AJAE 農經貢獻之回顧文獻

==noted by yinung==

2010年, vol. 92, 2, AJAE 回顧了過去百年以來農經學者的貢獻, 方向含括:

生產與農場管理、農產市場、農業政策、農產貿易、農業發展、自然資源與保育、環境經濟、食品與消費經濟、鄉村發展、農企業經濟與管理、計量方法之發展。值得細閱了解。

農企業研究含食品鏈的水平和垂直參與者之協調 (agribusiness economics)、與食品鏈內的決策 (agribusiness management)

1950s 出現的研究主題:on cooperatives, farm supply markets, industrial organization, vertical integration, market power of food processing and farm supply firms,antitrust decisions, and bargaining

1960s 中: marketing structure’ of the food industry, efficiency; services to consumers; market power; regulatory activities; services such as market news;and the effects of imports; Key papers on cooperative theory and agricultural finance also appeared during the 1960s
1970-80: teaching program serving the needs of the rapidly growing nonfarm segments of the food system. Work on food system structure and performance.
===有關供應鏈===
價格傳遞機能 Wohlgenant (1989, AJAE) 或者是食品供應鏈管理和制度設計、風險移轉分擔、契約設計、體系之收入成本利潤在供應鏈成員間之分配等 ,特別供應鏈體系面臨外部需求成長及風險變動增加下的相關議題 Hendrikse and Bijman (2002, AJAE)

==AJAE 該期相關目錄如下==

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廣告

Experiments in J. Agri. Econ

 

 

Experiments in EJAE

Experimental economics in AJAE

…AAEA Meeting Invited Paper Sessions Experiments with Farmers: Risk, Ambiguity, and Discounting Digging into Background Risk: Experiments with Farmers and Students David H…economic theory, or the corresponding experiments. As argued by Ellsberg (1961), the…Full Text (HTML); Full Text (PDF)

ASSA Meeting Invited Paper Sessions – Field Experiments in Food and Resource Economics Research

…Meeting Invited Paper Sessions Field Experiments in Food and Resource Economics Research Can Field Experiments Return Agricultural Economics to the…science: more extensive use of field experiments. We view our solution as stemming from…Full Text (HTML); Full Text (PDF)

Brian E. Roe and David R. Just

Internal and External Validity in Economics Research: Tradeoffs between Experiments, Field Experiments, Natural Experiments, and Field Data

The advantage of resource queues over spot resource markets: decision coordination in experiments under resource uncertainty

Fonseca, Miguel A., Alexander Pfaff, and Daniel Osgood. “The advantage of resource queues over spot resource markets: decision coordination in experiments under resource uncertainty." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94.5 (2012): 1136-1153. [oxfordjournals.org]; [Open Access PDF]

==Notes by yinung==

本文用實驗法探討灌溉水源 (以 water queues 的形式) 的事前分配 (用 bidding) vs 事後水源拍賣,對生產決策 (種高/低水量需求作物) 之影響。以2007-08 英國 Exeter 大學學生和巴西農業區半工半讀的學生或公務員為受試者,實驗結果證明,事前的 water queues 制度,相對於事後的 spot market 分配水源的制度,有助於提昇效率。
其原因主要是在,決策者面對 environmental and strategic 兩種不確定之下, 可以利用先知道對手對環境不確定之選擇,用來當做生產決策協調之依據。
[引文] The advantage of resource queues over spot markets concerns two types of uncertainty, environmental and strategic.
(較早寫的)
此篇用經濟實驗法, 研究農民在灌溉用水不確定下之決策; 投入種子、肥料、整地的成本, 但利潤取決於不確定供水。在環境不確定 (雨量多寡) 前,先以 bidding (water queues) 決定用水優先序,可做為投入種植決策之協調機制,使得在事前 water queues 制度下, 比雨量確定後才拍賣決定水權制度更有效率。

==abstract==

Farmers have to make key decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil, before knowing how much water they will get. They face losses if they make costly decisions but do not receive water, and they may forego profits if they receive water without being prepared. We consider the coordination of farmers’ decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil when farmers must divide an uncertain water supply. We compare ex-ante queues (pre-decision) to
an ex-post spot market (post-decision & post-rain) in experiments in rural Brazil and a university in England. Queues have greater coordination success than does the spot market.

