弗農·史密斯 (Vernon L. Smith)

Vernon L. Smith (弗農·史密斯)

引自:維基百科

弗農·洛馬克斯·史密斯Vernon Lomax Smith,1927年1月1日-,加利福尼亞查普曼大學法學院和商學院教授喬治·梅森大學多學科研究中心經濟學研究學者、莫卡托斯中心成員、亞利桑那大學教授、查普曼大學 (Chapman University) 教授。

他是2002年諾貝爾經濟學獎獲得者,獲獎原因是「開創了一系列實驗法,為通過實驗室實驗進行可靠的經濟學研究確定了標準」。大學在加州理工學院主修電子物理,於1952獲堪薩斯大學經濟學碩士,1955年得哈佛大學經濟博士。

Vernon Lomax Smith (born January 1, 1927) is professor of economics at Chapman University’s Argyros School of Business and Economics and School of Law in Orange, California, a research scholar at George Mason University Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, and a Fellow of the Mercatus Center, all in Arlington, Virginia. Smith shared the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Daniel Kahneman. He is the founder and president of the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington D.C.. In 2004 Smith was honored with an honorary doctoral degree[1] at Universidad Francisco Marroquín, the institution that named the Vernon Smith Center for Experimental Economics Research after him.[2]

諾貝爾得獎講稿: Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics (PDF)

廣告

Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?

Einer Elhauge (2008) “Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?" Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4 (3): 535-570. doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhn027; link to CLER. download PDF.

==notes by yinung==

see also Shapiro (2010).

這篇亦有提到 patent 類似分餅 ultimatum game 遊戲

==original Abstract==

Some recent literature has concluded that patent remedies result in systematically excessive royalties because of holdup and stacking problems. This article shows that this literature is mistaken. The royalty rates predicted by the holdup models are often (plausibly most of the time) below the true optimal rate. Further, those predicted royalty rates are overstated because of incorrect assumptions about constant demand, one-shot bargaining, and informational symmetry. Although this literature concludes that overcompensation problems are exacerbated by doctrines measuring damages using past negotiated royalties, in fact such doctrines exacerbate undercompensation problems. Undercompensation problems are further increased to the extent that juries cannot measure damages with perfect accuracy, a problem that persists even if damages are just as likely to be overestimated as underestimated. Nor do the royalty rates predicted by the holdup model apply if there is competition in the downstream product market or upstream market for inventions. Royalty stacking does not lead to royalties that exceed the optimal rate, contrary to this literature, but in fact tends to produce royalties that are at or below the optimal rate.

Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties

Carl Shapiro (2010) “Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties."American Law and Economics Review, Volume 12, Issue 2,  Pp. 509-557. doi: 10.1093/aler/ahq014 ; link to ALER.

==original Abstract==

A simple model is developed to study royalty negotiations between a patent holder and a downstream firm whose product is more valuable if it includes a feature covered by the patent. The downstream firm must make specific investments to develop, design, and sell its product before patent validity and infringement will be determined. The hold-up component of the negotiated royalties is greatest for weak patents covering a minor feature of a product with a high margin between price and marginal cost. For weak patents, the hold-up component of negotiated royalties remains unchanged even if negotiations take place before the downstream firm designs its product. The analysis has implications for the use of injunctions in patent infringement cases.

==References==

Binmore, Ken, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton. 1989. “An Outside Option Experiment,” 104(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 4753–70. link to PDF.

Elhauge, Einer. 2008. “Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?” 4(3) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 3535–70.

Farrell, Joseph, and Carl Shapiro. 2008. “How Strong Are Weak Patents?” 98(4) The American Economic Review 41347–69. Available at: DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1347. 128.32.105.3 [PDF]

Federal Trade Commission. 2003. To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance Between Competition and Patent Law and Policy. October, Available at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.

Gallini, Nancy. 2002. “The Economics of Patents: Lessons From Recent U.S. Patent Reform,” 16(2) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 2131–54.

Hall, Bronwyn, and Rose Marie Ziedonis. 2001. “The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995,” 32 The Rand Journal of Economics 101–28.

Heller, Michael, and Rebecca Eisenberg. 1998. “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-Commons in Biomedical Research,” 280 Science 698–701.

