of each other, but instead the management of synergies and coordination of all relationships in an efficient way. In addition, network coordinators should set up a clear strategy and communicate for which innovations their network can advise and help the farmer. These first conclusions should be further proven and supported by future research in order to draw general conclusions for the agricultural sector. As the sample of our study is limited to 36 respondents spread over five subsectors, it is necessary to conduct a quantitative study to achieve a representable sample and to include more subsectors. In addition, the study is limited to the Flemish region and literature in other countries about this subject is scarce. Hence, other researchers are encouraged to investigate if the results of Flanders can be supported by other regions in Europe and the world.
|Keywords:||Farmers, network, innovation, Flanders, qualitative research, Agribusiness,|
We examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors. We consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture. We show that (1) demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit-maximizing licensing strategy; (2) the seller’s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive; (3) the seller’s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low; (4) larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation, and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs; and (5) a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation.
Schmitz, Patrick W. “On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information." Journal of Economic Theory 106.1 (2002): 177-189.uni-muenchen.de 提供的 [PDF]
Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms’ benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes serve fewer, but never more buyers when there is private information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L12, D45, D82
- private information