==References==

Lefebvre, M., L. Gangadharan, and S. Thoyer. 2012. “Do Security-Differentiated Water Rights Improve the Performance of Markets?” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. doi:10.1093/ajae/aas060.
本文回顧到這篇:
The most relevant experiment of which we are aware is that of Lefebvre et al. (2012), which studies profits with security-differentiated water rights (mimicking the essence of a queue) versus non-differentiated, equal share rights. The differentiated rights are seen to have profit and risk-management benefits relative to the non-differentiated rights.

Course: Barcelona LeeX Experimental Economics Summer School in Macroeconomics

Barcelona LeeX Experimental Economics Summer School in Macroeconomics in Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
June 11-15, 2012:

Introduction    Program    Lecturers     Course Lectures    Accommodation    BCN Information    How to Subscribe

More Summer Schools    Contact
 

Charles Noussair | Shyam Sunder | John Duffy | Frank Heinemann | Rosemarie Nagel

 

Charles Noussair

  • Experimental Studies on Economic Growth and   DSGE models

Understanding the mechanisms behind economic growth is a fundamental task of macroeconomics. A class of models, called growth models, has been proposed to address this challenge. This lecture will describe how experimental methods have been used to evaluate the predictions of these models. Empirical evidence from field studies supports the view that institutions can influence the rate of economic growth. This lecture will cover how the role of institutions in economic growth can be studied using experimental methods. A particular type of model, the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, has become a standard tool of policy analysis. This lecture will describe how experiments with the same structure can be constructed and used to address policy questions.

 

  • Literature:

Vivian Lei and Charles Noussair “An Experimental Test of an Optimal Growth Model", American Economic Review, Vol. 92, no 3, June 2002, pages 549-570.

C. Monica Capra, Colin Camerer, Tomomi Tanaka, Lauren Feiler, Veronica Sovero, and Charles Noussair “The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps", Economic Journal 119, 539, July 2009, pages 977 – 1009.

Charles Noussair, Damjan Pfajfar, and Janos Zsiros, “Frictions, Persistence, and Central Bank Policy in an Experimental Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Economy", Tilburg University working paper, 2011.

 

Shyam Sunder

 

  • Complexity and Abstraction: Designing Macro Experiments

Relevant real world phenomena and relevant models of interest serve as two important benchmarks in designing laboratory experiments. With their fractal structure, phenomena in field are endlessly complex. Accordingly, realism (i.e., fidelity to the field environment) and theory (i.e., fidelity to the model) place important, often conflicting, demands on design of laboratory experiments.  Do the details matter? Which ones do? How do we find out? Why do the details that “do not matter" exist in the field? If they are just matters of refinement, which refinements are and are not to be ignored in laboratory? How generalizable are the laboratory findings? How does an experimenter find his way through this maze that connects limitless complexity of the field to simple tidy models of economics to gain a better understanding of economic phenomena? We shall explore the practical problems of identifying interesting questions, and developing experimental designs to address them using some examples, notes, and some macro experiments.

Sunder, Shyam. “Determinants of Economic Interaction: Behavior or Structure." Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 1,   no. 1 (May 2006): 21-32. Text (PDF).

Sunder, Shyam. “Real Phenomena, Theory and Design of Laboratory Experiments in Economics." Notes. Text (PDF).

Lim, Suk S., Edward C. Prescott and Shyam Sunder. “Stationary Solution to the Overlapping Generations Model of Fiat Money: Experimental Evidence." Empirical Economics 19, no. 2 (1994): 255-277. Text (PDF)

Marimon, Ramon and Shyam Sunder. “Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: Experimental Evidence." Econometrica 61, no. 5 (1993): 1073-1108. Text (PDF).