Lemley, Mark, and Carl Shapiro. 2005. “Probabilistic Patents,” 19(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 275–98. Available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley. edu/shapiro/patents.pdf.

Lemley, Mark, and Carl Shapiro. 2007a. “Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking,” 85(7) Texas Law Review 71991–2049. Available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/stacking.pdf. (see also Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking: Reply)

Lemley, Mark, and Carl Shapiro. 2007b. “Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking: Reply,” 85(7) Texas Law Review 72163–73.

Shapiro, Carl. 2001. “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting” in Jaffe Adam Lerner Joshua and Stern Scott, eds., Innovation Policy and the Economy National Bureau of Economics. Available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.

Sidak, J. Gregory. 2008. “Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro,” 92(3) Minnesota Law Review 3714–48.

Probabilistic Patents

Lemley, Mark A., and Carl Shapiro. 2005. “Probabilistic Patents." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2): 75-98. DOI: 10.1257/0895330054048650; URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/0895330054048650

 

==Notes by yinung==

多年前就知道 Carl Shapiro 轉往研究 IP 相關之經濟議題, 不過卻到今日才略領其大意…

 

===引文===

為何稱做 “Probabilistic" patents

Virtually all property rights contain some element of uncertainty…. There are two fundamental dimensions of  uncertainty:
1) uncertainty about the commercial significance of the invention being patented, and
2) uncertainty about the validity and scope of the legal right being granted.

(p.81)…Many patent applications, and indeed patents themselves, are like lottery tickets. Inventors who are uncertain of the commercial significance…Two of the most common practices used by patentees to increase their chances of winning the patent lottery are continuations and a proliferation of closely related patents… increasing the chance that
their patents will cover technology that becomes widely adopted by market participants.

Patent 訴訟不見得不好, 因為有外部性

… because litigating patent disputes to completion tends to generate positive externalities, by clarifying the limits of patent protection if the patent is upheld or encouraging wider use of the innovation if the patent is invalidated.

為何大部份的 patent 的價值都很低, 但申請數量卻眾多?
1. 申請者不確定哪些會有價值 (Scherer, 2001; Denton and Heald, 2004)
2. 申請者不知道其價值 (Rivette and Kline, 2000)
3. 數量多有利於財務操作和增加市場評價 (Lemley, 2000; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005)
4. 當做 signaling mechanisms (Long, 2002)
5. 防禦性功能 “defensive” use of patents to deter others from suing (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Lemley, 2001)
6. 綁在 patent portfolio 中 (Parchomovsky and Wagner, 2004)

Why do inventors file for many patents that turn out to have little or no value? Surely part of the reason is that patent applicants do not know which patents will be valuable and which will be worthless (Scherer, 2001; Denton and Heald, 2004). But other explanations have been offered: a failure to understand the value of patents (Rivette and Kline, 2000); the use of patents to obtain financing and boost market valuation (Lemley, 2000; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005); the use of patents as signaling mechanisms (Long, 2002); and the “defensive” use of patents to deter others from suing (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Lemley, 2001). Even individually weak patents might have value as part of a large patent portfolio, because the portfolio can be licensed as a block or can serve to deter lawsuits (Parchomovsky and Wagner, 2004).

專利入場券 patent ticket

… “patent thicket," in which hundreds of patents can apply to a single product (Shapiro, 2001; FTC, 2003). …One way to cut through the patent thicket is for incumbents with extensive patent portfolios to enter into broad cross-licenses (that is, exchanges of roughly symmetric patent positions) to “clear” the thicket.

royalty stacking

Without such cross-licenses, the result is inefficient “royalty stacking,” in which a manufacturer without its own patent portfolio must pay royalties to a number of separate companies.

申請者比較會有個別資訊 …applicants appear to have considerable private information at an early stage about the likely value of at least some of their patents. … Allison, Lemley, Moore and Trunkey (2004) find… most significant predictors of ultimate value observable to researchers are the industry, the number of prior art references, the number of claims in the patent and the time invested in prosecution of the patent.

