Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Date: 2014-10
By: Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham)
Renner, Elke (University of Nottingham)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8580&r=net
We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people’s behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs about others’ behavior. Our framework is an experimental public goods game with a leader. We find that leaders strongly shape their followers’ initial beliefs and contributions. In later rounds, followers put more weight on other followers’ past behavior than on the leader’s current action. This creates a path dependency the leader can hardly correct. We discuss the implications for understanding belief effects in naturally occurring situations.
Keywords: leadership, beliefs, experiments, public goods, path dependency, public policy, management
JEL: C72 C90 H41 Z13

Deception in Networks: A Laboratory Study

Date: 2014-04
By: Rong Rong (Department of Economics, Weber State University)
Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1046&r=net
Communication between departments within a firm may include deception. Theory suggests that telling lies in these environments may be strategically optimal if there exists a small difference in monetary incentives (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Galeotti et al, 2012). We design a laboratory experiment to investigate whether agents with different monetary incentives in a network environment behave according to theoretical predictions. We found that players’ choices are consistent with the theory. That is, most communication within an incentive group is truthful and deception often occurs between subjects from different groups. These results have important implications for intra-organizational conflict management, demonstrating that in order to minimize deceptive communication between departments the firm may need to reduce incentive differences between these groups. Length: 19
Keywords: social networks, deception, strategic information transmission, experiments
JEL: D85 D02 C92

Facts and Figuring: An Experimental Investigation of Network Structure and Performance in Information and Solution Spaces

Date: 2014-03
By: Jesse Shore (Boston University – Department of Information Systems)
Ethan Bernstein (Harvard Business School, Organizational Behavior Unit)
David Lazer (Harvard University – Harvard Kennedy School (HKS))
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:14-075&r=net
Using data from a novel laboratory experiment on complex problem solving in which we varied the network structure of 16-person organizations, we investigate how an organization’s network structure shapes performance in problem-solving tasks. Problem solving, we argue, involves both search for information and search for solutions. Our results show that the effect of network structure is opposite for these two important and complementary forms of search. Dense clustering encourages members of a network to generate more diverse information, but discourages them from generating diverse theories: in the language of March (1991), clustering promotes exploration in information space, but decreases exploration in solution space. Previous research, generally focusing on only one of those two spaces at a time, has produced inconsistent conclusions about the value of network clustering. By adopting an experimental platform on which information was measured separately from solutions, we were able to reconcile past contradictions and clarify the effects of network clustering on problem-solving performance. The finding both provides a sharper tool for structuring organizations for knowledge work and reveals the challenges inherent in manipulating network structure to enhance performance, as the communication structure that helps one antecedent of successful problem solving may harm the other.
Keywords: networks, experiments, clustering, problem solving, exploration and exploitation, knowledge, information, communication, search

Endogenous vs. Exogenous Transmission of Information: An Experiment

==notes by yinung==

此實驗研究資訊傳遞效率 (利用 matching game 為基本設計)
player2 和 player1 若選擇 (和 nature played by player 1, 隨機)一致, 則獲利 = 1;否則得 0
treatment: 有C/無NC online chat
所謂 endogenous communication:
… several type 1 players make an intentional mistake to induce a change in type 2’s behavior. Several type 2 players, by looking at type1’s actions, make some kind of guess about the future actions of nature.
Date: 2013
By: Aurora García-Gallego (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)
Penélope Hernández-Rojas (ERI-CES & Department of Economic Analysis, University of Valencia, Spain)
Amalia Rodrigo-González (Department of Business Finance, University of Valencia, Spain)
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2013/06&r=net
Based on Gossner, Hernández and Neyman’s (2006) 3-player game (hereafter GHN) we analyze communication efficiency in the lab. In that game, player 1 represents random nature an i.i.d. procedure, player 2 is a fully informed player (wiser), and player 3 is the less informed player (agent). The game is repeated and players 2 and 3 get 1 if both actions match nature’s actions and 0 otherwise. We propose an experiment following this game. We implement two treatments: one without chat (NC) and one with chat (C). In the treatment with chat, players may first send messages to each other through an online chat application, and then play the game. After the chat time, only the wiser player has perfect information on the realized (random) sequence played by nature. The players then play the finitely repeated binary game. In treatment NC, subjects just play the game. In the experiment we observed endogenous communication treatment NC as well as exogenous in treatment C, both of which result in higher payoffs. Furthermore, when explicit communication is possible we observe a chat effect which can be interpreted as a higher level of efficiency in communication. Strategies used by subjects are in line with GHN strategies.
Keywords: communication, transmission of information, efficiency, experiments