Marimon, Ramon and Shyam Sunder. “Expectations and Learning Under Alternative Monetary Regimes: An Experimental Approach." Economic Theory 4 (1994), 131-162. Text (PDF)

Huber, Juergen, Martin Shubik, and Shyam Sunder. “Financing of Public Goods through Taxation in a General Equilibrium Economy: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1830, October 23, 2011.

Huber, Juergen, Martin Shubik and Shyam Sunder. “Sufficiency of an Outside Bank and a Default Penalty to Support the Value of Fiat Money: Experimental Evidence." Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1675, Revised June 12, 2011.

 

  • Experiments with Minimally Intelligent Agents and Minimal Institutions

Laboratory exploration of properties of economic institutions and policies has traditionally been done using profit motivated human traders.  Outcomes of such experiments, when compared with outcomes of identical economies populated with minimally intelligent algorithmic agents yield valuable insights. We can isolate which of the properties of the economies of interest arise from their structure, and which ones are attributable to the behavior of agents. Starting with three micro applications, we shall study three macro applications of this human-algorithm hybrid approach to experimentation.

Gode, Dhananjay K. and Shyam Sunder. “Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality." The Journal of Political Economy 101, no. 1 (February 1993): 119-137.Text (PDF).

Gode, Dhananjay and Shyam Sunder. “What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 2 (May 1997), 603-630. GSIA Reprint No. 1473.Abstract (PDF), Text (PDF).

Gode, Dhananjay K., and Shyam Sunder. “Double Auction Dynamics: Structural Effects of Non-Binding Price Controls."Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, no. 9 (July 2004): 1707-1731. Abstract(PDF), Text (PDF).

Huber, Juergen, Martin Shubik and Shyam Sunder. “Three Minimal Market Institutions: Theory and Experimental Evidence." Games and Economic Behavior 70 (2010) 403-424.

Angerer, Martin, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik and Shyam Sunder. “An Economy with Personal Currency: Theory and Experimental Evidence."Annals of Finance, Volume 6, Number 4, October 2010, pp.475-509.

Huber, Juergen, Martin Shubik and Shyam Sunder. “Default Penalty as a Selection Mechanism Among Multiple Equilibria."Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1730R, Revised February 6, 2011.

 

John Duffy

  • Overview of Macroeconomic Experiments

This lecture will expose participants to the breadth of macroeconomic topics and questions that have been explored using laboratory methods. The aim of this lecture will be to stimulate thinking about ideas for new projects that build on what has already been done. In addition, participants will be encouraged to extend laboratory methods to macroeconomic models or questions that have not been previously addressed. Methodological issues that are particularly relevant to macroeconomic experiments, e.g., implementation of discounting and infinite horizons, will also be addressed.

  • Readings:
Duffy, J. (fortcoming), “Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research" to appear in Handbook of Experimental Economics, vol. 2, edited by John Kagel and Al Roth.

Ochs, J. (1995), “Coordination Problems," in J. Kagel and A.E. Roth, (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Ricciuti, R. (2005), “Bringing Macroeconomics into the Lab," working paper, University of Siena.

Duffy, J. (1998), “Monetary Theory in the Laboratory," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 80, 9-26.

 

  • Asset Pricing: Bubbles, Crashes and Expectations

Currently, economies around the world are experiencing an economic downturn brought about by the collapse of housing and equity prices and the deleveraging of the financial institutions that underwrote those assets.  In this lecture we examine laboratory studies addressing asset pricing and the phenomenon of asset price bubbles and crashes.  An understanding of the causes of asset price bubbles and cashes is of obvious importance to both policymakers and asset market participants. While there exists experimental designs that reliably yield asset price bubbles and crashes among inexperienced subjects, there remains much more work to be done on this topic, for instance, there is a need for an experimental design in which asset price bubbles and crashes are recurrent phenomena.