使專利失效 invalidating a patent 會有正外部性 (即會 under-supplied), 因此被控之廠商通常會尋求和解, 而不是興訟

… challenges to patents are undersupplied (Gilbert, 2004; Farrell and Merges, 2004)

The key insight is that invalidating a patent generates significant positive externalities, and activities that generate positive externalities are undersupplied. There are very strong reasons to believe that challenges to patents are undersupplied (Gilbert, 2004; Farrell and Merges, 2004).

==original Abstract==

Economists often assume that a patent gives its owner a well-defined legal right to exclude others from practicing the invention described in the patent. In practice, however, the rights afforded to patent holders are highly uncertain. Under patent law, a patent is no guarantee of exclusion but more precisely a legal right to try to exclude. Since only 0.1% of all patents are litigated to trial, and since nearly half of fully litigated patents are declared invalid, this distinction is critical to understanding the economic impact of patents. The growing recognition among economists and legal scholars that patents are probabilistic property rights has significant implications for our understanding of patents in four important areas: (1) reform of the system by which patents are granted; (2) the legal treatment of patents in litigation; (3) the incentives of patent holders and alleged infringers to settle their disputes through licensing or cross-licensing agreements rather than litigate them to completion; and (4) the antitrust limits on agreements between rivals that settle actual or threatened patent litigation.

 

Steven D Levitt (史帝芬‧雷維)

*引自 Wikipedia

Steven D Levitt (史帝芬‧雷維) (born May 29, 1967) is an American economist known for his work in the field of crime, in particular on the link between legalized abortion and crime rates. Winner of the 2004 John Bates Clark Medal, he is currently the William B. Ogden Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, director of the Becker Center on Chicago Price Theory at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. He was co-editor of the Journal of Political Economy published by the University of Chicago Press until December 2007. He co-authored the best-selling book Freakonomics (2005) and its sequel Superfreakonomics (2009). He is a grand-nephew of Robert L. May, the lyricist of Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer. In 2009, Levitt co-founded The Greatest Good, a business and philanthropy consulting company. He was chosen as one of Time magazine’s “100 People Who Shape Our World" in 2006.[1]

 

John List (約翰‧李斯特)

*以下引自 Wikipedia

John Emil List (約翰‧李斯特) (born September 25, 1968) is The Homer J. Livingston Professor in Economics at the University of Chicago. He received his B.S. from the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point, and his Ph.D. from the University of Wyoming in 1996. List had his first teaching position at the University of Central Florida, and he then moved to the University of Arizona and the University of Maryland, College Park, where he still holds an adjunct position, before moving to Chicago. List also spends time at Tilburg University, where he is a distinguished visiting scholar and Resources for the Future, where he is a University Distinguished Scholar. From May 2002 to July 2003 he served as Senior Economist, President’s Council of Economic Advisors for Environmental and Resource Economics, where he worked on multi-national market institutions to address climate change, the Clear Skies Act, the OMB benefit cost guidelines, and the Canada–United States softwood lumber dispute.

Within academia, List is known particularly for his innovative use of field experiments in economics, a research approach that List links to Swedish Economist Peter Bohm. For his work using field experiments, List was included as one of the Top 7 economists in the world according to a 2010 Forbes publication.[citation needed]. In 2012, List was selected to receive the Yrjo Jahnsson Lecture Series prize, given by the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation. The award, given every 2 years by the Finnish Foundation, recognized List’s achievements to society from pioneering the use of field experiments. Ten of the previous Nineteen recipients have gone on to win the Nobel Prize in economics.

List uses field experiments to offer new insights in various areas of economics research, such as education, private provision of public goods, social preferences, prospect theory, environmental economics, marketplace effects on corporate and government policy decisions, and multi-unit auctions. Some of his more recent field experimental work in the area of education was discussed in Bloomberg Magazine.[1] In the article, Nobel Laureate Gary Becker tabs List as a strong candidate for a future Nobel Prize for his work on field experiments. His work on charitable fundraising was highlighted in New York Times Magazine on March 9, 2008.,[2] where List is credited as being an early pioneer of field experiments. In a recent Crain’s Chicago Business article, List is referred to as a “rock star" in the area of philanthropy.[3] Many of these seminal studies were produced while List was a faculty member at the University of Maryland, College Park and the University of Arizona.