Smith, Vernon, Gerry L. Suchanek and Arlington W. Williams, 1988. “Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Econometrica, 56, 1119-1151.

 Lei, Vivian, Charles N. Noussair and Charles R. Plott 2001. “Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality," Econometrica, 69, 831-859.

Dufwenberg, Martin, Tobias Lindqvist and Evan Moore, 2005. “Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment," American Economic Review, 95, 1731-1737.

Hommes, Cars.H., Joep Sonnemans, Jan Tuinstra and Henk van de Velden, 2005. “Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments," Review of Financial Studies 18, 955-980.

Ernan Haruvy, Yaron Lahav and Charles N. Noussair, 2007. “Traders’ Expectations in Asset Markets: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review 97, 1901-1920.

Crockett, Sean and John Duffy, 2009. “A General Equilibrium Approach to Asset Pricing Experiments." working paper.

 

  • Monetary Theory

Among the central questions in monetary theory are why intrinsically worthless fiat money serves as a store of value and why it is used as a medium of exchange when other assets dominate it in rate of return. Various theories have been developed to address these fundamental questions. For instance, overlapping generations models of money may explain why fiat money has value, and search-theoretic approaches can rationalize why money is used when dominated in rate of return by other competing assets. However, the frictions in these models -overlapping generations and search frictions- make them difficult to take to field data. On the other hand, a number of laboratory studies of such models have been conducted. These lectures will outline the main findings from those studies and point out promising new extensions.

 

  • Literature:

Introduction:

Duffy, J. (1998), “Monetary Theory in the Laboratory," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 80 (September/October), 9-26.

Theory:

Lucas, R.E. (1986), “Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory," Journal of Business 59,
S401-S426.

Wallace, N. (1980), “The Overlapping Generations Model of Fiat Money," in J.H. Kareken and N. Wallace, Eds., Models of Monetary Economies, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Kiyotaki, N. and R. Wright (1989), “On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy 97, 927-54

 

Experiments:

Bernasconi, M. and Kirchkamp, O. (2000), “Why Do Monetary Policies Matter? An Experimental Study of Saving and Inflation in an Overlapping Generations Model," Journal of Monetary Economics 46, 315-43.

Brown, P. (1996), “Experimental Evidence on Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 20, 583-600.

Camera, G., Noussair, C., and Tucker, S. (2003), “Rate-of-Return Dominance and Efficiency in an Experimental Economy," Economic Theory 22, 629-60.

Duffy, J. and J. Ochs (2002), “Intrinsically Worthless Objects as Media of Exchange: Experimental Evidence," International Economic Review 43, 637-73.

Duffy, J. and J. Ochs (1999), “Emergence of Money as a Medium of Exchange: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review 89, 847-77.

Lim, S. Prescott, E.C. and Sunder, S. (1994), “Stationary Solution to the Overlapping Generations Model of Fiat Money: Experimental Evidence," Empirical Economics 19, 255-77.

Marimon, R. and Sunder, S. (1994), “Expectations and Learning under Alternative Monetary Regimes: An Experimental Approach," Economic Theory 4, 131-62.

Marimon, R. and Sunder, S. (1993) “Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica 61, 1073-107.

Frank Heinemann

  • Understanding Financial Crises: The Contribution of Experimental Economics

The patterns of financial crises are remarkably predictable. Minsky (1972) has described these patterns by phases, some of which contain behavioural hypotheses that can be tested by laboratory experiments. Under which conditions can bubbles arise? When do they burst? Why do people herd and does herding destabilize financial markets? What triggers a bank run and how do people coordinate in an environment with multiple equilibria? This lecture will lay out experimental evidence containing some answers to these questions. In particular, we will look at experiments on games with strategic complementarities. How predictable are choices if the game has multiple equilibria and which theory is well-suited to give advice for individual behavior? Managing information flow is one of the major challenges for central banks and bank supervisors. The lecture explains what we can learn from experiments for managing information flow in the presence of strategic complementarities.