List has received numerous awards. In 2004, List received the 1st Place Competitive Paper Award for his field experiment titled “Informational Cascades: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Market Professionals.” The paper was picked as the top research study in 2004 within finance by the FMA, which considered hundreds of studies. List received the prestigious 2008 Arrow Senior Prize for his field experimental work in the area of testing economic theory from the BE Press. In July 2010, List was awarded the highest honor by the AAEA, the John Kenneth Galbraith prize. The award was given for recognition of List’s “breakthrough discoveries in economics and outstanding contributions to humanity through leadership, research, and service. In particular, List’s pathbreaking work using field experiments in economics." Finally, List was selected to deliver the Yrjo Jahnsson Lecture in October of 2012.

Marginal Revolution, a blog written by economist and author Tyler Cowen calls List “one of the most important young economists".[2] Greg Mankiw also tabs List as a top mind on his blog.[citation needed] The University of Chicago economist and author of Freakonomics, Steven Levitt, has referred to List as the young economist most likely to win a Nobel Prize in Economics. It has also been heavily speculated that List was the Clark medal runner-up in 2007.[3] In 2011 List was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.[4]

List’s research on behavioral economics has focused on testing theories like gift exchange, social preferences, and prospect theory. Traditional tests of these theories relied on recruiting undergraduate students to participate in experiments for a small amount of money. List instead recruited subjects in actual marketplaces to participate in experiments, sometimes unbeknownst to even the subjects.[6] List’s field experiments have found that gift exchange is not as powerful a motivator of labor effort as earlier research found,[7] that social preferences are not as pronounced as prior research found,[8] and that the divergence between Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept often called the endowment effect, predicted by prospect theory, disappears with market experience.[9]

List’s recent work in behavioral economics has found that framing can induce increased worker productivity.,[10] and has been picked up by several corporations around the world.

born September 25, 1968) is The Homer J. Livingston Professor in Economics at the University of Chicago. He received his B.S. from the University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point, and his Ph.D. from the University of Wyoming in 1996. List had his first teaching position at the University of Central Florida, and he then moved to the University of Arizona and the University of Maryland, College Park, where he still holds an adjunct position, before moving to Chicago. List also spends time at Tilburg University, where he is a distinguished visiting scholar and Resources for the Future, where he is a University Distinguished Scholar. From May 2002 to July 2003 he served as Senior Economist, President’s Council of Economic Advisors for Environmental and Resource Economics, where he worked on multi-national market institutions to address climate change, the Clear Skies Act, the OMB benefit cost guidelines, and the Canada–United States softwood lumber dispute.

Within academia, List is known particularly for his innovative use of field experiments in economics, a research approach that List links to Swedish Economist Peter Bohm. For his work using field experiments, List was included as one of the Top 7 economists in the world according to a 2010 Forbes publication.[citation needed]. In 2012, List was selected to receive the Yrjo Jahnsson Lecture Series prize, given by the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation. The award, given every 2 years by the Finnish Foundation, recognized List’s achievements to society from pioneering the use of field experiments. Ten of the previous Nineteen recipients have gone on to win the Nobel Prize in economics.

List uses field experiments to offer new insights in various areas of economics research, such as education, private provision of public goods, social preferences, prospect theory, environmental economics, marketplace effects on corporate and government policy decisions, and multi-unit auctions. Some of his more recent field experimental work in the area of education was discussed in Bloomberg Magazine.[1] In the article, Nobel Laureate Gary Becker tabs List as a strong candidate for a future Nobel Prize for his work on field experiments. His work on charitable fundraising was highlighted in New York Times Magazine on March 9, 2008.,[2] where List is credited as being an early pioneer of field experiments. In a recent Crain’s Chicago Business article, List is referred to as a “rock star" in the area of philanthropy.[3] Many of these seminal studies were produced while List was a faculty member at the University of Maryland, College Park and the University of Arizona.

List has received numerous awards. In 2004, List received the 1st Place Competitive Paper Award for his field experiment titled “Informational Cascades: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Market Professionals.” The paper was picked as the top research study in 2004 within finance by the FMA, which considered hundreds of studies. List received the prestigious 2008 Arrow Senior Prize for his field experimental work in the area of testing economic theory from the BE Press. In July 2010, List was awarded the highest honor by the AAEA, the John Kenneth Galbraith prize. The award was given for recognition of List’s “breakthrough discoveries in economics and outstanding contributions to humanity through leadership, research, and service. In particular, List’s pathbreaking work using field experiments in economics." Finally, List was selected to deliver the Yrjo Jahnsson Lecture in October of 2012.

Marginal Revolution, a blog written by economist and author Tyler Cowen calls List “one of the most important young economists".[2] Greg Mankiw also tabs List as a top mind on his blog.[citation needed] The University of Chicago economist and author of Freakonomics, Steven Levitt, has referred to List as the young economist most likely to win a Nobel Prize in Economics. It has also been heavily speculated that List was the Clark medal runner-up in 2007.[3] In 2011 List was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.[4]

 

Colin Camerer (柯林‧康莫若)

*引自 Wikipedia

Colin F. Camerer (born December 4, 1959) is an American behavioral economist and a Robert Kirby Professor of Behavioral Finance and Economics at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech).

A former child prodigy, Camerer received a B.A. in quantitative studies from Johns Hopkins University in 1977 (at age 17), followed by an M.B.A. in finance from the University of Chicago in 1979 and a Ph.D. in behavioral decision theory from that same institution in 1981 (at age 21). Camerer worked at Kellogg, Wharton, and the University of Chicago Booth school of business before moving to Caltech in 1994.

Camerer’s research is on the interface between cognitive psychology and economics. This work seeks a better understanding of the psychological and neurobiological basis of decision-making in order to determine the validity of models of human economic behavior. His research uses mostly economics experiments– and occasionally field studies– to understand how people behave when making decisions (e.g., risky gambles for money), in games, and in markets (e.g., speculative price bubbles).

He spoke at the Econometric Society World Congress in London on August 20, 2005 and at the Nobel Centennial Symposium in 2001 on Behavioral and Experimental Economics.

He is the author of “Behavioral Game Theory" published by Princeton University Press in 2003. [PDF]

Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions

Gary Charness and Matthias Sutter (2012) “Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3): 157-76. DOI: 10.1257/jep.26.3.157; URL: AEAWeb. PDF1; PDF2

==Notes by yinung==

集體決策和個人決策之差異:

從賽局理論的角度看, 集體決策較個人決策來得理性 (rational), 因其可避免認知錯誤與限制。

不過集體決策也因此不見得會提高社會福利 (集體決策比較 self-interest)

待研究問題:

the optimal size of the group ( A useful starting point here is Forsyth’s (2006) work)

==original Abstract==

In this paper, we describe what economists have learned about differences between group and individual decision-making. This literature is still young, and in this paper, we will mostly draw on experimental work (mainly in the laboratory) that has compared individual decision-making to group decision-making, and to individual decision-making in situations with salient group membership. The bottom line emerging from economic research on group decision-making is that groups are more likely to make choices that follow standard game-theoretic predictions, while individuals are more likely to be influenced by biases, cognitive limitations, and social considerations. In this sense, groups are generally less “behavioral" than individuals. An immediate implication of this result is that individual decisions in isolation cannot necessarily be assumed to be good predictors of the decisions made by groups. More broadly, the evidence casts doubts on traditional approaches that model economic behavior as if individuals were making decisions in isolation.