 

  • Literature:

Minsky, H.P. (1972), Financial Instability Revisited: the Economics of Disaster,          http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/dismech/download/59037/fininst_minsky.pdf

Brunnermeier, Markus, and John Morgan (2008), Clock Games: Theory and Experiments, Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming, http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/clock_games.pdf

Kübler, Dorothea, and Georg von Weizsäcker (2004), Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory, Review of Economic Studies 71, 425-442.

Schotter, Andrew, and Tanju Yorulmazer (2009), On the Severity of Bank Runs,  Journal of Financial Intermediation 18, 217-241.

Heinemann, Frank, Rosemarie Nagel, and Peter Ockenfels (2009), Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games, Review of Economic Studies 76, 181-221.

Cornand, C., and F. Heinemann (2010), Measuring Agents’ Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities, CESifo Working Paper 2947, http://anna.ww.tu-berlin.de/~makro/Heinemann/download/ch_3.pdf

 

  • Speculative Attacks and the Theory of Global Games – Experimental Tests of Global Game Predictions

Speculative attacks can be viewed upon as coordination games: if a sufficient number of traders (and a sufficient amount of capital) is involved in an attack, the pressure on foreign exchange markets forces the central bank to devaluate its currency. Then, all attacking traders gain from the devaluation. But, if the number of attackers is too small, the central bank can defend the peg, and attacking traders lose on transaction costs. Speculative-attack games have multiple equilibria if payoff functions are common knowledge. The theory of global embeds a coordination game in an environment with private information about parameters of the payoff function. If private information is sufficiently precise, the global game has a unique equilibrium. Hence, the theory of global games can be used for a unique prediction of the outcome of a speculative-attack game. This theory provides a number of hypotheses that can be tested in laboratory experiments. This lecture first presents some of the theoretical background and derives testable hypotheses. Then, it explains experiments that have been used for these tests and shows how they have been analyzed.

 

  • Literature:

Introduction:

Heinemann, Frank (2002), “Exchange-Rate Attack as a Coordination Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 18, 462-478.

 

Theory:

Obstfeld, Maurice (1997), “Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," Journal of International Economics, 61-77.

Carlsson, Hans and Eric van Damme (1993), “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica 61, 989-1018.

Morris, S., and H.S. Shin (1998), “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, 88, 587-597.

Heinemann, Frank (2000), “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment," American Economic Review 90, 316-318.

Hellwig, Christian (2002), “Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games," Journal of Economic Theory 107, pp. 191-222.

 

Experiments:

Heinemann, F., R. Nagel, and P. Ockenfels (2004), “The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information," Econometrica 72 (5), 2004, pp. 1583-1599.

Cornand C. (2006), “Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: An Experimental Study," Review of International Economics 14, 797-817.

 

Rosemarie Nagel

  • Methodology

This lecture introduces the methods of experimental economics. We will discuss what is an economic experiment (field vs lab experiment), the different areas in experimental economics and behavioral economics, the link between experimental economics, theory and empirical work and important design issues. This introduction is meant to give a quick introduction to those who have never followed an experimental economic course. Prior to the course we will send the partipants of the summer school some classical experiments which they can do online.

 

  • Literature:
Akerlof, G.A. (2002), “Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior, “American Economic Review," 92. 411-433.

Camerer, C. (2003), “Behavioral Game Theory," Princeton University Press

Friedman, D. and Sunder, S. (1994), Experimental Methods. Cambridge Univ. Press: Chapters 1-2: 1-20.

Roth, A.E. (1995), Introduction to Experimental Economics. In: Kagel, J.H. and Roth, A.E. (eds.): Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton Univ. Press: Princeton, N.J., Chapter 1: 3-109.

Plott, C. and Smith, V. (2003), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, North-Holland, Amsterdam.