==References==

  • Forsyth, Donelson R. 2006. Group Dynamics, 4th edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson Higher Education.
  • Camerer, Colin F.  2003.  Behavioural Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press.
  • Charness, Gary, Edi Karni, and Dan Levin. 2007. “Individual and Group Decision Making under Risk: An Experimental Study of Bayesian Updating and Violations of First-Order Stochastic Dominance.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 35(2): 129–48.
  • Charness, Gary, Edi Karni, and Dan Levin. 2010. “On the Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence Regarding Linda.” Games and Economic Behavior 68(2): 551–56.
  • Charness, Gary, and Dan Levin. 2005. “When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect.” American Economic Review 95(4): 1300–1309.
  • Charness, Gary, Luca Rigotti, and Aldo  Rustichini. 2007. “Individual Behavior and Group Membership.”  American Economic Review 97(4):  1340–52.
  • Chen, Yan, and Xin Li. 2009. “Group Identity and Social Preferences.” American Economic Review 99(1): 431–57.
  • Cooper, David J., and John H. Kagel. 2005. “Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games.” American Economic Review 95(3): 477–509.
  • Fahr, René, and Bernd Irlenbusch. 2011. “Who Follows the Crowd—Groups or Individuals?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 80(2): 200–209.
  • Feri, Francesco, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Matthias Sutter.  2010. “Efi  ciency  Gains  from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence.”  American Economic Review 100(4): 1892–1912.
  • Holmstrom, Bengt.  1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams.” Bell Journal of Economics 13(2): 324–40.
  • Kocher, Martin G., Sabine Strauss, and Matthias Sutter.  2006. “Individual or Team Decision-Making— Causes and Consequences of Self-Selection.” Games and Economic Behavior 56(2): 259–70.
  • Kocher, Martin G., and Matthias Sutter.  2005. “The Decision Maker Matters: Individual versus Group Behavior in Experimental Beauty-Contest Games.” Economic Journal 115(500): 200–223.
  • Kugler, Tamar, Gary Bornstein, Martin G. Kocher, and Matthias Sutter. 2007. “Trust between Individuals and Groups: Groups are Less Trusting Than Individuals But Just as Trustworthy.” Journal of Economic Psychology 28(6): 646–57.
  • Laughlin, Patrick R., Bryan L. Bonner, and Andrew G. Miner. 2002. “Groups Perform Better Than the Best Individuals on Letter-to-Numbers Problems.”  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 88(2): 606–620.
  • Levitt, Steven, and John A. List.  2007. “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2): 153–74.
  • Mas, Alexandre, and Enrico Moretti.  2009. “Peers at Work.” American Economic Review 99(1): 112–45.
  • Michaelson, Larry K., Warren E. Watson, and Robert H. Black.  1989. “A Realistic Test of Individual versus Group Consensus Decision Making.” Journal of Applied Psychology 74(5): 834–39.
  • Schopler, John, Chester A. Insko, Jennifer Wieselquist, Michael Pemberton, Betty Witcher, Rob Kozar, Chris Roddenberry, and Tim Wildschut.  2001. “When Groups Are More Competitive Than Individuals: The Domain of the Discontinuity Effect.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80(4): 632–44.
  • Sheremeta, Roman M., and Jingjing Zhang. 2010. “Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-bidding in Contests?”  Social Choice and Welfare 35(2): 175–97.
  • Song, Fei. 2008. “Trust and Reciprocity Behavior and Behavioral Forecasts: Individuals versus Group-Representatives.”  Games and Economic Behavior 62(2): 675–96.
  • Surowiecki, James. 2004. The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations. Doubleday.
  • Sutter, Matthias. 2005. “Are Four Heads Better Than Two? An Experimental Beauty-Contest Game with Teams of Different Size.”  Economics Letters 88(1): 41–46.
  • Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman.  1983. “Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.” Psychological Review 90(40): 293–315.

==cited by==

1. Ananish Chaudhuri, Tirnud Paichayontvijit, Lifeng Shen. 2012. Gender differences in trust and trustworthiness: Individuals, single sex and mixed sex groups. Journal of Economic Psychology.

 

Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results

Werner Güth, and Reinhard Tietz (1990) “Ultimatum bargaining behavior:: A survey and comparison of experimental results." Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 11, Issue 3, September 1990, Pages 417–449. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-Z. (PDF from EconPaper)

==notes by yinung==

==original Abstract==

In an ultimatum bargaining game players 1 and 2 can distribute a positive amount of money in the following way: first, player 1 determines his demand which player 2 can then either accept or induce conflict, i.e. player 2 faces the ultimatum either to accept player 1’s proposal or to have no agreement at all. Experimentally observed ultimatum bargaining decisions with amounts ranging from 0.50 to 100 German marks are statistically analysed. The demands of player 1 are compared with the acceptance behavior of player 2 with the help of consistency tests in which a subject has to decide in the position of both players. Finally, we consider ultimatum bargaining games with more than just one round where, except for the final round, nonacceptance does not cause conflict but another round of ultimatum bargaining for a smaller cake.