Porter, D. and Smith, V. L.Samuelson, L. (2005), “Economic Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature 43(1): 65-107.

Smith, V.L. (2002), “Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality." Experimental Economics 5(2): 91-110.

Special issue (2005), Experiment, Theory, World: A Symposium on the Role of Experiments in Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 12(2)

 

  • Literature:
Williams, A.W. (1987), “The Formation of Price Forecasts in Experimental Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 19, 1-18.

Dwyer, Jr., G.P., A.W. Williams, R.C. Battalio and T.I. Mason (1993), “Tests of Rational Expectations in a Stark Setting," Economic Journal 103, 586-601.

Marimon, R. and S. Sunder (1993) “Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica 61, 1073-1107.

Hommes, C.H., J. Sonnemans, J. Tuinstra and H. van de Velden (2007), “Learning in Cobweb Experiments," Macroeconomic Dynamics 11 (Supplement 1), 8-33.

Camerer, C. F. (2003). Chapter 5, Dominance Solvable Games. Behavioral game theory: Experiments on strategic interaction. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Nagel Rosemarie (1995), “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study." American Economic Review 85,5, 1313-1326.

Literature on Experiments for agricultural economics

==以下來自 google scholar 搜尋之結果==

[PDF] A Partial-Adjustment, Mixed Linear Model Of Price Discovery In An Experimental Market For Fed Cattle

JG Carlberg, CE Ward – 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, …, 2001 – ageconsearch.umn.edu
Abstract The Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS) was developed by a team of researchers
at Oklahoma State University to aid in understanding the forces that influence price
discovery in the fed cattle market. Participants in the FCMS play the role of feedlot

Marketing agreement impacts in an experimental market for fed cattle

CE Ward, DS Peel, JN Trapp… – American Journal of …, 1999 – ajae.oxfordjournals.org
Abstract Marketing agreements between meatpacking and cattle feeding firms have created
concerns about their effects on fed cattle prices. Profit-sharing marketing agreements were
imposed onto a simulated fed cattle market. Price level and variability differences with and

Captive supplies and the spot market price of fed cattle: The plant‐level relationship

JR Schroeter, A Azzam – Agribusiness, 2003 – Wiley Online Library
Abstract Numerous articles in the agricultural economics literature investigate the empirical
relationship between the spot market price of fed cattle and the volume of packers’
precommitted, or “captive,” supplies of cattle. In this article, we use an extensive data set

Captive supplies and cash market prices for fed cattle: The role of delivery timing incentives

JR Schroeter, A Azzam – Agribusiness, 2004 – Wiley Online Library
Abstract The use of non-cash methods of procuring fed cattle for slaughter has led to
concern about the effect of these so-called “captive” supplies on cash market prices. Some
empirical evidence suggests that there is a negative short-run relationship between the

Experimental economics and the economics of contracts

DR Just, SY Wu – American Journal of Agricultural …, 2009 – ajae.oxfordjournals.org
This article discusses the application of experimental economics to the study of contract
theory. While contracts have become an integral part of the production and marketing of
agricultural commodities, the economic study of contracts is still an evolving field that

An experiment on experimental instructions

M Bigoni, D Dragone – 2011 – papers.ssrn.com
Abstract: In this paper we treat instructions as an experimental variable. Using a public good
game, we study how the instructions’ format affects the participants’ understanding of the
experiment, their speed of play and their experimental behavior. We show that longer

[PDF] Testing for Market Power in Beef Packing: Where Are We and What’s Next?

L Hunnicutt, Q Weninger – Research Bulletin, 1999 – naiber.com
Consolidations in the US beef packing industry have prompted concern within the
government and interest among academics over whether packers possess and are able to
exercise market power. Economists have generated numerous studies to test for and

The dynamics of coalition formation – a multilateral bargaining experiment with free timing of moves

Date: 2015-02-10
By: Tremewan, James
Vanberg, Christoph
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0582&r=net
We experimentally study behavior in a finitely repeated coalition formation game played in real time. Subjects interact in groups of three, bargaining over the distribution of payments which occur at regular time intervals. During a given interval, payments occur if and only if a majority is in agreement about their allocation. Aside from these rules, we purposefully impose little structure on the bargaining process. We investigate the frequency and stability of different types of agreements, as well as transitions between them. The most frequent agreement is an equal split between two players, leaving the third with nothing. The most stable is the three-way equal split. Transitions between agreements are frequent and generally consistent with myopic payoff maximization. We find evidence that both fairness concerns and risk aversion may explain the prevalence of the three-way equal split, and that loyalty can play a role in cementing coalitions.
Keywords: Bargaining; group choice; experiments; coalition formation

CALL FOR PAPERS: CJAE Special Issue on the Agricultural Sectors

CALL FOR PAPERS: CJAE Special Issue 2016 on Applications of Behavioural and Experimental Economics to Decision-Making in the Agricultural, Food and Resource Sectors

Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics

Special Issue 2016

Applications of Behavioural and Experimental Economics to Decision-Making in the Agricultural, Food and Resource Sectors

Call for Papers

Editors: Jill E. Hobbs University of Saskatchewan

Siân Mooney, Boise State University

Motivation: Tools and insights from behavioural and experimental economics are increasingly important to problems faced by the agricultural, food and resource management sectors. The 2016 special issue of the Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics (CJAE) will be dedicated to showcasing advances in and applications of behavioural and experimental economics as they apply to the agricultural, food and resource sectors. We are currently encouraging submissions with a strong behavioural or experimental economics grounding for consideration in this special issue. Possible topic areas include, but are not limited to:

· Food consumption decisions and health

· The influence of social media/social networks

· Attitudes toward the environment and the management of natural resources

· Decision-making at the firm (including farm) level

· Risk aversion and decision-making

· Applications to innovation, science and technology

The intent is to publish the special issue as the December 2016 (63.4) issue of the Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics.

How to Participate: Authors submitting to the special issue should note the following:

· Abstracts should be between 500-800 words

· Papers submitted will be subject to a double-blind peer review process

· Authors agree to pay normal page charges for the CJAE (currently C$75 per page)

· Authors will abide by the copyright agreement of the CJAE

· Authors will submit an original research paper that has not previously been published

· At least one author will be a member of the Canadian Agricultural Economics Society

The following deadlines will be strictly adhered to:

· March 15, 2015, abstracts due.

· April 30, 2015, authors informed of selection decision for full papers.

· September 1, 2015, first draft of papers due.

· October 31, 2015, first round of reviews due.

· February 1, 2016, revised papers due.

· April 1, 2016, second round of reviews due.

· May 31, 2016, FINAL PAPER DUE.

Abstracts should be submitted to cjae()uvic.ca by March 15, 2015 with an e-mail subject line indicating “submission for special issue 2016”.

Please contact Special Issue Editors Jill Hobbs (jill.hobbs()usask.ca) or Sîan Mooney (sianmooney()boisestate.edu) with questions.

Quality Versus Quantity in Information Transmission: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Date: 2015-01
By: Alistair Wilson
Jonathan Lafky
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:540&r=net
Information sharing has become increasingly important in helping consumers make better, more informed choices over competing products. Our project uses a novel theoretical framework and laboratory experiments to analyze three simple, commonly used incentive schemes against an unincentivized baseline. Each incentive scheme has qualitatively different theoretical predictions for behavior and efficiency, while our laboratory experiments examine the degree to which these differences manifest themselves, and the best-cast theory`s robustness to human behavior. Our findings indicate the possibility for substantial efficiency gains by introducing incentives that reward information sharing, even where those incentives drive a wedge between those sending and those receiving information.
Keywords: Ratings, Information Sharing, Dishonesty, Incentives
JEL: C71 C92 D82 D83